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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

INQUIRY SERIES

GOVERNMENT AND NATIONALISM  
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA



# GOVERNMENT AND NATIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

## *Part I*

### INTRODUCTION

*By*

RUPERT EMERSON

*Formerly Associate Professor of Government  
Harvard University*

## *Part II*

### THE GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

*By*

LENNOX A. MILLS

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## *Part III*

### NATIONALISM AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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*I. P. R. INQUIRY SERIES*

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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## FOREWORD

This study forms part of the documentation of an Inquiry organized by the Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East.

The three monographs which make up the present volume have been prepared by Mr. Rupert Emerson, formerly Associate Professor of Government, Harvard University and author of the standard work *Malaysia*; by Mr. Lennox A. Mills, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota and author of *British Rule in Eastern Asia* and other works on colonial administration, and by Miss Virginia Thompson, research associate of the Institute of Pacific Relations and of the *Far Eastern Survey* and author of *Thailand*, *The New Siam* and *French Indo-China*. Although the monographs were independently written, the authors have had some opportunities for reading and commenting upon one another's work. Except for minor editorial changes, however, no effort has been made to make the three essays conform to a uniform pattern of treatment or to a single point of view. The differences in method of analysis and of interpretation have been purposely retained as being useful illustrations of the complexity of a many-sided problem. The studies were originally undertaken as part of a larger series of comparative essays on the political, economic and social problems of southeast Asia and were to have constituted volumes in the International Research Series of the Institute of Pacific Relations along with related volumes on welfare and industry in southeast Asia (now in press), on foreign capital, on agriculture and settlement, on trade and material resources in southeast Asia (all to be published shortly). The present book, however, has been included by special arrangement in the Inquiry Series because of its close bearing on the position and policies of the Western Powers in the Far East, especially in connection with possible post-war readjustments.

All or parts of the three studies have been read in draft form by a number of authorities, including the following: Professor Joseph R. Hayden, Mr. John L. Christian, Dr. and Mrs. Karl J. Pelzer, Mr. Jack Shepherd and Mrs. Beatrice Bain.

Though many of the comments received have been incorporated in the final text, the above authorities do not of course accept responsibility for the study. The statements of fact or of opinion appearing herein do not represent the views of the Institute of Pacific Relations or of the Pacific Council or of any of the National Councils. Such statements are made on the sole responsibility of the author. The Japanese Council has not found it possible to participate in the Inquiry, and assumes, therefore, no responsibility either for its results or for its organization.

During 1938 the Inquiry was carried on under the general direction of

Dr. J. W. Dafoe as Chairman of the Pacific Council and in 1939 under his successor, Dr. Philip C. Jessup. Every member of the International Secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection with the Inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell and Miss Hilda Austern, who have carried the major share of this responsibility.

In the general conduct of this Inquiry into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East the Institute has benefited by the counsel of the following Advisers:

Professor H. F. Angus of the University of British Columbia

Dr. J. B. Condliffe of the University of California

M. Etienne Dennerly of the Ecole des Sciences Politiques.

These Advisers have co-operated with the Chairman and the Secretary-General in an effort to insure that the publications issued in connection with the Inquiry conform to a proper standard of sound and impartial scholarship. Each manuscript has been submitted to at least two of the Advisers and although they do not necessarily subscribe to the statements or views in this or any of the studies, they consider this study to be a useful contribution to the subject of the Inquiry.

The purpose of this Inquiry is to relate unofficial scholarship to the problems arising from the present situation in the Far East. Its purpose is to provide members of the Institute in all countries and the members of I.P.R. Conferences with an impartial and constructive analysis of the situation in the Far East with a view to indicating the major issues which must be considered in any future adjustment of international relations in that area. To this end, the analysis will include an account of the economic and political conditions which produced the situation existing in July 1937, with respect to China, to Japan and to the other foreign Powers concerned; an evaluation of developments during the war period which appear to indicate important trends in the policies and programs of all the Powers in relation to the Far Eastern situation; and finally, an estimate of the principal political, economic and social conditions which may be expected in a post-war period, the possible forms of adjustment which might be applied under these conditions, and the effects of such adjustments upon the countries concerned.

The Inquiry does not propose to "document" a specific plan for dealing with the Far Eastern situation. Its aim is to focus available information on the present crisis in forms which will be useful to those who lack either the time or the expert knowledge to study the vast amount of material now appearing or already published in a number of languages. Attention may also be drawn to a series of studies on topics bearing on the Far Eastern situation which is being prepared by the Japanese Council. That series is being undertaken entirely independently of this Inquiry, and for its organization and publication the Japanese Council alone is responsible.

The present study, "Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia," falls within the framework of the first of the four general groups of studies which it is proposed to make as follows:

I. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of the policies of Western Powers in the Far East; their

territorial and economic interests; the effects on their Far Eastern policies of internal economic and political developments; and of developments in their foreign policies vis-à-vis other parts of the world; the probable effects of the present conflict on their positions in the Far East; their changing attitudes and policies with respect to their future relations in that area.

II. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of Japanese foreign policy and possible important future developments; the extent to which Japan's policy toward China has been influenced by Japan's geographic conditions and material resources, by special features in the political and economic organization of Japan which directly or indirectly affect the formulation of her present foreign policy, by economic and political developments in China, by the external policies of other Powers affecting Japan; the principal political, economic and social factors which may be expected in a post-war Japan; possible and probable adjustments on the part of other nations which could aid in the solution of Japan's fundamental problems.

III. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of Chinese foreign policy and possible important future developments; Chinese unification and reconstruction, 1931-37, and steps leading toward the policy of united national resistance to Japan; the present degree of political cohesion and economic strength; effects of resistance and current developments on the position of foreign interests in China and changes in China's relations with foreign Powers; the principal political, economic and social factors which may be expected in a post-war China; possible and probable adjustments on the part of other nations which could aid in the solution of China's fundamental problems.

IV. Possible methods for the adjustment of specific problems, in the light of information and suggestions presented in the three studies outlined above; analysis of previous attempts at bilateral or multilateral adjustments of political and economic relations in the Pacific and causes of their success or failure; types of administrative procedures and controls already tried out and their relative effectiveness; the major issues likely to require international adjustment in a post-war period and the most hopeful methods which might be devised to meet them; necessary adjustments by the Powers concerned; the basic requirements of a practical system of international organization which could promote the security and peaceful development of the countries of the Pacific area.

EDWARD C. CARTER  
*Secretary-General*

*New York,  
January 2, 1942*





## EDITORIAL NOTE

This book was completed and in proof when Japan went to war against the United States and the British and Netherlands Empires. Despite the changes which the Japanese offensive in Southeast Asia is inevitably bringing to the political and economic systems of that area, it has seemed best to publish the book immediately without attempting to revise it for the day-to-day changes produced by the war. To make such a revision would involve indefinite delay in publication at a time when there is an urgent new need for reasonably up-to-date information on the countries of Southeast Asia.

It will be obvious to all who have studied Japan's earlier methods in Formosa, Korea, Manchuria and occupied China, that far-reaching administrative changes can be expected, especially in the upper and middle levels of government, wherever Japanese rule is established. Even in countries like Indo-China and Thailand which have not been technically "conquered" it is certain that Japanese (or trusted pro-Japanese agents) are taking key positions (nominally, perhaps, advisory but actually controlling) in both economic and political administration. Such a process had already begun under combined German and Japanese pressure in the Vichy-directed government of Indo-China, long before Japan declared war.

The Japanese offensive is producing equally important, though less predictable changes in the nationalist movements of Southeast Asia. In many areas it is clear that the attack has dramatically dissolved old animosities between nationalists and the colonial governments and produced a new sense of solidarity against the invader. This appears to be notably true of the Netherlands Indies. It is too soon to say how far Japan will be able to counteract this tendency by using former nationalist or dissident groups to establish puppet pro-Japanese regimes in the invaded areas of the Philippines, Malaya and Borneo. There is some evidence that the Japanese have already so used groups of Annamese nationalists in Indo-China and have attempted to subsidize movements among other groups in the Philippines and certain tribes in Burma.

Whatever the initial success of the Japanese attempts it is almost certain that far-reaching readjustments in the colonies of Southeast Asia will be necessary after the war. An eventual allied victory will involve widespread co-operation from the native peoples of the region and from Chinese and Indians and the peace will require some political recognition of that help on the part of the governing powers. For that reason alone there is urgent need for careful study of the situation as it existed and was developing just before the Japanese attack. In that sense the present book should be useful to the officials who have to organize the co-operation of the native peoples during the war and to private citizens and officials alike in planning for the peace and colonial post-war reconstruction.

New York  
January 10, 1942

W. L. HOLLAND  
*Research Secretary*

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*Part I*  
INTRODUCTION

*By*  
RUPERT EMERSON  
*Formerly Associate Professor of Government*  
*Harvard University*  
*Author of Malaysia*



## INTRODUCTION

### I

About the rim of southeast Asia there clusters a diverse and partitioned world of peoples and administrations. To the west lies the great mass of the Indian peninsula, united under British rule; to the north the vast expanse of China, the politically centralized islands of Japan, and the solid sweep of the Soviet Union through Siberia to the Pacific. In striking contrast to these great consolidated neighbors, the peninsulas and islands of the southeast have been divided into a checkered pattern of alien rule. Blocking the paths from India to China and Japan and from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific they have held a fatal attraction for the Powers both because of their great resources and potential wealth and because of their vital strategic importance. Portugal, Spain, Holland, Britain, France, and, more recently, the United States and Japan have been drawn to carve out empires or imperial footholds in these cross-roads of peoples, cultures and commerce. Of all the territories of southeast Asia and the islands stretching up to Japan, only Thailand has been able to preserve a somewhat precarious independence, hemmed in on three sides by the colonial holdings of Britain and France.'

For many centuries on the outer fringes of the world's activities, this region has now been drawn all too intimately into its main streams. As the world has shrunk with the development of modern transport and communications, its remotest territories have felt in ever-increasing measure the dynamic impact of the new industrial system and have been thrust into distant conflicts with which they have little direct concern. To regard the territories of southeast Asia as forming a single unit is perhaps an error save in the sense that they have in common their status as Asiatic borderlands and as colonial or quasi-colonial appendages of the Powers. Together they form the southeastern frontier of Asia and together they are dragged along inevitably in the wake of the Powers to which they are attached—or, if war on the large scale would develop in the Far East, they are thrust into the front lines.



'Of the colonial holdings, the Netherlands Indies Archipelago is by far the largest in extent, in population, and in developed and potential resources. With the possible exception of Singapore and the Malay Peninsula, which its islands bracket to the west, south and east, it holds the key strategic position since it lies amorphously athwart the passages from west to east and also commands the normal routes to Australia and New Zealand. Thrust down into the heart of the Dutch islands is British Malaya, occupying the bulging tip of the Malay Peninsula and culminating at its southern extremity in the great port and naval base of Singapore. To the north of Malaya and stretching far down the peninsula lies Thailand (formerly Siam), an independent country whose territories have dwindled in the not too distant past under the imperial pressure of the British in Burma on the west and the French in Indo-China on the east. Through the meeting of these two neighbors in the north, Thailand lost her former common frontier with China. French Indo-China itself occupies the southeastern corner of Asia with a long and curving coastline on the China Sea. Not far off its northern shores lies the large island of Hainan, recently occupied by Japan as one phase of her activities in the China war. Still further to the east are the Philippine Islands, separated from the Netherlands Indies, to which they are both geographically and demographically akin, only by the accident of early Spanish conquest. Again to the north and closer to the eastward sweep of the Chinese coast is Formosa, since 1895 a part of the Japanese Empire. The British colony of Hongkong is closely attached to the Chinese coast near Canton.)

Merely to name these major territories which will form the center of attention for the purposes of this study is, however, to give only a part of the complexity of the region. Its geographical conditions, the overlapping waves of imperialist advance, and the desire of the Powers to establish footholds in China and in the southern seas have invited an even greater degree of partition. The Spanish Empire in the East vanished with the conquest of the Philippines by the United States in 1898, but of the ancient glories of the Portuguese Empire two small pieces have survived: Macao on the coast of China just south of Hongkong, and the eastern half of the island of Timor in the southeastern part of the Dutch archipelago and on the

path to Port Darwin in Australia. To round out the British holdings in this region mention must be made not only of the larger territories which Britain controls in north Borneo—Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo—but also of the smaller islands and island groups which have been drawn into the imperial fold, such as Labuan, Christmas, and the Cocos-Keeling Islands. Eastward, the region of southeast Asia merges almost imperceptibly with other territories which must impinge sharply on its destiny.<sup>1</sup> The Dutch-owned western half of New Guinea borders on the Australian territory of Papua and the Australian Mandate of Northeast New Guinea, including the Bismarck Archipelago and the northern part of the Solomon Islands to the north and east. Again to the east and stretching down southward toward New Zealand are the French possessions of New Caledonia and the New Hebrides (the latter under joint Anglo-French control); while to the north of New Guinea lie the clusters of former German islands taken over by Japan as mandates after the World War.

It must be obvious that virtually no generalizations can be effective for the whole of a region as heterogeneous as southeastern Asia in the somewhat arbitrary sense which that term has been given for this study. To take only a single example, Hongkong is an almost exclusively Chinese city which has grown from nothing to its present world position in the course of the last century under the British aegis. If in these respects it largely parallels the flowering of Singapore since its acquisition by Raffles in 1819, it clearly has few elements which can be used to link it to the background and conditions of the Malayan mainland or Netherlands India. But for much of the region there are common threads and elements which have imposed a certain similarity of destiny. This is not only a matter of the last few decades in which the imperialisms of the West and of the East, under the new technical conditions, have forced the disparate pieces of the Far East together into a single unstable amalgam. To take the region's history as beginning only with the encroachments of the Europeans some five centuries ago

<sup>1</sup> These island territories of the Pacific are discussed in a parallel survey, recently completed for the Institute of Pacific Relations by Felix M. Keesing, under the title *The South Seas in the Modern World* (John Day Co., New York, 1941).

would be to eliminate the long period in which it revolved in its own orbit and gradually assumed the shape in which the Europeans found it. That period was far from being one of idyllic peace and isolation. In its earlier phases it is the long and unrecorded story of the gradual migration southward of a great part of the peoples now inhabiting the region, driven forward by the irresistible pressure of the Chinese advance. From the main portions of the continent they were pushed to the peninsular edges and from there to the great belt of surrounding islands. Thus the Malay peoples migrated throughout the great Indonesian archipelago, peopling the sweep from Sumatra in the west through Java and Borneo and Celebes to the Philippines in the north and east. Behind them there lingered on the extremities of the mainland the peoples of Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China, in part more closely related to the Chinese and maintaining a greater degree of connection with China. Behind these migrant stocks and tribes there came the Chinese, now no longer moving forward in solid masses, but as individuals or in small groups, settling among them temporarily at least to carry on trade and in a less degree to open up the resources, such as tin. From the west, from India and Arabia, came more traders and missionaries, bringing with them the powerful cultural and religious influences of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. Among the peoples themselves, tribes, states, colonies, empires grew, conquered, and fell. But it was an Oriental world which moved in its own pattern and rhythm.

Given these strong external influences it would manifestly be a misreading of history to see the early European encroachments as the first breach in the development of an indigenous life and culture. In fact, in some respects, it may be doubted whether the first centuries of European contact had as significant implications for the peoples of southeastern Asia as the cultural-religious revolutions which came to them from the Near and Middle East. With the exception of the Philippines, Christianity made only minor inroads and is still a religion which has not adequately learned the means of competing in the mission field with Islam. For the rest it was not until the last half or quarter of the nineteenth century that the impact of the Western world was very seriously felt. Formosa, Indo-China, Thailand, the Malayan mainland, and vast stretches of Netherlands India had only scattering and incidental contacts

with the West prior to the middle of the last century; and even where the contact was more elaborate and effective it normally had a relatively slight influence on either the economic or the social structure of the region. For the Dutch in particular the establishment of formal political control and the reconstruction of the existing economic and social systems were wholly incidental to the carrying on of trade at a profit.

In the latter part of the century, however, the new capitalist imperialism began to run its truly revolutionary course. Under Napoleon III earlier casual French contacts with Indo-China were utilized to provide an opening for a wider offensive which in a few decades of piecemeal action brought the entire territory under French control. Shortly thereafter, the Dutch began the great forward movement which pushed their substantial command of the Indies out from their main center in Java over the bulk of the remaining islands to which they laid claim, although this is a process which has still not reached its end as the recent activities in Dutch New Guinea indicate. At the same time the British abandoned their policy of noninterference with the Malay States on the peninsula and moved speedily from their older bases at Penang, Malacca, and Singapore to place them under a protection which is only little removed from colonial rule. Japan forcibly took Formosa as one of the fruits of the Sino-Japanese War, and from the other side of the Pacific the United States somewhat haphazardly thrust itself into the picture through the acquisition of the Philippines as an unexpected prize of the Spanish-American War. Hongkong came to a new importance as the focus of imperial rivalries shifted to China. The meteoric rise of Japan and the renewal of her pressure on China shifted the balance again, and her occupation in 1939 of Hainan and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea brought her into closer proximity to the colonial holdings of the Western Powers in southeastern Asia. More recently since the fall of France Indo-China has come still more into Japan's political and commercial orbit with Japanese garrisons stationed at Hanoi, a Japanese-dictated settlement of the border conflict between Indo-China and Thailand, and Japanese virtually monopolizing Indo-China's exports of rice, coal, and rubber.

For the further future it is doubtful whether these outstanding political events, great as is their contemporary importance, have as deep and lasting a significance as the economic and

social revolutions which they brought with them. Although there are still immense reaches of hinterland, as in Borneo, Indo-China, and Thailand, into which the modern world has barely penetrated, it is still no exaggeration to say that everywhere the immemorial and largely static systems of social and economic life have felt the disruptive force of the new economy and technique. Everywhere an economy geared to local needs and carried on by the traditional methods has felt the pressure toward integration into a world market and the drive toward a rationalization and modernization. Prior to the latter part of the nineteenth century the economic life of southeastern Asia had either been touched only at the fringes by the Western world or had developed somewhat further along traditional lines the tropical produce, such as spices, which the European traders and rulers sought. From that time on it tended to produce increasingly, under Western direction and with Western methods, the specialized products which supplied the needs of the new industrial world. Even in connection with a product as traditional and indigenous as rice, still the staple foodstuff of the region, the new possibilities of transport, the expansion and improvement of irrigation, the opening up of new plantation and mining areas, all combined to change the direction and tempo of life. The introduction of rubber from Brazil and its cultivation in a planned and scientific fashion on great European estates with a labor force frequently brought from distant countries is a striking example of the new age. In tin-mining the time-honored Chinese methods, depending upon masses of cheap coolie labor, have given way in large part to the monstrous dredges which dig their own channel before them as they fill it up behind. It is typical of the new era that Japan, in taking over Formosa, should not be content merely to expand the existing trade and productive facilities, but should instead deliberately build up a sugar industry which had come to supply all of Japan's needs and even leave an occasional surplus for export to China.

## II

In every respect which one can name this recent development of southeast Asia has been a colonial development. To say this does not mean that it is necessarily a region of exploitation and oppression, but it does mean that it has been able to move

and to develop only within the limits and toward the goals set by the imperial masters. Formally speaking, this statement has no application to the independent sovereignty of Thailand, but in the realm of hard actualities the economic life and movement of Thailand has frequently been almost as circumscribed as that of its colonial neighbors. It has retained a distinctive flavor of its own which is without doubt attributable to its independence, but its economic development has been dependent upon British and French capital and its political survival has been made possible only by a subtle balancing of the imperialist interests which have impinged upon it and threatened its existence. All the remainder of southeast Asia has been under the direct control of alien imperial Powers even where, as in Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, and Indo-China, native states and native rules have been allowed to maintain some shadow of their former independence. From the standpoint of political control the region has wholly lost its autonomous life and moves in the paths which are determined for it by the controlling imperial interests. In the case of the Philippines, this situation appears to be rapidly drawing to an end since a full independence has been promised by the United States for 1946 and in the interval a largely autonomous Commonwealth has been established; but there are many who fear that in the present chaotic state of world affairs the realization of this program will be attended by many delays and difficulties. In the Netherlands Indies a far less ambitious program of evolution toward political freedom has been under way for the last couple of decades but the strings of power are still closely held by the Dutch authorities.

The colonial character of the economy of southeast Asia is as immediately evident as is the political control. As the outward symbol of political subjection is to be found in the fact that the key offices of state are held by alien rulers, so in the economic realm, there is a similar concentration of power and wealth in the hands of the European, Japanese, and American banks, business houses, and corporations. The great modern enterprises of all descriptions and the managers, technicians, and engineers who occupy the key positions in them are all products of the Western world or of Japan. If relatively large numbers of the indigenous population have been trained to take over the lesser skilled and white collar posts in economic

as in political life, it still remains true that the control, the upper salaries, and the profits flow almost exclusively to the alien persons and interests. A distinctive feature of the more recent period has been the tendency toward a transference of the ultimate control of the larger Western enterprises to the countries where ownership rests, leaving the day-to-day operations in the East in the hands of managers, engineers, and technical experts, who have neither the prospect of long continued residence in the region nor strong local ties.

Particularly since the turn of the century there has been immense progress in the direction of a modernization and industrialization of economic life, but the price which has been paid for it is the acceptance of an inferior and subordinate status in life. It is not an evolution which has come from within and which has developed its own leadership and tempo, but one which has been thrust upon the region from outside and from above. The Western world has been superimposed upon the native society and the latter has been forced to make the adjustments which would enable it to serve the Western purposes. In the process there can be no doubt that many real and substantial benefits have accrued to the peoples of the region, but they are benefits which have come in large part as accidental by-products of a system designed for other ends. Throughout the region the advance of the indigenous population has been complicated by the presence and continued immigration of large numbers of Chinese who have on the whole been readier to step into the intermediate employments opened up in the new era and to adapt themselves to its requirements than have the original inhabitants. Admittedly it is an exaggeration requiring many particular corrections, but it may be said that the typical social-economic structure of the region is that of the native peoples tilling the soil and doing the manual labor, the Chinese filling the role of a middle class, and the representatives of the imperial Powers forming a small but vitally important upper and directing class.

A determining factor in the economic development of the region is that it was and remains poor in capital. It was the Western world which first recognized the necessity for and the potential value of the region's raw materials and which possessed the techniques and skills which would make possible their profitable exploitation. In addition, it possessed the capital

which enabled it to take over a full command of the situation from an economic standpoint. Under colonial conditions it is exceedingly difficult for subject peoples to amass the resources which are necessary for the effective extension of large-scale enterprise in the modern world. At the outset they are confronted by great amalgamations of capital in the hands of experienced financial and industrial leaders and are necessarily forced into playing a secondary and subordinate role; by the time that they have been able to make an adjustment to the new era the essential features of the new economic system have already become firmly established under the control of alien interests and management. At the best the individual employees normally rise no higher than to relatively poorly paid intermediate jobs, and the corporate profits tend to flow out of the country to the imperial centers. In a technically backward but independent country such as Thailand it is possible to break out of the vicious circle through the activities of a government which centralizes the control of necessarily meager and scattered resources with the deliberate purpose of backing national economic development, and substantially the same possibility has been opened in the Philippines; but where the control of the political machinery is in alien hands only a very modest movement in this direction can be expected. It should, however, be noted that it has been one of the consequences of the depression that everywhere there has been a tendency to move toward more rounded and self-contained economies accompanied by an inevitable swing toward the encouragement of local and native enterprise.

A further logical consequence of the imperialist control which exists for the great bulk of southeast Asia is that the development of the region's productive forces has been in large part directed toward satisfying the needs in raw materials and foodstuffs of the industrialized parts of the world. The original local self-sufficiency which was a characteristic of the several parts of the region as it is of all relatively primitive economies has given way to a high degree of dependence on world markets. Given tropical conditions, a highly fertile soil, occasional rich mineral deposits including petroleum, and cheap labor forces which were inexhaustible if the vast human reservoirs of neighboring India and China were taken into account, it was wholly natural that these territories should evolve into



raw material supply centers for the machine age economy. The further prerequisites were the improvement of the techniques of production, the speeding up of means of transport and communication, and the curbing of tropical diseases; and all these were furnished by the scientific advance of the Western world. In the case of Indo-China, the Philippines and Formosa, the recent economic upsurge of the colonial territories was closely linked to the system of the mother country through a deliberate manipulation of tariff and other preferential arrangements, subsidies, etc., but in the Dutch and British Territories the doctrines of *laissez-faire* and free trade guided the development until the forces of the depression caused a change to more restrictive policies in the course of the last decade.

Superficially the immense economic advance of southeast Asia in the last half century appears to indicate a hitherto undreamed-of progress and prosperity for the region, but two important reservations must be made to any such conclusion. The bare figures which portray the magnitude of the production, the foreign trade, and the revenues of the region, particularly in the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and Indo-China bear striking witness to the significance of these territories for the world economy and demonstrate them to be colonial prizes of the first order, but looking from the inside of the region outward the picture is by no means so completely rosy. One great feature of their development has been precisely the extent to which they have been geared into the rest of the world: the continuance of their prosperity is strikingly dependent on the maintenance of the purchasing power of the larger industrial centers, and notably of the United States. Once the industrial demand elsewhere slackens, as it did at a sickening pace from the beginning of the depression years, the one-sided character of their economic structure becomes desperately apparent, and not only the economy but also the governmental apparatus which derives its revenue from the economy is brought to an abrupt crisis. The demand for tin and rubber is almost wholly dependent upon the maintenance of prosperity or upon special wartime needs in Europe and in the United States; the demand for sugar is conditioned in part by the degree of prosperity elsewhere and even more largely by the extent to which other countries attempt to achieve a degree of economic self-sufficiency through the encouragement of beet sugar or other sources of

cane sugar; and even the demand for rice fluctuates seriously as wages and employment throughout the region rise and fall under the impact of foreign and essentially uncontrollable economic events.

To this instability deriving from the one-sided development of an economy which is subsidiary to that of more highly industrialized regions, there must also be added the fact that despite the outward appearance of prosperity and the swollen figures of foreign trade no marked improvement has been apparent in the economic welfare of the great mass of the people. The prosperity is one which has derived—in a sense, artificially—from the West, and its substantial benefits have in large part flowed to the imperial centers. Again, it must surely be acknowledged that in health and sanitary conditions, in transport and communications, in the establishment of peace and order, and to a lesser degree in education there have been real improvements in the lot of the ordinary human being inhabiting the region, but the immense divide which separates the living standards of the European, American, or Japanese in the region from that of the indigenous inhabitants has barely been narrowed, if at all. To some degree it is true that the imposition of external rule and the benefits which it has brought have meant a multiplication of the population which has served to illustrate the Malthusian fears of a continued pressure of population against the limits of subsistence. But the sophisticated and objective explanations of Western observers can serve little to dim the glaring contrast in standards of life which is so immediately obvious to the eyes of the native nationalist.

In some measure the dependence of southeast Asia on the industrialized world from an economic standpoint is naturally balanced by an equivalent dependence of the latter on the former, but no true equality has actually been attained. Even apart from the element of imperial control which directly throws the balance in favor of the ruling Powers, there are further elements of inequality, some of which have been indicated above. As a market for the products of the remainder of the world, the importance of the region is considerably smaller than as a provider of raw materials, although it is obvious that in this realm also it holds great potentialities. While it supplies a few extremely important commodities in larger quantities than are supplied from any other part of the world, it is neither

the market exclusively for any specific commodities nor does the low purchasing power of the bulk of its inhabitants allow it to figure in this capacity to the extent which its export figures might suggest. It may again be pointed out that the economy of the region is a typically colonial economy: in general it is a region which exports raw materials and imports manufactured goods. In the range of foodstuffs, with the exception of some canned foods, it has imported from other countries in the Pacific area, and the same is true of petroleum imports. Iron and steel imports of all varieties are provided by European and American countries which compete among themselves for dominance in southeast Asia's markets. But textiles, which are the region's most important imports, come principally from the United Kingdom, Holland, British India, and Japan, and there has been bitter controversy between these countries for domination of the textile markets, particularly since the sudden rise of Japan in this field during the last couple of decades.

### III

It is within this framework of external political and economic control, sketched in the preceding pages, that southeast Asia has developed during the last few decades, torn from its natural environment and from its traditional ways of life. On the whole, leaving aside the periods of original imperial acquisition and conquest, it has been a period of peaceful development, but that period of peace has been gravely threatened in recent years by the rapidly shifting balance of forces in the Far East and by the outbreak of major wars both in the East and in the West. It is inconceivable that the region should be allowed to continue fundamentally undisturbed by the cataclysmic changes in the world into which it has been so closely integrated. Nor are these changes wholly in the external world. Within southeast Asia itself the revolutionary processes which have transformed it from an inconspicuous backwater of largely isolated segments into one of the strategic and economic centers of the globe have inevitably worked in such fashion as to sow the seeds of further revolutions. Throughout the region imperial control is challenged by rising nationalist forces. In Thailand the jealously guarded independence is being given increasingly the substance of a Thai national state. In the Philippines the independence movement has carried the country close to a prospec-

tive final breach with American control. In the Netherlands Indies and in Indo-China the nationalist movements have constantly grown and gained strength, and in both there have been violent outbreaks not sufficient to challenge the supremacy of the imperial power but adequate to demonstrate that the external appearances of calm belie the inner agitations. Throughout there has also been felt in varying degrees of strength the impact of China's national revolution and of her wars to protect her integrity. Complicating and intensifying these issues there have been for the last decade the added crisis of world depression and, since 1937, the recrudescence of Japanese westward and southward imperialism, now merged into the vaster struggle between the Axis powers and the Soviet Union, the British Empire and its allies.

Nationalism in Asia is a phenomenon of very recent origin despite sporadic nationalist utterances and incidents of earlier years in which the warning rumbling of future events can be heard. In southeast Asia, with the exception of the Philippines, the nationalist movements did not develop with any effective strength until the first World War. They first blossomed and flourished in that far distant era of the 1920's when the forward surge of Western imperialism had slackened and the League of Nations lent color to the illusion that a new era of peace and international good will had been inaugurated. It was in that time that the doctrine of national self-determination took on an aspect of flesh and blood. In the great neighboring countries Gandhi in India and Sun Yat-sen in China moved on to new national triumphs. Although resistance to the nationalist pressures was still strong on the part both of governments and of economic interests the European Powers were on the whole on the defensive, concessions were being everywhere made to the rising forces of the "backward peoples," and the issue seemed not one of stemming the further advance but of determining the rate at which the process of decolonization would go forward. In the succeeding decade of the 1930's nationalism continued its triumphs at first and then became at least temporarily obscured by the wave of violence, war, and imperialism which broke over the world. From listening, with some degree of passive acquiescence and even approval, to the claims of the new and rising nations the world was again forced to give its full attention to the forward thrust of new imperialisms. The

calculation as to the likely victor in the clash of dynamic nationalisms against static imperialism was complicated by the intrusion of a third and even more dynamic and powerful force.

To date the beginning of nationalism in any country with precision is an impossibility. It is always the expression of a community which has been a long time in the shaping and which has been through varied phases of religious, cultural, economic, and political development to which the attribute of nationalism may or may not be ascribed. Even where, as in England, France, or Germany, elaborate historical records are available concerning a process which is well established and of long standing, serious estimates as to origins may vary by as much as several centuries. Long periods of preparation may lie behind the ultimate assertion of the national claim and at any stage in the process there may be legitimate doubt as to the extent to which it has effectively penetrated into the consciousness of the mass of the people as distinguished from the few leaders who give voice to it in one form or another.

Under the conditions existing in southeast Asia there is also the problem of attempting to distinguish modern nationalism from the earlier and more primitive, perhaps almost instinctive, resistance to the foreigner who represents merely an alien intrusion in the established scheme of things. In almost no instance has the imperial control been able to establish itself without some show of armed force to extinguish the resistance of the existing authorities, and the subsequent history of European rule in southeast Asia has been punctuated by movements of unrest and revolt. Generally speaking, however, it appears to be the case that the earlier resistance is followed, save for incidental and minor outbursts, by a considerable period of acquiescence in the foreign rule, flowing either from the bare necessity of accepting defeat and the shock accompanying subjection or from the temporary acceptance of the claim of technological and cultural superiority asserted by the conqueror. There seems, indeed, adequate evidence to justify the belief that the doctrine of white supremacy was not only one which was convenient for the new rulers but was also accepted as an article of faith by the peoples on whom it was imposed. With the spread of Western education, the induction of larger numbers of the local inhabitants in the administration and in Western business enterprises, and the consequent appearance of a

new generation bred in the new ways the elements which constituted that supremacy were transmitted to the ruled themselves and the doctrine lost the magic which had earlier been in it. The claim of a superior destiny was challenged by a new and equal sense of destiny which sprang up in the politically and economically inferior community.

Nationalism in southeast Asia as elsewhere is not merely an instinctive movement of resistance to the alien and the foreigner but a conscious assertion of the unity, the distinct and separate identity, of the community in question. Whether or not the effective moving spirit, as is frequently contended, is essentially a desire for jobs, for the loaves and fishes of office, nationalism puts itself forward as the assertion of a claim as of right on behalf of an historically shaped community of men knowing itself to be radically differentiated from similar communities. It may well be that in essence this type of movement cannot be distinguished from earlier movements of smaller groups, such as tribes or clans, inasmuch as both are merely types of social organisms of the same general order, but it is unquestionably a characteristic of modern nationalism that it should involve large masses of men who feel themselves bound together as against the rest of the world by peculiar and long-standing historical and cultural bonds.

Although it is impossible to speak with finality of a process which is still only in midcourse or to state definitively the formula which expresses the principles about which the national movements have grouped themselves it appears that, in terms of their demographic and territorial extent, they more nearly follow the political lines which have been imposed by the Western colony-makers than any other discernible criteria. The later colonial status has outweighed the earlier ties of blood and culture. Thus the Malayan stocks divided between British, Dutch, and Spanish rule, have developed nationalisms which correspond to their present political boundaries. Despite an original homogeneity of race and culture the Malay peoples particularly of the two great island groups of the Philippines and the Indies have grown apart during the centuries of Spanish and Dutch rule which have left a deep imprint in all spheres of life and most notably in the realm of religion. It is, of course, natural that movements of political reform or of revolt should direct themselves at least in the first instance against the existing

political authorities but it appears that actually the national movements seek to express a deeper unity than would be dictated merely by political expediency. In other words, it is not only that the people of the Netherlands Indies must, if they are to achieve independence, overthrow the Dutch authority but also that they assert the existence of an Indonesian community which is entitled to its equal and separate place among the nations of the world. No final answer can be given to this question as to the extent in space of the several national movements unless and until the present political regimes are supplanted by a new fluidity which would allow the peoples of southeast Asia greater freedom to work out their own basic linkages.

Under such conditions it might, for example, develop that the relatively small number of Malays of the peninsula would throw in their lot with their brethren of the archipelago rather than attempt to pursue an independent destiny although any verdict to that effect which they might attempt to reach would be gravely compromised by the fact that they are themselves a minority in their own country, outnumbered by the Chinese and Indians. For present purposes, however, the general rule appears to be that the national movements seek to unite all those who are regarded as "native" inhabitants of the existing colonies or political entities.

A number of relatively minor exceptions to this territorial principle must be noted. In a few instances the accidents of imperial rivalries, adjustments, and compromises, have failed to leave a permanent imprint, as in the case of the Thai national claims to areas taken into Indo-China by France. This type of situation is particularly evident where the establishment of the colonial status or the fixing of boundaries has occurred so recently as not to have had any appreciable effect on the cultural and political allegiance of the peoples concerned. Similar conflicting claims might well arise at some later time in connection with the lands and peoples on both sides of the boundary between Thailand and British Malaya. Here the northern Malay States were formerly under Siamese suzerainty and have some admixture of Thai people while the southern provinces of Thailand are largely Malay in population. Uncertainties must also exist concerning the ultimate allegiance of great stretches of southeast Asia which have been subject to

relatively little development along Western lines and appear to have been left substantially untouched by nationalist movements of any sort to date although claims may be made in their behalf by nationalist leaders elsewhere. For the most part, for example, Borneo appears to fall in this category. A particular case is that of the British areas in north Borneo which might well find themselves drawn to make common cause with the Moro regions of the Philippines in Mindanao with which they have maintained close connections. The Moros have so far shown themselves more ready to accept a continuance of American rule in the Philippines than to yield gracefully to the newly established authority of the Philippine Commonwealth. In this instance the explanation appears to lie in the fact that the Spanish system was never effectively extended to the Moros who have continued Mohammedan as against the Catholicism of the remainder of the Filipinos.

A vastly more important problem than that of the border areas of indeterminate allegiance is that of the peoples who through deep divergences in race and culture are severed from the national movements of the areas in which they live and have lived, in some instances, for generations. Southeast Asia is a region which has been subject to many migrations which have left behind them an inextricable tangle of minorities of race, language, and religion. If European rule, however inadvertently, has done much to extend political consciousness on broad national scales it must also bear a large responsibility for having confused the basic picture through its introduction of great numbers of alien elements, primarily for the purpose of securing abundant supplies of cheap labor. Even assuming all imperialist influences to have disappeared from the scene—an assumption far removed from the present realities—the problems of a national minority character which the new native administrations would face would tax the skill and wisdom of the world's greatest statesmen.

In both numbers and influence the Chinese are by far the most significant group of this sort since they are scattered throughout the entire region and everywhere have come to occupy a position of central importance in the economic life of the community. Although many are poverty-stricken coolies and they are to be found in every occupation they have characteristically established themselves as middlemen carrying on



retail trade, as moneylenders, as small processors, and as intermediaries between the native producers of raw materials and the world market. Until the last two or three decades they have to a remarkable degree tended to stay aloof from the political affairs of the areas in which they have settled and have been content to be allowed to pursue their own business activities in peace. While they have on one hand made no effort either to establish an imperialist control over the inhabitants of the areas into which they have migrated or even to seek a share in political life, they have on the other hand normally sought to maintain something of a state within the state, keeping a close control over the affairs of their own community through agencies often of a secret society character. With the elaboration of more effective Western administrative systems this aspect of the Chinese problem has declined in importance, but the decline has been accompanied by the rise of Chinese nationalism, a closer relationship with the authorities in China, and even a partial replacing of the secret society type of organization by the Kuomintang. For the several administrations during the past two decades this has necessitated a constant watchfulness against anti-imperialist propaganda and demonstrations and since 1931 against anti-Japanese boycotts and activities. Very large sums have been collected for the benefit of the war-stricken homeland.

In each of the main divisions of southeast Asia and in the different sections of these divisions the Chinese problem varies in magnitude and intensity but its main lines are the same everywhere save, of course, in Hongkong and Formosa where substantially the entire population is Chinese. In British Malaya and the Indies the clear trend since early times has been for all persons of Chinese or part-Chinese descent to remain Chinese and not to become incorporated into the native population. In Thailand to a very considerable extent and in the Philippines and Indo-China to a lesser extent the offspring of interracial marriages have not only been accepted into the local fold but have even risen to positions of political prominence. The more recent Chinese immigrants, however, in all portions of southeast Asia have been regarded as aliens who cannot be absorbed into the national movements and who threaten the economic well-being of the native populations. In consequence where political power rests in the hands of the nationalists, as in Thailand and the Philippines, measures have been adopted to curb

the Chinese control of economic life and to build up a national economy from which the typical Chinese middleman and trader would be excluded.

None of the other alien groups within southeast Asia approaches the Chinese in importance. A considerable number of Indians have filtered into almost all sections of the region, the largest colonies being in British Malaya and Thailand, but they have played a comparatively small role in local affairs and for any present purposes do not need to be taken seriously into consideration. A more difficult problem is that presented by the Eurasians but it achieves serious proportions only in the Netherlands Indies, where, classed for all legal purposes as Europeans, the so-called Indo-Europeans have found themselves in the last two or three decades pathetically crushed between the Dutch who look upon them with some degree of scorn and the native nationalists who have declined to accept them into their movements. In the economic sphere as in the social and political the hold which they once had upon the clerical and white collar jobs is tending to loosen.

The only remaining element of real significance is that composed by the Europeans and Americans. As the present centers of power and of wealth they have, of course, an importance far exceeding their slight numerical strength but in virtually no instance have they become settled and integral members of the general community. They have come to southeast Asia for a temporary stay as businessmen, planters, or engineers, as teachers or missionaries, as officials or as members of the armed forces, and their homes are established elsewhere. When their time of service is over or their fortunes are made they return with few exceptions to their native country with which they have maintained close contact in the interval of their absence. The development of large-scale corporate enterprise has tended to wipe out even the class of settled European planters and entrepreneurs who to some degree identified themselves with the community in which their plantations or businesses lay. The tendency has been to substitute for the "old-timer" who lived out his life in the tropics the salaried employee who serves a distant corporation by accepting a period of exile. Except for the few of the radical left-wing who have worked intimately with the nationalists and the revolutionaries, it would be difficult to find more than a handful of Europeans and Americans who

could be identified in any positive way with the nationalist movements or with the societies which may develop under their aegis.

The net effect of the nationalist movements has unquestionably been to intensify and make more manifest the racial differences which abound in southeast Asia. Nationalism has a way of breeding nationalism. So long as nationalistic sentiments were the exclusive property of the Westerners or, in the case of Formosa, of the Japanese it was possible for the multi-racial societies to move forward relatively smoothly with each of the different elements playing its allotted role, but once nationalism spread more widely the inherent cleavages began to become of dominating significance. Even the nationalism of the ruling group was, in the time when it met no substantial challenge from below, a matter which could be so calmly taken for granted that it required little assertion or display, but when a hostile counter-nationalism rose to the attack it shortly found conscious formulation and expression of a sort which had previously been lacking. Notably in the Netherlands Indies many of the Dutch of pure European descent shaped themselves into a politically conscious and organized patriotic society (the *Vaderlandsche Club*) while the Eurasians in self-protection formed another and separate body (the *Indo-Europeesch Verbond*). To a lesser degree the same process was effective for the British, the French, and the Americans in their respective territories. Coincidentally with these developments Chinese nationalism was growing at approximately the same time as the native nationalisms and each operated to some degree to stimulate and lend sharpness of definition to the other.

Little or no friction, however, has developed up to the present time between the several actual or potential nations of the region but this must be attributed in large part to the fact that their political life in general and their foreign affairs in particular are guided, except in the case of Thailand, by their imperial masters. It would be a far jump to assume from the present absence of ill-will among them that the future nations of southeast Asia, once they were established in their own sovereign powers, would continue on in amity and good-neighborliness. If there has been little friction to date it is equally the case that there has not been in any real sense either unity or co-operation among these growing nations. The colonial gov-

ernments have unquestionably worked both to keep their nationalist leaders from too intimate contact with each other and to pool their police and secret service activities in such fashion as to give the greatest possible control over dangerous persons and groups. This common front was most successfully established between the British and the Dutch who jointly attacked the threat of Communism, of Chinese nationalism, and of native unrest. It is open to doubt, however, whether, even if there had been no such official curbs, the people of the region would either have felt or made common cause on any considerable scale. Aside from vague and insubstantial rumors of a Pan-Asiatic movement—now frequently derided as signifying only a Japanese hegemony over a host of satellites—there has been little unity of direction. Almost the only exception to this statement is to be found in the Pan-Islamic movement which has at all times claimed some adherents and which in the period immediately preceding and during the World War was particularly in evidence in Java and Sumatra. For a time there seemed a possibility that there might be a revival of Islam which would again bring it forward as a great political force and the central meeting place of Mecca made contacts between leaders from distant lands continuously possible, but the bond of religion succumbed to the greater attractive force of secular political nationalism. In the Netherlands Indies one of the earliest and most important nationalist agencies was *Sarekat Islam*, founded shortly before the World War, which in its earlier days stressed the Mohammedan claim against the infidel ruler but it soon subordinated this element to demands on behalf of the general Indonesian community.

#### IV

Diverse in language, culture, and history the peoples of south-east Asia have moved in their separate paths. There has been some measure of cross-stimulation through the mere impact of the events in one area on the imagination of the rest, but this has not apparently been very marked. The greatest advance toward political freedom has been that of the Philippines but it is difficult to discern that the stages of this advance have been followed with any intensity of interest by neighboring peoples or that Philippine achievement has made more urgent the clamor of other nationalities. On the whole the isolation of

the different parts from each other has been more striking than their fraternization. Almost the only continuing co-ordination of effort and attack has been contributed by the Communists operating from the common center of Moscow and, at times, from Shanghai and Canton, but even this lost some part of its influence after 1927.

To a somewhat greater degree there has been a direct and continuous influence from the larger Asiatic countries, Japan, China, and India, whose swelling nationalisms have been closely watched and examined. It was in some part the success of the Japanese in defeating the Russians which began the decay of the myth of an inherent white superiority and replaced the sense of hopelessness of a struggle against the alien overlords by the knowledge that that struggle was not necessarily foredoomed to failure. In recent years there has been much speculation as to the attitude of the various nationalists toward an imperialist Japan but there is little decisive evidence available. In general it seems to be the case that there is an awareness that the acceptance of Japanese aid would be the first step in the substitution of Japanese for European or American imperialist control but unquestionably some of the nationalists have been prepared to welcome any ally against their more immediate opponents. The rising influence of Japan in Thailand is one clear indication of this sentiment, and charges are made that certain Filipinos—perhaps in anticipation of a day when they would have fallen within the orbit of Japan's New Order and co-prosperity—are endeavoring to conciliate the Japanese. In the case of India the most significant influence appears to derive from a study of the thought and tactics of Gandhi whereas Chinese nationalism has intruded itself more directly in part because of the large number of Chinese in southeast Asia. One troublesome issue in this connection is the occasionally expressed fear that a victorious nationalist China might attempt to exert not only a more effective control over the Chinese scattered throughout the region but even an imperialist sway over the region or some parts of it. It is natural that this fear should find the strongest expression in the regions nearest to China: Thailand, Malaya, and Indo-China, all of which have large Chinese populations.

The greatest and most effective influence of all on the nationalism of southeast Asia, however, has been that exercised

by the culture and political ideology of the Western world. It was from this source that the conception of national independence and of the rights of all peoples to self-determination sprang most clearly and with the greatest vigor. The nationalist struggles of nineteenth century Europe and the constant reiteration of the right of all peoples to political freedom which appears in European and American literature inevitably worked to stimulate similar demands elsewhere. It must be recognized that the normal channel of intercourse with the outside world for the colonial and semi-colonial peoples of southeast Asia led, not through their immediate neighbors, but through the imperial centers which held political and economic control over them. Hence, save for rare exceptions, the language in which the new nationalist claims were couched was patterned after the earlier Western models and the leaders who shaped and organized the national movements were peculiarly the men who had had the closest contact with the Western world and its culture. Through Western education the ideal of national freedom was spread to the East, and passion was lent to it by the men and women who found themselves discriminated against in their own countries.

Difficult as it is to define exactly the elements which enter into nationalism it is possible to say that it is a modern phenomenon obscurely but certainly a product of the economic, political and cultural conditions which the industrial revolution has characteristically brought into being. Everywhere it has been formulated and guided by the new middle class which the changing economic system brings to the fore. If its first prophets have been the writers, the poets, the religious leaders, the educators who have discovered or re-discovered the ancient glories and unique cultural virtues of the nascent nations it has been carried forward under the added leadership of the professional men—the engineers, the doctors, the lawyers—who have been an inevitable by-product of the industrial system as it has impinged upon economically and technologically backward communities. In the main its followers have been recruited either from the urban populations or from the rural areas which have been most subject to an intensive modern exploitation. A deeply significant element, therefore, in the spread of nationalism is that it has meant the substitution of a new class and new style of leadership for that traditionally present. Only rarely have the descendants of the old royalty or aris-

toocracy taken a leading role in the new movement except in the rare instances where individuals have broken away from their traditional status and background and entered into the competition of the new world imposed from outside. Perhaps the most vivid illustration of this is the striking difference between the intense nationalism of the Provinces of British India, led by the Western-trained middle and professional classes, and the backwardness and relative political quiescence of the Indian Native States where the traditional aristocracy has retained its sway. Despite some efforts in the Principalities (*Vorstenlanden*) of Java to share in the guidance of the new nationalism, essentially the same is true in the Netherlands Indies where the Dutch have throughout placed great reliance on the principle of indirect rule through the time-honored hierarchy. Although there are, of course, occasional exceptions it is the general rule that the regents, deliberately selected as representing the old lines of native authority, as well as the princes and rajahs who have been maintained in nominal power have been rather the enemies than the inspirers and leaders of the contemporary nationalist movements. Indeed, the entire scheme of things from which their prestige and powers flow is threatened by the nationalists, and only a few among them either through conviction or shrewd calculation have thought it sounder tactics to join with the new forces than to stand aside or to oppose. This relationship symbolizes admirably the basic cleavage between the old order and the new. The nationalist leaders draw their strength and their claims to authority from sources essentially foreign to those from which the traditionally established powers arose, and in all nationalism there is a basic strand of democracy because of the inevitable reference back to the national people in whose name the entire edifice is erected.

Against this background it appears reasonable to assume that a great limiting factor in the development of nationalism in southeast Asia has been and continues to be the fact that the bulk of the inhabitants of the region are still only meagerly and externally touched by the impact of the European and post-industrial revolution world. Where that impact is slight or nonexistent there the nationalists universally find that the response to their appeal is negligible. Even where the contact with Europe has existed for several centuries, as in the Philippines or the Netherlands Indies, it is only in the past few decades

that there has been an intensive exploitation of resources by methods and techniques essentially different from those traditionally in use. The continued utilization of this older type of production meant both that there was little disturbance of the ordinary way of life for the mass of the peasantry and that there was little direct contact between the new overlords and their subjects who remained for the most part under the immediate control of the established native hierarchy. It is only the modern style of exploitation which has necessitated the education of any considerable number of people on Western lines to meet as cheaply as possible the demand for skilled workers, technicians, and intermediate bosses of various kinds. As a necessary counterpart of this modern economic development there has been a marked intensification of the processes of administration looking toward the introduction of modern sanitation and health methods and an expansion of the means of the communications in order to secure the mobility of persons and of goods essential to the new order. Accompanying this change in basic economic structure was the appearance of liberalism at home in the imperial centers which demanded a more enlightened and less crudely oppressive system of exploitation. The net result of these steps, insofar as the movement toward nationalism is concerned, was to induce the sudden superimposition on the old economy and social structure of a modified version of the social structure which had gradually evolved in Europe and America: at the top a new layer of intellectuals and professional men and at the bottom a new proletariat, both to a considerable degree divorced culturally and geographically from the traditional setting of native life. It is from these new elements that the nationalists are normally recruited.

It would be a complete misconception, however, to assume that even the last years of imperialist development have extended the new conditions of life to anything approaching the entire population of southeast Asia. There continue to be vast stretches, such for example as Borneo and New Guinea, into which there has been only a minimal penetration by the white man and the technological revolution which he brings with him. Even in a great and teeming center of Western activity such as Java there are great numbers of people whose lives have hardly been touched. In Indo-China the entire province of Laos and much of the rest of the hinterland remote from the urban



centers have been left almost as they were. In Thailand only a relatively small section of the people, notably in Bangkok and the area immediately surrounding it, has departed from the ancient ways and joined in the national and nationalist revolution which has taken over the management of the country. It would, perhaps, be possible to explain the still embryonic character of the nationalist movement in British Malaya by the fact that on the whole the Malays have held themselves aloof from the economic developments undertaken in the last decades under British auspices and have, outside the big cities which form the scattered nuclei of the Straits Settlements, been left under the formal rule of native Sultans derived from the old reigning families. It is the Chinese who have pressed forward into the new economy and among them nationalism is by now a fixed principle—but it is Chinese and not Malayan nationalism. Even in the Philippines where the political slogans of nationalism have been given the widest currency there is ample testimony to the fact that many of the Filipinos have little effective realization of the actual meaning and import of the slogans to which they have responded so vigorously on election day.

There is unfortunately no means by which it is possible to determine how deep into the native society the nationalist ideologies and organizations have penetrated. Only the shock of a revolutionary situation in which basic loyalties would be tested could give a really adequate indication as to whether the masses of the people have been stirred so deeply as to take their stand behind the nationalist leaders rather than to continue their essentially passive obedience to the established political authorities. That there have been no widespread challenges to the existing order which might have furnished this sort of test is in itself an indication that as yet the great bulk of the people have not been won to the nationalist cause. In Thailand the revolution proceeded under nationalist symbols but it was to a considerable degree the revolution of a relatively small clique of insiders—almost a palace revolution—rather than a great popular movement. Carried through by leaders of a nationalist stamp, it was a revolution on behalf of a nation still to be formed rather than the rising of a nation in search of freedom and self-expression. From the outset army officers played an outstanding role in it, and the talk of and planning for democ-

racy appears to have been outweighed in practice by the reality of a centralized quasi-Fascist political set-up.

Elsewhere in southeast Asia there have been threats of revolution and sporadic minor outbursts but no major revolutionary attempts. The most serious uprising was probably that which took place in Java in 1926 followed early in 1927 by its spread to Sumatra. In both instances it appears clear that the Communist influence was a highly significant element; in fact, they marked the high point of Communist activity in the Indies. As the Indonesian nationalists had earlier looked to Islam as a possible point of support outside the islands, so they turned after the Russian Revolution to the Comintern as a new ally in their struggle; but it is to be doubted whether the doctrines of Communism at any time took a very deep hold. As the Communists were avowedly ready to lend their support to national movements which were not too closely tied to reactionary elements, so nationalists everywhere were in a position to accept the co-operation of the Communists without themselves becoming committed to the full Marxist program. Communist influences similar to those in the Indies have also been apparent in Indo-China where the Annamite nationalists have in past years maintained close connections with Chinese revolutionaries located in Canton. But despite continuous unrest in Indo-China under a frequently maladroit French administration which has not known how to utilize the facade of indirect rule as effectively as have the Dutch and the British there has been no major upheaval.

Where democratic systems of election have been introduced it is possible to secure some evidence as to the spread of nationalist sentiment, but in southeast Asia these are on the whole so conspicuous by their absence as to throw little light on the problem. Only in the Philippines has there been a significant democratic advance, and here the popular appeal of the nationalists has regularly been triumphant. It is, of course, a matter of record that Philippine nationalism antedates the Spanish-American war in which Aguinaldo and other Filipino leaders assumed that the Americans had the purpose of aiding them in establishing their independence, but under American rule far more free play was allowed the forces of Philippine nationalism than is normally the case in colonial administrations. From the beginning of Philippine-American relations it

was the constant assumption on the part of the United States that at some not too distant point the islands, having been educated in the American democratic and constitutional pattern, would be granted their freedom. As early as 1905 Secretary of War Taft in a speech in the Philippines stated that two definite rules of action had been laid down to guide the United States in its relations with the islands: "The first is 'The Philippines for the Filipinos,' and the second is that 'We shall extend to the Filipinos self-government as rapidly as the people show themselves fit for it' . . . We are here to prepare the people for self-government . . ." To the slogan "the Philippines for the Filipinos" the Filipino politician was not slow to respond, and it has been his dominant theme ever since. With the passage of the Jones Act in 1916 a virtual dominion status was established under the administration of Governor Harrison, and, if there was a reversion to a stronger type of rule under General Wood, Philippine nationalism continued on unabated. In general terms it may be said that whoever among the political leaders was able to bid loudest for the quickest independence carried the day. The final stamp of approval was put on Filipino ambitions by the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934, and this was followed shortly by the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth which is to fill the interim period prior to full independence in 1946. It is now rumored with more than a hint of veracity that there are many who would gladly welcome a reconsideration of the independence which has been so nearly won, but the official doctrine of President Quezon still reads that independence is a prize to be treasured above all others. And it should also be remarked in passing that the national freedom which has at last come to the Filipinos is in many respects not easily to be distinguished from a national dictatorship in a one-party state.

The only other significant experiment along democratic lines in southeast Asia is that which has been undertaken in the Netherlands Indies, but here the method of election to the ultimate parliamentary body, the *Volksraad*, is so constituted as to give it only meager significance as a full representation of public opinion. Meeting for the first time in 1918, this body has undergone several changes which have increased its powers and given a greater degree of native representation, but it remains strictly limited in its control over the government and its

membership is still largely recruited from the official hierarchy, both native and Dutch. The system of indirect election for the majority of its members—the remainder being appointed—removes it from the direct effect of public opinion and hence renders it unsatisfactory as an instrument by which to judge the extent of nationalist feeling. Furthermore, following the model of the Indian National Congress at some stages in its life, the more ardent nationalists have advocated a policy of non-co-operation and have stood aloof from the councils and the representative political machinery established by the Dutch. To a far greater extent than in the Philippines the nationalist movement in the Indies has been split within itself into a number of different factions and fractions, deriving in part from basic differences in outlook and tactics and in part from a tendency for political parties and movements to shape themselves about outstanding personalities and leaders. It is also the case that the Dutch have sought far more vigorously than the Americans to impose sharply repressive measures upon the nationalist movement in its various manifestations. Although they have in the last decades made serious efforts to correct the more flagrant abuses of imperialism and have hesitantly moved forward on the democratic path, the Dutch have at the same time kept a strong hand on the situation.

The Netherlands Indies also offers an admirable illustration on a large scale of the caution which must be exercised in attempting any generalizations as to the spread of nationalism within each of the several territories of southeast Asia. It is an easy and temptingly attractive matter to speak of an Indonesian nationalism as if it embraced the whole of the Indies or were at least somewhat evenly spread throughout the Archipelago, but the reality is far different. As has been indicated above, the nationalist centers are virtually exclusively those which have undergone a period of intensive Western development and exploitation. Thus nationalism flourishes in the urban centers of Java, in the parts of Sumatra which have been effectively opened up, and in the parts of the Celebes where a strong Dutch rule is of long standing. In these areas even the occasional blocks of Christian converts have not operated as a barrier to nationalism. But across the narrow straits which separate Java from Bali the Balinese, who alone have lingered in the original Hinduism of the islands and who have been subjected to almost no encroach-

ment of Western industry, have remained substantially immune to the lure of the nationalism preached by their Javanese cousins, partly perhaps because of curbs imposed on Javanese in Bali. In all the Outer Islands it must also be reckoned with that the Dutch reversion after 1900 to the principle of indirect rule has had a very real effect in at least temporarily removing entire local communities, somewhat artificially preserved in the old parochial setting, from the modern influences of which nationalism is an end-product.

As appears to be the conclusion in connection with revolutions in general, nationalist revolutions are not inspired by those who are the most downtrodden. On the contrary, they are set in motion by the men who have made a close approach to the riches and power offered by the Western world and yet are denied full access to them. In a large number of instances it is even possible to discover the particular episodes of discrimination on grounds of race or color which appear to have been influential or even decisive in turning away from an acceptance of Western rule men trained on the new model who have later become outstanding as nationalist leaders. More broadly it is indisputably the case that the mere fact of being a native of a colonial territory normally operates as an effective barrier not only to the occupancy of the higher governmental posts but also to positions of economic importance and power. In crude terms, the higher salaries go to the controlling group of aliens and even in the middle range of salaries there is likely to be a higher rate of pay, either directly or through special allowances or leave provisions, for aliens than for natives. The one sphere left undisturbed for native possession, insofar as nationals of the imperial power are concerned, is the manual labor of the fields and mines and factories. Inevitably there is an irresistible attraction in the drive toward the conquest of the power which would enable the native inhabitants of the region themselves to fix the rules of the game which determine the channels of flow for wealth and command.

Nor is it possible in the real world to dismiss such contentions by the argument that, although a few key political posts may be reserved for the ruling power, the free play of economic forces will allow all men of merit to rise to their appropriate station in the world of business. Even assuming that a nineteenth century *laissez-faire* prevailed in southeast Asia, and recent years

have in fact seen a constant swing away from any such condition, it would still remain true that the dice are heavily loaded in favor of the dominant alien group. It is they, operating either from the metropolitan center or perhaps locally, who fix the basic conditions under which economic life can be carried on through their control of tariffs, subsidies, quotas, fiscal policy. Even for the British and the Dutch whose colonial economic policy has until recently followed strongly liberal lines it has been a usual assumption that colonies should be consumers of the manufactured goods of the mother country and producers of the raw materials needed at home and in the world markets. For the French and Japanese and in a different fashion for the Americans the intimate linking of the colonial to the imperial economy has been a cornerstone of policy. To this must be added the fact that almost by definition capital is a rare commodity in a region which is just beginning its acquaintance with the industrial system. Save for bare labor power virtually every element of the new economic structure must be imported from outside. Machinery, operating capital, technical skill, managerial experience, etc., are all of them imports. And the clear tendency is that the profits of the new system flow for the most part back to the original investors in Europe, America, or Japan, with the result that the initial capital poverty of the region remains largely uncorrected.

The break into this charmed, or, from the native standpoint, this vicious circle is by no means an easy matter. The invisible barriers which determine economic control along racial lines have been established under the auspices of the imperial and colonial governments and in varying degree through their direct and deliberate intervention. They can in all probability only be broken down by the deliberate intervention of a new governmental authority which will be prepared to reverse the previous pressures. The capital which would be necessary for the transfer to native hands of the existing industries and for their continued operation as well as for the creation of the new industries which would aid in establishing rounded economies can only come through a national pooling of the resources which a national government can muster. No colonial government, however well-intentioned, will take the steps necessary for the creation of a national economy.

In southeast Asia the only countries which have had an oppor-

tunity to move with relative freedom toward such a national economy are Thailand and the Philippines, and in each there has been a marked movement toward nationalization and government control of economic life. It seems evident that this has been the case far less because of socialist tendencies than because of the realization that in no other way was it possible to move toward the goal of replacing an alien (including Chinese) domination of economic life by an increasing native participation. In both countries there has been, of course, much difficulty in securing even the effective initiation of such a program. The foreign capital is well entrenched, has great influence, and can only be replaced by slow and gradual stages unless there is to be a drastic revolutionary overturn. It is also apparent that the difficulty of a revolution which strikes at the foundations of economic control is much greater in a small than in a large country, particularly if the productive forces of the country have been geared in large measure to supplying a small number of commodities for the world market. The external pressures which can be brought through the manipulations of exchanges, tariffs, and quotas may easily prove ruinous in such a situation.

But it is at least equally difficult to see how peoples who have been brought to the threshold of the Western world can long be content to remain in a position of colonial inferiority after they have mastered the use of the tools by means of which the West brought about their subjection. The nationalist movements are the assertion of the coming of age in the modern world and in a modern sense of the peoples of southeast Asia who, for a time remote from the main channels of recent history, have now been drawn inextricably into them. The victory of these movements would be revolutionary not only in the sense that it would mean the disappearance of the imperialist control of the region but also in the sense that it would mean the disappearance of much which is traditionally characteristic of the region. Unquestionably the nationalisms would be strongly colored by the individual differences and cultures and backgrounds of the several countries, as the nationalism of each of the countries of the Western world varies from that of the rest, but it would also have in it the basic common element of representing the impact of the industrial era. The striving toward national freedom, economic, political, and cultural, is

a by-product of imperialism which may yet spell the end of imperialism. Even if the new imperialist forces which now threaten southeast Asia should be temporarily triumphant they would in all probability merely fall heir to an intensified combat with the forces of nationalism which grew toward maturity under their predecessors.





*Part II*  
THE GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

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### AUTHOR'S NOTE

The account of the governments of the Philippines, British Malaya and Hongkong is based principally upon my own investigations there. To some extent this is also true of the Netherlands Indies; but in addition, I have drawn very heavily upon: Amry Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies* (2nd ed., 1941); G. H. Bousquet, *La Politique Musulmane et Coloniale des Pays-Bas*; and A. D. A. De Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy*. I am glad to acknowledge my indebtedness to the manuscripts entitled *Modern Burma*, by John Christian and *The Economic Development of Formosa*, by A. J. Grajdanzev, now being published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I have also used Kenneth P. Landon, *Siam in Transition*; Virginia Thompson, *French Indo-China*; C. Robequain, *L'Evolution Economique de L'Indochine Française*; T. E. Ennis, *French Policy and Developments in Indochina*; J. R. Hayden, *The Philippines, A Study in National Development* (in manuscript); and Virginia Thompson, *Thailand, the New Siam*.

## I. INTRODUCTION

A comparative study of the governments of southeast Asia is more provocative of contrasts than similarities. The differences between them are found not only in the present form of the administrations but also in their historical evolution, the relative importance attached to the various social services and the attitude toward the development of native self-government. Yet at the same time the United States, Great Britain, Holland and France have all tried to combine political concessions and the improvement of the material condition of the peoples under their rule with the preservation of the economic interests of the ruling power. That the same general policy should be interpreted in such divergent manners is one of the clearest indications of the profound differences between the colonial policies of the four Western powers.

The most distinctive feature of American policy has been the emphasis placed upon the very rapid development of self-government. The first step was taken only a few years after the conquest of the Philippines by the establishment of self-government in the municipalities and provinces. The actual power of the municipal councils and provincial boards was slight; but in 1907 a legislature composed of elected Filipino representatives was given partial control over legislation, taxation and expenditure.

The Jones Act of 1916, and even more the way in which it was carried out in practice, extended these powers and gave the Philippine legislature a considerable degree of control over the executive. The Tydings-McDuffie Act and the Commonwealth set up in 1935 in accordance with its provisions established internal self-government, subject to the wide emergency powers of intervention which were vested in the President of the United States. In a generation the form of government progressed from a backward and not very intelligent Spanish autocracy to something approaching a democracy of the American type. The salient feature has been the speed with which this transformation has been carried out; and this in turn has sprung

from the conviction that any people can learn to govern themselves after only a few years of apprenticeship. The distinctive American point of view has also been shown in the reliance placed upon the schools as one of the principal media for training in democracy. A small group of politically-minded Filipinos had arisen during the last years of the Spanish regime; and the character of the teaching in the American schools was one of the principal causes of the rapid growth of their influence over the mass of the population. For many years about 20 per cent of the revenue of the Insular or central government was spent upon the schools, while far less attention was paid to public works, agricultural improvement and the other social services. American economic policy has aimed at a semi-monopolization of the Philippine market through the establishment of free trade between the United States and the Islands combined with the imposition of duties and (in recent years) quotas upon competing foreign goods. The effect upon the Philippines of opening the American market to their exports has been to assist in raising the standard of living; but it has also led to a concentration upon the production of those few commodities such as sugar and copra which could be sold most profitably in the United States. The closing of the American market which is supposed to follow the grant of complete independence will almost certainly have so catastrophic an effect upon the economic structure of the Philippines as to make their political prospects highly dubious. The failure of the United States to perceive that the economic policy of free trade was really in contradiction to the political policy of progressive self-government leading to complete independence bids fair to bring about the failure of this attempt to set up a democratic government in Asia.

The difference between British and American colonial policy has been largely one of emphasis. The two are similar in that both regard the attainment of self-government by the dependencies as the ultimate goal. To the British, however, it is to be autonomy within the Empire; while, for the present at least, the Philippine policy of the United States envisages complete independence. In the strategic Caribbean area, however, it seems most unlikely that there will be a complete severance of the imperial tie with Porto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Great Britain has also been more cautious and deliberate than the United States in carrying out the policy of self-government by

installments. The Burmese and the Filipinos were alike in that both were completely inexperienced in democratic government; but the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of twenty years ago were less sweeping than the Jones Act in the powers which they transferred to native control. In the field of the executive, for example, the social service departments were placed under Burmese ministers responsible to the legislature, but courts and police remained under British control. So long as Great Britain controlled the enforcement of law and order the Burmese ministers could gain administrative experience without doing any serious damage to the interests of the country. The same cautious policy was followed in the Burmanization of the civil service: the percentage of Burmese was progressively increased, but enough British officials were retained to train their successors and to see that the old standards were maintained. In the Philippines the number of Americans was reduced from 25 per cent in 1913 to three per cent in 1921 and most of those who remained were school teachers and technical experts. Practically all the Americans who held key positions in the administration were replaced by Filipinos; and the result of this precipitate policy of Filipinization was the serious decline in efficiency described by the Wood-Forbes Commission of Inquiry in 1921. The present Burmese constitution has very greatly enlarged the limits of autonomy, and in transferring to Burma the control over the tariff it has gone further than the United States in the Philippines. On the whole, however, the grant of self-government has been less complete than under the Philippine Commonwealth constitution; and the final stage of Dominion status has been reserved until after the war.

British educational policy has resembled American in that the standard type of school has been literary rather than vocational, and has produced sedentary workers rather than trained mechanics and agriculturists and, in the university field, doctors and technical experts. The political effects have also been similar: both in the Philippines and Burma the schools have been one of the great formative influences in the growth of nationalism. This has been due partly to the character of the teaching with its emphasis upon democratic ideas, and partly because the number of graduates who hoped for sedentary employment was increasingly larger than the number of positions available. The unemployed surplus usually refused to go back to the land

or learn a trade, and swelled the ranks of the intellectual proletariat. Poor and discontented, they constituted one of the most active elements in the nationalist movements, thus providing a curious parallel to the role of the educated unemployed in the rise to power of the Nazi Party in Germany. Despite these resemblances there has nevertheless been a striking difference between British and American educational policy. The United States deliberately relied upon the school as one principal means of training the Filipinos in democracy. The British foresaw that the teaching of democratic ideas would in the end produce a demand for self-government which would lead to the downfall of the paternal despotism of the nineteenth century. One evidence that there were no illusions on the subject is afforded by an educational debate of eighty years ago in the Council of the Governor General of India, of which Burma was then a province. The decision of the Council was that since democratic government was the crowning achievement of Great Britain, the government had no right to conceal this fact from Indians, however much trouble the disclosure might ultimately entail. But while the British deliberately disseminated a knowledge of democratic ideas, the schools were not regarded as a means of affording training in citizenship, probably because of the ingrained British belief that theoretical teaching is incapable of imparting any practical accomplishment. So the future was left to take care of itself, and the British policy was to meet the demand for self-government when it arose.

Another difference between British and American policy was the belief that education was of less value than health. This is not to deny that the United States carried out a remarkable program of medical and health work in the Philippines, and that the British have created an excellent system of Malay vernacular education in Malaya. But, judged by the crucial test of budget expenditure, the British attached far more importance to health than to education, while the United States reversed the emphasis. The same test shows that the British paid more attention than the Americans to the improvement of the agricultural standard of living by research and propaganda, the formation of co-operative societies and the building of roads and railways. One principal reason was to increase the taxable capacity of the population in order to provide more revenue to meet the heavy cost of the social services. These services had

been evolved in Western industrialized states which were able to bear the cost because of the comparatively high per-capita income produced by industrialization. They were introduced into tropical colonies where the individual taxable capacity was low because the staple occupation was a backward agriculture comparable to that of medieval Europe. If the Malay, for instance, could be induced to produce better rubber and copra, he would have more money for himself, and he could also afford to pay more in taxes. This would provide additional funds for the schools, hospitals and public health measures, the absence of which impaired his productive capacity and helped to keep his standard of living low. The building of roads and railways made it profitable to transport to the seaports crops which were of low value in proportion to their bulk. This enabled the cultivator to produce for a world market instead of for his own immediate locality, as had been unavoidable when means of communication were few and primitive. Comparatively speaking, the United States laid far less stress upon the improvement of means of communication, and relied more upon the effect of granting Philippine produce free entrance into the American market. So far as the absence of duties upon colonial produce went, the British policy was the same; but the system of relatively free trade which prevailed until about 1932 prevented Great Britain from providing the additional advantage of giving the exports of the dependencies a preferred position by the imposition of import duties upon competing foreign products.

The greater importance which the British attached to public works had a second motive—the desire to attract Western capital. The Federated Malay States provide a typical example. The development of the social services would be exceedingly slow if it had to rely solely upon the ability of the Malay cultivator to pay higher taxes. The only way to accelerate matters was to induce European or Chinese capital to develop the mineral and agricultural resources of the country. It was not enough to demonstrate the potentialities of tin and rubber and to provide liberal land laws. The produce must be got to the ports, so a good system of roads and railways must be provided before investors could be induced to interest themselves in Malaya. From the early years of British rule, public works expenditure was one of the heaviest items in the budget. In return Western



interests provided a large part of the revenue in the form of export duties on tin and rubber, land rents and import duties.

Dutch colonial policy resembles British far more than American, although it has been considerably more cautious than either in its attitude toward self-government and education. The Volksraad in the Netherlands Indies has 25 Dutch members out of its total of 61. This is a vastly greater representation of Europeans in proportion to the total population than in Burma; and in the Philippines there are no American representatives. The Volksraad has concurrent powers with the Governor General in legislation and finance, but it has no legal control over the executive although in actual practice its views sometimes influence policy. This contrasts markedly with the constitutional position in Burma and the Philippines. The Dutch have a very strongly developed paternalistic bent; they have insisted that they and not the Indonesians shall judge how fast the political advance shall be. The Indonesians were as inexperienced as the Burmese or the Filipinos in self-government; but Holland has been decidedly the most skeptical of the three colonial powers as to the political capacity of her wards. Another very powerful factor has been the strong tradition of centralized control, even in minor matters, first of the Governor General over the administration of the East Indies and ultimately of the Government of Holland over its local representative. Dutch policy in this regard has contrasted with the British tradition of avoiding undue interference with the local authority on the grounds that it was best qualified to judge the needs of the situation.

Dutch educational policy is that the masses should receive a training which will enable them to carry on their traditional occupation of agriculture with greater profit, while Dutch education should be confined to the future leaders. Between the vernacular and the Dutch-language schools there is a great gulf fixed; and the bridge which spans it, the "Link School," is not easy to cross. The vast majority receive only a simple vernacular education in the three R's, although some also attend the trade and agricultural schools. A high percentage of those who enter the Dutch-language schools are the children of native officials, and will themselves enter the ranks of the government services. There is nothing here of the American belief that the schools can be used as an agent of democratic training, and little of the

British attitude that any child should have a chance to acquire an English education. The Dutch justify their system on the ground that, if the Indonesians were given their choice, most of them would choose a literary rather than a vernacular or trade education. Like the Burmese and the Filipinos they greatly prefer sedentary employment, preferably under the government; and the number of would-be clerks and lawyers would soon exceed the capacity of the East Indian Islands to absorb them. The surplus would swell the intellectual proletariat, where they would be an economic loss to the country and a political cause of trouble. The Dutch are frankly skeptical of the ability of the Indonesians to decide what is best for their own interests and prefer to give them what they do not want.

Dutch policy resembles British in the importance attached to the improvement of material conditions. Education has been regarded merely as one means of improving the standard of living, and not the most important. A cultivator with an elementary knowledge of arithmetic is better able to hold his own with the village moneylender. The emphasis has been placed upon irrigation works, health, agricultural improvement, rural credit and means of communications. Native land rights in Java have been carefully safeguarded and customary law has been to a considerable extent preserved. An excellent system of roads and railways has been created from the same mixture of motives as animated the British. Improved means of transit would benefit the Indonesian cultivator, and they would also lead to the investment of Dutch capital. Prior to 1929 the taxes imposed upon Western interests provided 40 per cent of the revenue. As in the case of British Malaya, Dutch liberalism and economic interests were equally responsible for the development of the Indies by Western capital.

French policy in Indo-China had little in common with that of the other powers on the political side. The old assimilation policy had been modified, but colonial autonomy was not contemplated. Indo-China was to form one unit of an integrated empire of which France was the center and the directing force. The powers of the various Indo-Chinese councils were carefully limited, and control lay with the French officials and their superiors in the Colonial Office in Paris. A limited number of Indo-Chinese who had assimilated French culture had been granted French citizenship; but their influence with the govern-

ment was limited. On the economic side France supplied some thing under three-fifths of the imports through her control of the tariff.

Japanese government in Taiwan resembles that of France in the very limited powers of the consultative councils and the suppression of nationalist movements among the Chinese population. The economic policies have also been similar since both have been actuated by the belief that the colony existed primarily for the benefit of the ruling power.

The United States, Great Britain and Holland have each in their own distinctive fashion attempted the experiment of acclimatizing democracy in Asia. The Americans have been the most optimistic, the Dutch the slowest and most cautious, and the British have been somewhere in between. It is much too early to draw any definitive conclusions from the fact that so far none of the three has been successful. Western experience shows that it is far easier to set up the machinery of democratic government than to create the attitude of mind and the experience which alone can make the outward forms operate successfully. France has been a democracy on and off for 150 years; yet one could make out a convincing argument that one principal reason for her fall was that neither her people nor her leaders had really learned to stay within the limitations which alone can make a democracy succeed. So in considering the incomplete experiment of the Volksraad one cannot be certain that there is any permanent significance in the fact that Javanese nationalism is represented by a large number of small parties which find it impossible to combine. The British reforms have been far more extensive as regards the field of power transferred to Burmese control; but like the Dutch they have only been in operation about 20 years. Nationalism in Burma has expressed itself in several loosely compacted parties based upon personalities rather than definite programs. Party organization is in its infancy, and as in the Indies the agricultural mass of the population has very little interest in or understanding of self-government. The Burmese political leaders have shown a lack of a sense of concrete reality and on occasion an opportunism which cannot be described as encouraging. The Philippine experiment is the oldest of the three; but it has been in existence only about a generation. The result to date is that an impartial American bureaucracy has been replaced by a Filipino oligarchy,

and that a quasi-dictatorship operates under the forms of an American democracy. A single party, the Nacionalista, controls the Commonwealth through a machine which has been so thoroughly organized that no opposition party has any real hope of gaining an electoral victory. The party itself is controlled by its leader, President Quezon. The secret of the Nacionalista success is that the vast majority of the Filipino electors do not really understand the meaning of democracy, and that like their kinsmen the Malays and the Javanese, they look to a leader to tell them what to do. There are other factors such as the dominating position, especially in the rice-growing districts, of the *cacique* who is a combination of moneylender, landlord, and local political boss. When one looks at Thailand, the single independent state of southeast Asia, the picture is the same. A comparatively benevolent despotism has been replaced by a Western-educated oligarchy of army officers and government officials which has announced its intention of establishing a genuine democracy in ten years. Meanwhile it controls the government, and has set up a mild form of fascism which does not allow freedom of speech and press or the formation of any opposition political party. Of course it must be remembered that the Siamese revolution took place only nine years ago and that in that period a population of small cultivators with a veneration for absolute monarchy could not be transformed into democrats. At the present moment the only conclusion which one can safely draw is that southeast Asia is reacting against Western control. The result to date, in the Philippines, Burma and Thailand, has been to place power in the hands of the Western-educated minority. It is too early to say whether the final outcome will be rule by the people or the domination of an oligarchy.

Malaya and Hongkong are the only parts of southeast Asia which so far have been practically untouched by nationalism. The Malays have been almost the least politically-minded people on earth and often seem to prefer to obey orders even though they like their wishes to be considered. The Chinese and Indians have until very recently been too much concerned with making money to trouble themselves with politics. Also the British governments of Malaya have rarely used their autocratic powers and in practice have tried to disarm opposition in advance by compromise and persuasion. The result is a fairly

general acceptance of things as they are. The same policy has been followed in Hongkong; and this together with the fact that most of the population are Chinese who have temporarily migrated to the colony to make money explains their support of British rule. If ever democracy should become a live issue in Malaya, however, it would be extraordinarily difficult to devise a satisfactory electorate. The principal difficulty would be that the Malays, who after all are the people of the country, would be politically submerged by the more mature and aggressive immigrant races from China and India. A federal solution is impossible: Malays, Chinese and Indians are too intermingled to make possible a territorial division of the country. The only method would be the establishment of communal electoral rolls: the three races would have to be divided into separate political compartments each of which would elect its own racial representatives.

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The future of southeast Asia after the present war is a question which is already receiving consideration. It has been suggested that the dependencies should be placed under the control of a League of Nations, and that the civil service should be international instead of being composed exclusively of subjects of the ruling powers. Presumably the international council which exercised ultimate authority as well as the separate administrations would contain representatives of China, Japan and the United States as well as of the European powers. One difficulty is that it would be no easy matter to create the mutual confidence and harmonious co-operation which would be essential if such a form of government were to operate successfully. Japan's imperial ambitions will not end abruptly with the treaty of peace, and it is difficult to conceive of either British Malaya or the Netherlands Indies welcoming Japanese officials for a considerable time to come. The Japanese have too thoroughly established the reputation of single-minded devotion to the interests of their own country. Much the same attitude will exist toward Germans. One may deplore the prediction of General Smuts that after this war Germany will for the first time be surrounded by a wall of fear and hate, but one has to face the fact that this will probably be the situation. Nazi ambitions for world domination are merely the revival on a

more extensive scale of the dreams of Pan-Germanism thirty years ago and defeat in this war will not cause them to disappear immediately and finally any more than it did in 1918. Another effect which will survive the war is that for a time at least Germans living abroad will be suspect. So many of them, both officials and private individuals, have abused the hospitality of the countries in which they lived and have been used by the German Government to promote the national interests. It would be too much to expect that German officials would be immediately accepted by their Dutch and British colleagues as trusted collaborators. The presence of the Chinese would also raise a problem. They already possess great economic influence in Malaya and the Netherlands Indies; and the National Government of China has made repeated efforts to maintain control over them. The British and Dutch governments have opposed these attempts; and in addition the Chinese are disliked by the Indonesians and the Malays. The British policy is that the Malays must be shielded and strengthened to save them from submergence. The introduction of Chinese officials would not be popular with the governments, and it would be loudly opposed by the Indonesian nationalists and the Malay sultans. The attitude of the latter would be that when they negotiated treaties accepting British control they had never dreamed that this could be interpreted to mean Chinese officials.

Another difficulty in an international administration would arise from the marked differences between the colonial policies of the great powers. The officials drawn from each nation will at first almost inevitably hold their national viewpoint. The Americans will continue to have an instinctive bias toward democracy and schools; the Japanese will stress authority and obedience; the Dutch will be cautious and skeptical of sudden reforms, the British less markedly so; and the French are not likely to lose their long-standing predilection for assimilation. Opinions will also differ widely as to the relative importance of health, education, public works and agricultural betterment. Some individual must decide how an insufficient revenue shall be allocated among the different social services. The international committee which is the final authority cannot do this effectively: it can give general instructions but there can be a world of difference between a general principle and the con-

crete, day-by-day application of it. In practice the governor of the dependency will have decisive influence in shaping policy. This means that the form which the colony's development takes will depend largely upon his nationality. This also raises the question of what will happen if governors of different nationalities succeed one another. Under these conditions it will be difficult to maintain continuity of development; but few things are more unsettling in a tropical dependency than abrupt changes of policy.

One of the economic proposals is that nationals of all states shall have equal opportunities for investment. In some of the dependencies this situation already exists: in British Malaya, for example, part of the mines and plantations are owned by Japanese, Chinese, Americans and French. In certain other colonies only companies established in the mother country or the dependency are at present allowed to operate. The proposal which has been most emphasized is that raw materials shall be freely accessible to all nations. Practically no attempts have been made by the colonial powers to direct the export of raw materials: one of the very few exceptions has been the differential export duty imposed on Malayan tin ore consigned to smelters outside the British Empire. This law was passed about forty years ago in order to protect the Malayan smelters from the attempt of American interests to transfer the industry to the United States. The normal situation especially since 1929 has been the inability of producers to find a market for their raw materials; they and the governments have been only too glad to sell to anyone who had the money to buy. The lack of foreign exchange has been the stumbling block: Germans and Italians, for example, have complained that they have had to decrease their purchases of Dutch and British tin and rubber from inability to pay for them. It is therefore advocated that the open door should replace the preferential tariffs and quotas which at present favor the trade of the ruling power in all the dependencies of southeast Asia. To some extent this change would make it easier for the noncolonial powers to obtain the foreign exchange needed to pay for their purchases; but it would not solve the problem. The exports of Malaya and the Netherlands Indies are usually greatly in excess of their imports. Together they produce the bulk of the world's rubber and tin, while their imports are limited by the low purchasing capacity

of the vast bulk of the population. A redistribution of the internal market in favor of Germany and Italy would not provide each of the industrialized Western powers with adequate exchange for its purchases: this could only be effected by the lowering of tariffs in the Western nations themselves. In the world of moderate tariffs which existed prior to 1914 no nation ever complained of its inability to buy all the raw materials it required. The inability to pay for them has grown with the rise of the semi-prohibitive tariffs and the autarchy of the interwar period. A contributory factor in Germany particularly has been that after 1933 foreign trade was increasingly controlled by military considerations, and that considerable amounts of foreign exchange were used to build up Nazi organizations abroad instead of to pay for imports. The problem of freedom of access to raw materials is only in part a colonial question: the root of the trouble is the world-wide rise of tariffs and quotas in the past 20 years. The abolition of preferences in the dependencies would be only a partial remedy: the real solution is dependent upon the reduction of trade barriers elsewhere.

The adoption of the open-door policy in southeast Asia may well produce unexpected results. This is a market where cheapness rather than quality is the deciding factor with most consumers, and the spectacular inroads made by Japan a decade ago were due to this factor. None of the Western industrialized nations, nor even China and India, was able to compete; and all lost heavily to Japan. In Malaya the textile quota saved Italian exports from virtual extinction and enabled the Indian cotton mills to regain part of their former market. Japan will continue to have the competitive advantage of lower costs of production, and equal tariffs will aid her far more than, for example, Germany and Italy. Another aspect of the open door is that on occasion it may benefit the industrialized nations rather than the dependencies. In 1939, for example, the Jewish and Arab orange growers of Palestine were protesting against it. Their complaint was that their fruit was excluded from many foreign markets, and that they could not obtain more favorable terms of entrance because the open door imposed by the Mandate deprived them of all bargaining power. The Dutch Government used protection to promote the sale of Netherlands Indies produce, offering larger quotas to the countries which were willing to increase their purchases of the exports of the dependency.



When the Philippines obtains control of its tariff in 1946, the government hopes to use this as a means of gaining alternative markets to take the place of the United States. An open-door regime for the dependencies alone might on occasion prove to be a one-sided and unfair arrangement. It would benefit a few of the great industrial powers but would do little to relieve the chronic problems of the dependencies and would not free the governments of southeast Asia of responsibility for local measures designed to raise living standards and combat the prevailing evils of illiteracy, disease, usury and political apathy or corruption.

## II. THE PHILIPPINES

The population of the Philippines in 1941 was estimated to be about 17,000,000, over 90 per cent of whom are Christians, mainly Roman Catholics. Basically all the people are of Malay stock, with in many localities a considerable admixture of Spanish and Chinese blood. About 600,000 pagans live in the mountains of Northern Luzon and in wild country throughout the Archipelago, and the same number of Mohammedan Moros in Mindanao and the Sulu Islands. There are also some 120,000 Chinese, 29,000 Japanese and 14,000 Americans and Europeans.

Both the pagan tribes and the Moros are traditionally hostile to the Christian Filipinos owing to differences of religion, stage of civilization and past history. The Filipinos who live in the plains of Luzon and the Visayan Islands occupy the richest and, from the military point of view, the most accessible part of the Archipelago. They were conquered and Christianized by the Spaniards in the 16th Century and their racial traits were influenced to a very important degree by their long contact with Spanish and American rule. No other Asiatic race has been under complete Western control for so long a time: the Dutch, for example, did not dethrone most of the Javanese sultans and substitute government by Dutch officials until the 18th and early 19th Centuries. Nearly four centuries of Spanish and American rule have had profound and far-reaching effects upon the Filipinos and have made them the most Westernized of all the peoples of Asia. As a result of this historical evolution they became increasingly unlike the pagan tribes and the Moros, who retained their independence until they were conquered by the United States. The pagans of northern Luzon owed their long immunity to their fighting prowess combined with the very difficult nature of the country and the fact that so far as the Spaniards knew it had no resources which would repay the cost of military operations. Until about a generation ago the tribes retained their primitive civilization almost unchanged, and their custom of head-hunting gained them a good deal of notoriety. When the American regime ended, control was transferred to the Commonwealth Government, and the

tribes were placed under Filipino officials whom they dislike and who regard them as barbarians. The government intends to Filipinize them as quickly as possible, and in the long run it seems likely to succeed in its object.

The Moros are a more formidable problem than the pagans, but in any serious military struggle with the Philippine Government they would stand no chance of victory under modern conditions. They live in the Sulu Archipelago and the island of Mindanao. Formerly they were the most dreaded pirates of the East Indian Archipelago, and their fleets methodically combed the seas from Luzon to Java and New Guinea to Burma. The Filipinos were constantly raided for slaves and loot owing to their proximity, and pirate galleys attacked coastal villages within a few miles of the Spanish fortress at Manila. The Moros despised the Filipinos as inferior fighting men, and in addition they felt toward them the hostility of the Mohammedan for the Christian. The Moros remained independent until they were conquered by American troops in the early years of this century after a good deal of hard fighting. Army officers were usually appointed as governors of the Moro Provinces, and their wise and tactful handling of a very difficult problem had a good many similarities to the British method of controlling the Pathan tribes of the North West Frontier Province of India. A mutual respect and liking grew up between Americans and Moros; but trouble quickly developed when Filipino governors were substituted.

The Moros had a very strong feeling of independence and resented being placed under the control of a race which for centuries they had regarded with contempt. The policy of the Philippine Government aggravated what would have been a difficult situation under any circumstances. The American governors had recognized the powerful Datus, or chiefs of clans, and had worked through them. The object of the new administration was to abolish the semi-autonomous American regime, establish its own direct control and rapidly assimilate Mohammedans and Christians. There was considerable expenditure upon education and health; but the Moros declined to be Filipinized. The powerful Datus were ignored by the Filipino governors, and their great influence was turned against the new regime.

The principal cause of trouble, however, has been the

Philippine Government's economic policy in Mindanao. The island is large and sparsely inhabited: there is ample room for colonization and its rich agricultural and mineral resources have hardly been touched. The Filipinos look upon it as an El Dorado which will solve most of their economic problems, and are determined to develop it. Agricultural colonies have been formed of Filipinos from some of the overcrowded parts of the archipelago. The Moros looked upon Mindanao as their own country and saw that ultimately they would be outnumbered by the new settlers. They demanded that Mindanao and the Sulu Islands should be separated from the Philippines and American control restored. This was refused, and sporadic guerrilla warfare broke out, which still occasionally recurs. There can be no doubt as to the result since the Moros are badly armed and incapable of combining owing to the rivalry of their Datus, while the Philippine Constabulary have the advantage of modern arms and training. President Quezon is determined to force the Moros to submit to his policies of assimilation and Filipino development of Mindanao; and in the long run they will have no alternative save to surrender or be crushed.

The Commonwealth of the Philippines was formally inaugurated in 1935 and will presumably come to an end in 1946 when it is planned that the Islands shall become an independent republic. During the decade of transition the Philippines have substantial control of their internal affairs, although the United States retains powers of supervision and, if necessary, intervention. In practice these powers have been little used, but they are capable of great extension if the necessity arose. The United States continues to be responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs and the defense of the Islands. She has the right to maintain garrisons and the naval stations at Cavite and Olongapo, upon which the recently created Asiatic Fleet is based. The President of the United States may require the services of the troops organized by the Philippine Government and has recently incorporated them into the U. S. Army. The present form of government has a great many resemblances to that of Burma in the degree of autonomy conferred and the rights reserved to the paramount power. One of the more important differences is that the Burmese have been given control of their tariff while the Filipinos have not.

Most of the restrictions imposed upon the Commonwealth Government are in the fields of trade and finance. The consent of the President of the United States is required for all acts affecting the tariff, immigration, currency and coinage. No loans may be floated in foreign countries without his consent; and the government debt may not exceed the limits fixed by Congress. The purpose is to preserve the preferred position which the United States enjoys in the Philippine market, to ensure that the financial credit of the Commonwealth will not be impaired, and to make sure that the government debt, most of which is held in the United States, will be repaid. The Governor of Burma has been given extensive powers of control in the fields of currency and finance. The Burmese also resembles the Philippine constitution in the proviso that citizens and corporations of the paramount power shall enjoy the same rights as those of the dependency. The right to appeal from the Philippine Supreme Court to the Supreme Court of the United States is paralleled by the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The constitution has no clause protecting the rights of the small number of Americans still in Philippine service, save that those who had held government positions for any length of time before 1935 were provided with liberal retirement allowances. Some accepted the offer at that time and those who remained in office will receive their gratuities when they retire. There are only 116 Americans left, most of them being school teachers: the vast majority left the service between 1913 and 1921 when Governor General Harrison carried out his policy of rapid Filipinization. The British have insisted that Burmanization must take place much more slowly and gradually, in order that the government services may not deteriorate as they did under Harrison from the sudden influx of large numbers of inexperienced natives of the country. For the same reason, they have carefully safeguarded the position of British officials as regards pay, promotion and pensions. Their experience in other dependencies had shown that unless financial prospects were assured it was impossible to recruit able men, or to retain those already in the services for the 25 or 30 years of the normal tropical career. Other restrictions on Philippine autonomy are that the approval of the President of the United States is required to all constitutional amendments, and to all laws which in his judg-

ment will result in a failure of the Philippine Government to meet its bonded indebtedness. He has a similar power of veto over any law which he considers would violate the international obligations of the United States. In Burma the Governor and also the Imperial Government have the right to veto any law passed by the legislature. The President of the Philippines must make a report on the proceedings of his government to the President and Congress of the United States, either annually or at such times as they may direct. The President of the United States has the right to intervene for the preservation of the Philippine Government, for the protection of life, property and individual liberty and for the discharge of government obligations. In the opinion of a former member of the Philippine Supreme Court, "all those powers singly and together permit the President of the United States to do almost anything he may desire with the Commonwealth Government."<sup>1</sup> In their potentialities they have a strong similarity to the special responsibilities of the Governor of Burma. If they were frequently employed they could very largely nullify the grant of self-government which has been made to the two dependencies. The really significant point, however, is that the American and British Governments are equally sincere in their determination to establish democratic government in the Philippines and Burma. This can be done only if the dependencies are allowed freely to use their powers even when in the opinion of the paramount powers they do so unwisely. At the same time, it has to be remembered that the Burmese and the Filipinos have served only a brief apprenticeship in the very difficult art of governing themselves and that some Western nations with far longer experience have failed lamentably. Hence it is necessary for the United States and Great Britain to retain a latent power of intervention during the difficult period of transition from direct rule to complete self-government. The reserve powers of the President and the Governor of Burma are emergency powers which will remain dormant unless some serious necessity should require their use.

The High Commissioner is appointed by the President of the United States as his representative in the Islands, and holds office during his pleasure. So long as things go well he holds a

<sup>1</sup> Malcolm, G. A., *The Commonwealth of the Philippines* (New York, 1936), p. 371.

watching brief, reporting to the President on the progress of the Philippine administration. He has access to all government records, and must be furnished with whatever information he deems necessary. The High Commissioner has also very extensive reserve powers which may be exercised on the instructions of the President of the United States. If the Philippine Government fails to meet its debt payments the President may direct him to take over control of the customs department and so much of the revenue as may be necessary for the payment of the debt. He is also empowered to perform such additional duties and functions as may be delegated to him from time to time by the President. The High Commissioner has a staff of American Assistants who are selected by him and appointed by the President of the United States. They are the Financial Expert, the Legal and the Assistant Legal Adviser, the Economic Adviser, the Assistant Financial Adviser and the Administrative Assistant who has charge of the High Commissioner's office. The High Commissioner has also an Army and a Navy Liaison Officer and a Second Assistant Legal Adviser from the Judge Advocate-General's office, the legal department of the army. Their primary duty is to form a link between him and the United States naval and military authorities. The Government of the Philippines is represented at Washington by a Resident Commissioner. He has a seat in the House of Representatives and has the right to speak but not to vote.

The constitution of the Commonwealth continues the tradition of the American administrations which preceded it. Practically all authority is vested in the Insular or central Government, and the provincial and municipal governments have only minor duties. The urban and rural municipalities number about 1,000, and their Councils which are elected have power to pass local ordinances and control the expenditure of the municipal revenues. The provinces are administered by an elected Governor and Provincial Board. Their duties include supervision of the Municipal Councils, maintenance of the provincial roads and the collection of taxes for the Insular Government. In the Insular Government itself power is concentrated in the person of the President; and in many respects his position is reminiscent of that of the former American Governor General. The Philippine tradition of a strong executive is reinforced by the adoption of the American type of democracy

with its system of separation of powers. In this regard it is significant that the Filipino attempt to introduce the British cabinet system was not renewed when internal self-government was granted in 1935. During the previous period from 1916 to 1935 there had been, broadly speaking, Filipino control of legislation, taxation and expenditure, and American control of the executive through the instrumentality of the Governor General. The latter also had partial control over legislative and appropriation acts and used it freely after 1921 to prevent deficits. The constitution was based upon the principle of the separation of powers; but the Filipino political leaders made persistent attempts to bring the executive under the control of the legislature. The method used was to create the Council of State, a body resembling the British Cabinet which had not been contemplated by Congress when it conferred partial self-government upon the Philippines in 1916. The Council of State was, as it were, insinuated into the governmental machinery; and with the co-operation of Governor General Harrison, it attained a considerable measure of success during his regime. His successor, General Leonard Wood, opposed the attempts of the Council to retain the authority which it had gained, and it ceased to meet about 1924 during the struggle between him and Mr. Quezon. It was revived by Governor General Stimson as one part of his program of conciliating the Filipino political leaders. He did not allow it, however, to have the power which it had exercised under Harrison and by 1935 it had virtually atrophied. No attempt was made to revive it when the present Philippine constitution was drafted: in fact the whole tendency was to make the Presidency the dominating department of the government. The history of the Council of State was a tactical episode and not part of a continuing strategic plan. While the executive was in American hands the Filipino leaders of the legislature attempted to bring it under their control; but once the power had been transferred from the Governor General to the President the constitution was drawn up in such a way as to make him the dominating factor in the government.

The debates of the Constitutional Convention show that the general desire was to create a strong presidency. Individuals urged that this course might conflict with the theoretical principles of democracy; but the majority felt that this danger was



preferable to its alternative. They feared that if the powers of the President were weakened and the legislature were made the principal organ of government, the result might be strife between rival political leaders which would end in the breakdown of the constitutional regime. This might lead to a state of chaos which would facilitate the rise of a totalitarian government. The delegates preferred a republic with a strong President to a possible dictator, and their decision was overwhelmingly endorsed by the electorate in the plebiscite which accepted the constitution. The personal popularity of Mr. Quezon influenced the decision, since it was clear that he would be the first President of the Philippine Commonwealth. A very important factor, however, was the Filipino preference for a strong man who had the power and the determination to lead. "A government of laws and not of men" has little attraction for the majority; they prefer a strong and centralized administration which is dominated by one single person. This attitude is due in part to the four centuries of Spanish and American rule when power was concentrated in the central executive. Behind this again lies the strong aristocratic tradition which is also a marked trait of the Javanese and the Malays in British Malaya. They are very far from being subservient and they resent it if their interests are ignored; but at the same time they look to the man in authority to give them orders. In Java, for example, the native officials are appointed from the old ruling families because their birth secures ready compliance with their orders. In the Philippines the same attitude of mind explains the plebiscite of 1940 which allowed the President to be re-elected for a second term. Under the original constitution he could serve only for a single term since it was feared that a longer period of office might enable him so to entrench himself that he could not be removed. Mr. Quezon's term was to expire in 1941, and the Filipinos were afraid that his retirement would be followed by a struggle for power among his political lieutenants which would break up the Nacionalista Party. This had been the dominant political party which had controlled political life in the Philippines for a generation and they shrank from the prospect of internal disunion. Their apprehensions were intensified by the Sino-Japanese and European wars, and the suspicion of Japan's designs upon the Philippines. They demanded the leader in whom

they had confidence and felt that theoretical democratic principles must give way.

The President and the Vice-President must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, qualified voters and at least forty years old. They are elected by direct vote of the people, and according to the original constitution they held office for six years. The President could not be re-elected for the following term; but a constitutional amendment which was adopted in 1940 authorized him to stand for immediate re-election, reduced the term of office to four years, and limited the tenure of the post to two terms. The President controls the executive branch of the Insular Government, and in addition he exercises a general supervision over the provincial and municipal governments. By law and custom his right of supervision falls little short of actual control, if he chooses to exercise the power. He appoints administrative, judicial, military and naval officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. They include the members of the Supreme Court and all inferior courts, the Auditor-General who holds office for ten years and is ineligible for reappointment, and the nine department heads who compose the Cabinet. These are the Secretaries of the Interior, Finance, Justice, Public Instruction, Public Works and Communications, Agriculture and Commerce, Labor, Health and Public Welfare, and National Defense. The President has power to veto any legislative or financial measure, or to return it for reconsideration to the Legislature, which can override his veto by a vote of two-thirds of the members. He may also veto separate items in a revenue, expenditure or tariff bill without rejecting the whole measure. The Legislature may override his veto, but a vote of three-quarters of the members is required if the item in question appropriates a sum in excess of ten per cent of the total amount voted in the appropriation bill for the general expense of government for the preceding year, or if it refers to a bill which authorizes an increase of the public debt. The President draws up the annual budget, and the Legislature may not increase his recommendations for appropriations for the operation of the government with the exception of the amounts which he has specified for the National Assembly, the Judicial Department and for public works. The constitution prescribes that no bill may be passed unless printed copies have been furnished to the members at least three

days prior to its passage by the National Assembly, except when the President certifies the necessity of its immediate enactment. By custom, however, many of the most important laws are habitually introduced and passed in the last forty-eight hours of the legislative session. The combined effect of established custom together with this clause of the constitution is to give the President a large potential power of legislation. The Legislature may authorize him to fix tariff rates or export and import quotas within specified limits; and in time of war or national emergency it may empower him to govern by decree. He is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and may use them to prevent or suppress invasion or rebellion. He makes treaties with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the National Assembly. He has the power to grant reprieves and pardons and remit fines for all offenses except in cases of impeachment. The President determines general policy, guides legislation and dominates the government. The Constitutional Convention intended that he should be the most important factor in the state, regarding this as the best safeguard against the danger of a breakdown of law and order and a dictatorship. Mr. Quezon's whole policy since 1935 has been further to strengthen the position of the President at the expense of the Legislature and the judiciary.<sup>2</sup> The constitution laid the legal foundations for the quasi-dictatorship which seems to be emerging.

The Legislature established in 1935 was a unicameral National Assembly with a maximum of 120 members elected from territorial constituencies for three years. Members must be Philippine citizens, qualified voters, and at least 30 years of age. An amendment to the constitution adopted in 1940 authorized the establishment of a Senate of twenty-four members elected at large. The Legislature controls legislation, taxation, and expenditure subject to the veto of the President. The principle of the separation of powers is carried out by the proviso that no member may hold any other office in the government without forfeiting his seat. A link between the legislative and executive branches is provided by allowing the heads of departments to appear before the Legislature to defend their policies.

All questions relating to elections and the qualifications of members are decided by the Electoral Commission. According

<sup>2</sup> Hayden, J. R., *The Philippines, A Study in National Development*, Macmillan, New York, 1942, in press.

to the original constitution, this was composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court appointed by the Chief Justice, and of six members chosen by the National Assembly. Three were nominated by the majority party and three by the second largest party. This body was unsatisfactory in view of its predominantly political complexion; and in 1940 a constitutional amendment authorized the substitution of an independent commission. The President's appointments to office require the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This consists of twenty-one members elected from the Legislature on the basis of proportional representation. The Commission on Impeachment of twenty-one members is similarly elected, and has the power to impeach the President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General. The case is tried by the National Assembly, the votes of three-fourths of all members being necessary to secure a conviction. It is premature to pass judgment upon the new Electoral Commission, but the Commissions on Appointments and Impeachment seem likely to prove merely paper safeguards against the President's acquiring undue power. The purpose of the Commission on Appointments was to prevent his building a political machine by appointing his own followers to office. Since the Nacionalistas control the Assembly and Mr. Quezon controls them, the Committee seems unlikely to prove a serious obstacle. The Commission on Impeachment appears to be a safeguard against presidential and party domination. Owing to its composition, however, it places the executive and the party leaders almost beyond the reach of the Assembly as a whole, and it will operate as an executive safeguard against the Legislature.

The electorate is composed of all citizens (male and female) of the Philippines who are twenty-one years of age and can read and write. Voters must have resided in their constituency for six months preceding the election. Amendments to the constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths of all its members. They must be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the electorate. The members of the judiciary hold office during good behavior, and their salaries may not be decreased during their term of office. The Supreme Court has both original and appellate jurisdiction, and has the

particular duty of deciding the constitutionality of any treaty, law or executive order.

The American people hoped and believed that a short period of time would be enough to bring about the transition from autocratic Spanish rule to a democracy similar to their own. In the words of a former Governor General, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Americans "were not merely persuaded that it was a splendid altruistic action to pour others into the same mould, but also they were equally confident that all people were much the same. The people of Vermont, let us say, were convinced that if you once established on the island of Jolo among the Moros a democratic form of government with the requisite laws, provisions, etc., that those Moros would make it work and that Jolo would, *ipso facto*, become an operating republic."<sup>3</sup>

To fit the Filipinos rapidly for self-government, reliance was placed upon the creation of an educational system based upon the American model, and upon the progressive transfer of political control from the American administration to the people of the Philippines. The Spaniards had done little for education, and the establishment of schools began very shortly after the conquest in 1898. On the average about 20 per cent of the revenue was spent upon education. In 1935 the number of pupils in the government elementary and secondary schools was 1,229,242, or 36.9 per cent of the population of school age. Of these 79.6 per cent were in the primary, 15.8 per cent in the intermediate, and 4.6 per cent in the secondary schools. An additional 96,279 were in approved private schools, and about 7,000 in the university. In spite of the allocation of 19.51 per cent of the revenue to the schools, roughly two-thirds of the children were without education.<sup>4</sup> They could not be provided for unless the government greatly increased its educational expenditure, and it was unable to do this because of the needs of other departments.

On the political side local self-government in the municipalities and provinces was introduced from 1901 onwards, and in 1907 the first step was taken toward the democratization of the Insular Government. About four per cent of the population were given the franchise, and an elected Legislative Assembly

<sup>3</sup> Roosevelt, Theodore, *Colonial Policies of the United States* (New York, 1937), pp. 85-6.

<sup>4</sup> *Thirty Sixth Annual Report of the Director of Education for 1935* (Manila).

was set up which had a considerable measure of control over legislation and finance. Nine years later, in 1916, the franchise was widened to include all males over 21 who were literate or who paid \$15 annually in taxes. A bicameral Legislature was created, and its control over legislation, taxation and expenditure was greatly extended, although American supervision continued to exist, for example, in the form of the Governor General's power of veto.

The executive remained under American control but here, too, the power of the Filipinos was increased since appointments to office by the Governor General required the consent of the Philippine Senate. Concurrently between 1913 and 1921 the government services were Filipinized. In 1913 most of the key positions were held by Americans while Filipinos filled the subordinate posts; but by 1921 all except a few Americans had been replaced by Filipinos. Governor General Harrison went considerably beyond the terms of the Jones Act of 1916 in the degree of control over the government which he allowed to the Filipino political leaders. The results of his policy were condemned by the Wood-Forbes Commission of Inquiry in 1921. Thereafter the broad trend of American policy was to adhere to the terms of the Jones Act, and not to transfer to the Filipino leaders powers which had been reserved to the Governor General. The unfortunate results which had followed Mr. Harrison's haste led to the belief that the Filipinos must serve a period of apprenticeship in learning to use the powers already granted to them before these could wisely be extended. The next constitutional advance came with the Tydings-McDuffie Act and the establishment of the present Commonwealth Government in 1935. Between it and the creation of the first Legislative Assembly in 1907 there lay only 28 years, a very brief period in which to train a people in the exercise of a most difficult form of government to which they had been totally unaccustomed.

The outward form of the Philippine Commonwealth is a typical American-style democracy; in its operation it is evolving into a quasi-dictatorship with democratic embellishments. There is a minority of educated Filipinos who understand and are capable of working a democratic government; but the period of American control was too brief to bring about this change in the large majority. The Filipinos have been more deeply affected by Western influences than any other Asiatic people. Nearly

four centuries of Spanish and American rule and the conversion to Roman Catholicism of 90 per cent of the population have left a deep impress. Nevertheless in blood they are largely Malay and in many fundamental characteristics they are very similar to the peoples of Malaysia. The majority have the Malay preference for a leader who will do their political thinking for them; and they have the Malay trait of love of oratory and preference for the most eloquent speaker. Politics in the Philippines are a matter of personalities rather than principles; and especially in the country districts the voters have not realized that their representatives should be held to account for unfulfilled promises. The Filipinos attach less importance than the West to the virtues of impartiality and efficiency. It would be hypocritical to claim that Western politics are free from corruption and nepotism; but these evils are decidedly more widespread and are less condemned by public opinion in the Philippines.

The establishment of democracy has been rendered more difficult by the absence of a large Filipino middle class. The Chinese have controlled trade and to some extent moneylending; and ultimately many of them return to China and are succeeded by others. Some of the Chinese intermarried with the Filipinos as the Spaniards also did, and their descendants, the mestizos, are the native governing class. President Quezon, for example, is a Spanish mestizo and his former rival and present supporter Mr. Osmeña is a Chinese mestizo. The union of races often seems to produce a type which is abler and more energetic than the pure-blooded Filipino. The mestizos number perhaps 900,000, less than a sixteenth of the population, and own the bulk of the wealth. It is they who have chiefly benefited from the introduction of self-government; and they fill most of the important positions in politics, agriculture, business and the professions. Most of the pure-blooded Filipinos are manual laborers and small cultivators either tenant or freehold, and a high percentage of them are very heavily in debt to the propertied class.

The problem of rural debt would appear to be more serious in the Philippines than in Malaya or Java. The amount is often so large that there is no prospect of repayment, and the debtor is really a debt slave. Moreover in the other dependencies the moneylender is an alien, economically powerful but politically

without influence upon the government. In the Philippines the *cacique*, as he is called, combines economic and political power. Sometimes he is a small cultivator who is also a moneylender. Frequently he is a great landowner whose family has from long usage acquired an hereditary right of domination in the district. His land is cultivated by tenants and agricultural laborers who are often compelled by sheer economic necessity to borrow from him at exorbitant rates of interest. Even if the Filipino were thrifty he would frequently be compelled to contract loans; but owing to his improvidence he is his own worst enemy. The result is that tenants, agricultural laborers, and freeholders are often hopelessly in debt to the *cacique*. They are compelled to vote for the political candidate whom he supports; and his control of a large part of the rural vote makes him indispensable to the political leaders. It is significant that in the past it has been exceedingly difficult to pass laws which would seriously incommode the *cacique*. As a final rounding off of his position he frequently controls the local justice of the peace and police.

Lack of education is still another reason for the failure to establish democracy in the Philippines. For many years the government has spent 20 per cent of the annual revenue on the schools, as against about four per cent on public health, two per cent on agricultural improvement and 15 to 20 per cent on public works. The reason for this policy was the American belief that the school was one of the most successful means for training the Filipinos to govern themselves. In spite of these efforts something over half the population is illiterate and only about 14 per cent have carried their education beyond the primary school. Between 1900 and 1928 there were about 7,000,000 children of school age of whom little more than 600,000 completed their primary education. The average length of attendance has been less than three years, which is not enough to attain permanent literacy in a foreign language like English. The small circulation of the press is also significant: a few years ago it reached only 1.5 per cent of the population. A limited number of Filipinos are keen and informed critics of their government; but there is no educated public opinion among the mass of the population and especially in the country districts to which they can appeal.

A final reason for the emergence of quasi-dictatorship is that for a generation there has been only one effective political party



in the Philippines, the Nacionalista. The opposition parties which have appeared from time to time have had too small a following, too poor an organization and too limited a campaign fund to have any hope of winning an election. The Nacionalista Party is well organized, well provided with funds, and has the prestige of having conducted a successful thirty-year fight for Philippine independence. It has used its monopoly of office to build up a great political machine of office-holders and aspirants to government positions. The loyalty of the voters has been assured by pork-barrel legislation; and candidates for election have often spent upon their campaigns far more than the third of their salary of \$2,500 allowed by law, and have frequently bankrupted themselves by their expenditure.<sup>5</sup> President Quezon is the master of his party: his power is so great that he could break any politician who opposed him, and his followers are well aware of it.

The electorate, the party organization and the constitution work together to make it easy for the President to become virtually a dictator. Once democratic government was established, the only question was which of the Filipino political leaders would attain this position. Mr. Quezon was easily the ablest of them all. By sheer ability in political manipulation he had gained control of the Nacionalista Party and ousted its former leader Mr. Osmeña. The inevitable result was his election to the Presidency. He has immense ambition and determination, and none of his rivals are likely to display equal success in guiding the country through the difficult and troublous times which lie ahead of it. Agrarian unrest is likely to become the most serious internal problem which the Islands will have to face, owing to the economic dislocation which will be caused by the closing of the American market. The root of the trouble is the poverty and debt-slavery of a large proportion of the cultivators particularly in the rice-growing districts. During the American regime the Legislature was very reluctant to adopt any reforms which would injure the interests of the ruling oligarchy. The result was the organization of the Sakdal Party in 1931 and the weak and abortive revolt of 1935. Economic unrest continued to grow and has become chronic in some parts of the Philippines. President Quezon had never been a social reformer, and he had had close relations with the class who benefited from the conditions which

<sup>5</sup> Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-20.

had caused the agrarian discontent. About 1937 he began to change: he made a number of speeches attacking the "sugar barons" and championing the rights of the common man. His policy has on the whole followed a middle course: he has somewhat improved the position of the cultivator and laborer, but at the same time he has defended the rights of property and has refused to take drastic action against the wealthy classes. The program has not satisfied either the extreme left or the large employers; but it has been an attempt to stem unrest without going so far as to alienate the ruling class.

The President has been creating an army with the assistance of General Douglas MacArthur, who was authorized by Congress to establish a defense system. The avowed purpose is to make conquest of the Islands so difficult and costly that no opponent would hazard the attempt. In 1940 the regular army was composed of 363 officers and 3,735 volunteers enlisted for three years. In addition about 20,000 conscripts—as many as the available revenue permits—are called up each year on reaching the age of twenty-one and serve for five and a half months. Thereafter they pass into the reserve and will be given periodical short periods of training until they reach the age of fifty. In 1940 the trained reserve numbered 4,829 officers and 104,410 men. It is estimated that the cost will be about 17 per cent of the annual revenue, which in 1939-40 was \$48,531,000. In the long run the money will have to be found by reducing appropriations for other services, particularly education. At the present time this has not proved necessary, owing to the large sums received from the American Government as the proceeds of the excise taxes collected on Philippine produce sold in the United States. Apparently the army will be made up principally of infantry and artillery, will be weak in mechanization and will have only 250 airplanes. There will be no navy except for a few fast, light torpedo boats. Such a force could make a temporary defense, but since the only coastal fortifications are near Manila it could not prevent an invader from landing at other points. No doubt it could carry on guerrilla warfare in the mountains and jungle for a considerable time; but the preservation of the country would depend upon whether the United States intervened to protect it. This obligation continues until an independent republic is established in 1946; and during the past year the American land and naval forces have been considerably strengthened.

### III. BURMA

The government of Burma is in a state of transition from direct rule to Dominion status. A little over twenty years ago the country was a typical Indian province with British control of administration, legislation and finance. The Legislature had wide powers of debate but was neither expected nor intended to control the executive. The theory and practice of government was based on the prevalent belief that democracy was unworkable East of Suez. As a result of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms Burma received the same type of government as the other provinces of India. The majority of the members of the Legislature were popularly elected, and they were given substantial powers of legislation and partial control over finance and the executive. The next stage of Indian constitutional advance, the Government of India Act of 1935, was accompanied by a very important change in the position of Burma. The only reason for its inclusion in the Indian Empire was that it had been conquered by India during the 19th century; and a strong demand had arisen that Burma should be restored to its historic position as a separate country. In the Government of India Act of 1935, Burma was removed from the control of the Governor General and became a separate dependency under the control of the Imperial Government. The general form of the new constitution resembles that of an Indian province; but there is the important difference that the government unites in itself all the powers which in India are divided between the provincial and the proposed federal administrations.

The Burmese form about two-thirds of the population, and according to the census of 1931 they numbered 9,862,694 out of the total of approximately 15,000,000. The Indians numbered 1,017,825, the majority of whom eventually returned to India although several hundred thousand were permanently settled in Burma. They were laborers, traders and moneylenders, and were strongly disliked by the Burmese because their greater industry and astuteness had given them a dominant position in the economic field. There were 193,549 Chinese, most of

them traders and moneylenders; but they were on excellent terms with the Burmese. Finally there were 3,491,000 Shans, Karens and other tribesmen who live in the great horseshoe of hills which surround the central plains. They constituted 14 per cent of the population and their country made up 43 per cent of the whole of Burma. Many of them are in the tribal stage of civilization; and others live in native states under the rule of hereditary chiefs. They are not sufficiently developed politically to take part in a democratic government, and are excluded from the scope of the reforms, at least for the time being. The excluded areas remain under their traditional rulers, whose administration is supervised by British officers under the control of the Governor of Burma. The peace and good order of these areas are one of his special responsibilities.

The democratic reforms apply to the central and southern parts of Burma. They confer wide powers upon a people who have had very little experience in self-government, and who cannot as yet be entrusted with full control over their own affairs. During this period of transition the Governor has a far more difficult task than in the old days of benevolent despotism. He must still be a good administrator and, if it is unavoidable, an autocrat; but in addition he must be a constitutional ruler, the adviser of his ministers and a diplomat. The ideal Governor under the new regime should combine the wisdom of Solomon, the patience of Job, and the finesse of a veteran politician. The British cabinet system has been introduced, and about 90 per cent of the work of government has been placed under the control of Burmese ministers responsible to the Legislature. The reserved departments remain under the sole direction and control of the Governor. They are foreign affairs (which are unimportant), defense, ecclesiastical affairs (the maintenance of a few Anglican chaplains for the spiritual needs of the British community), the excluded areas, and monetary policy. The army is normally made up of two battalions of Imperial infantry, about 3,500 Indian troops, and the Frontier Defence Force. This last is composed of 12,000 military police, most of them Gurkhas, Karens and Chins, the majority being stationed along the frontier among the hill tribes. Four Burmese rifle battalions are also being raised. The Governor may appoint an Advocate-General, and three Counsellors to assist him in controlling the reserved departments. He may also appoint a Finan-

cial Adviser to assist him in matters pertaining to Burma's financial stability; but he must consult his ministers before making the appointment.

The Burmese ministers must be members of the Legislature and are appointed and dismissed by the Governor. They are the leaders of the majority party and hold office until they are defeated in the Legislature. Apart from the reserved departments the Governor follows their advice unless it conflicts with his special responsibilities. If this contingency arises he is required to disregard their wishes and act in accordance with his own view of the needs of the situation. A full report of the circumstances must immediately be made to the Imperial Government. The more important of his special responsibilities are the prevention of any grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of Burma, the protection of the government's financial stability and credit, and the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the minorities. The special responsibilities are very largely to be explained by the fact that the Burmese and their leaders have had so little training in the practice of democratic government. Sometimes they have shown a rather disquieting lack of a sense of political realities. They have not learned for example, as the English people have from centuries of experience, that democracy is government by compromise, and that the majority of the moment must not push its temporary electoral victory over its opponents too far, or the democratic system of government will be endangered. The special responsibilities should be regarded as a statutory and, one hopes, temporary substitute for the unwritten customs of parliamentary government in Great Britain. The hostility of the Burmese toward the Indians, for example, is very strong, and since 1930 there has been a disquieting series of riotous attacks upon Indians in which there has been considerable loss of life. Proposals have been made drastically to curtail their rights, and it is essential that the Governor should have discretionary power to prevent any acts of injustice. He has been instructed not to disregard his ministers' advice unless it is absolutely unavoidable, since the policy of Great Britain is that genuine self-government shall be established in Burma. In July 1940 Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, stated that the policy of the Government was *Dominion status within the British Empire*. The task of the Governor is to dissuade his ministers from policies

which would compel him to invoke his reserve powers; and one test of his success is the infrequency with which he has to make use of them. He has also the power to take over the government if the constitutional machinery should break down.

The Legislature is composed of a Senate of 36 members who sit for seven years and a House of Representatives of 132 members sitting for five years. The Legislature must meet at least once a year, and the Governor has power to summon, prorogue and dissolve it. The Ministers, the Counsellors and the Advocate-General have the right to speak in either Chamber but may not vote. The Senate and the House may elect their President and Deputy-President, and Speaker and Deputy-Speaker, respectively, and all of them must be members of the Chamber in which they serve. All questions are decided by a majority of the votes of the members present and voting, and the President or Speaker may vote only in the event of a tie. No member may continue to sit if he holds an office of profit (ministers excepted) under the Crown, is an undischarged bankrupt or is found guilty of corrupt electoral practices. Candidates for election must be British subjects who are not less than 25 years of age in the case of the House of Representatives and 35 for the Senate. In addition a Senator must have an income of 12,000 rupees (\$3,600) or own sufficient land to pay an annual tax of 1,000 rupees (\$300).

The Legislature has freedom of debate, save that it may not discuss foreign affairs or the excluded areas without the Governor's permission. All laws and all measures of taxation or expenditure must be passed by both Houses. Bills may originate in either Chamber with the exception of financial measures. They may be introduced only in the House of Representatives, and only on the recommendation of the Governor. He may assent, veto or reserve bills for the decision of the Imperial Government; or he may return them to the Legislature with his recommendations for reconsideration. In the event of an emergency he has the power to promulgate an ordinance which is valid for six months; and a full report on the circumstances must be sent immediately to the Imperial Parliament. If the House alters a financial measure in such a manner as to affect the Governor's special responsibilities, he may restore the items struck out. His power of legislation is not an innovation but the retention of the power of certification which has been held

by the Governors of Burma since the date of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. It has been very sparingly used and has been a theoretical far more than a practical restriction upon popular control of legislation. The Governor also legislates for the excluded areas, and decides which acts of the Burmese legislature shall have effect in them.

The majority of the members are elected from territorial constituencies, but as in India the remainder represent racial minorities and economic interests. Of the 132 seats in the House of Representatives 115 are filled from territorial constituencies which are allocated as follows. Ninety-one seats are non-communal, twelve are reserved for Karens, eight for Indians, two for Indian labor and two for non-Indian labor. Out of the remaining seventeen seats three are reserved for Europeans and two for Anglo-Burmans, these representatives being elected from the whole of Burma as the constituency. Eleven seats are reserved for representatives of commerce and industry, the electors being the members of the five Chambers of Commerce and the Chettiers' (Indian bankers) Association; and Rangoon University returns one member. The electors in noncommunal constituencies are entered in a general electoral roll, while there are separate communal rolls in the constituencies which are reserved for representatives of a single race. The result is to ensure that ninety seats will be filled by Burmese. Of the thirty-six members of the Senate eighteen are appointed by the Governor. The rest are elected by the House of Representatives in accordance with the system of proportional representation, each group voting separately. The electorate is composed of British subjects or subjects of an Indian state who are more than eighteen years of age, and who have paid taxes or have served in the army or the police. Inhabitants of a town may vote if they own immovable property to the value of 100 rupees (\$30) or have paid municipal taxes, or have occupied for at least three months a building of which the monthly rental is not less than four rupees (\$1.20). Women may vote if they fulfill the above conditions and in addition are twenty-one years old and can read and write. The electorate numbers 2,300,000 men and 700,000 women, or 23.26 per cent of the population as compared with 16.9 per cent before the reforms.

For administrative purposes Burma is divided into thirty-three districts, each of which is under the control of a Deputy

Commissioner who corresponds to the District Officer in Malaya. He is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and in this capacity exercises a general supervision over the police who are however under their own officers. The Deputy Commissioner controls the administration of justice by the subordinate magistracy, has appellate powers in minor cases and may himself try a case if it is of special importance. He is responsible for the collection of the land tax and other revenues; and he also supervises the work of the agricultural, education and other officers of the technical services in his district. Authority is concentrated in the Deputy Commissioner, but he does not deal with the minutiae of administration which he leaves to his subordinates: his part is that of a controlling and directing authority. Over half of the Deputy Commissioners are Burmese, as are the subordinate administrative officers in the district. Each village is under the control of a headman, who collects the taxes and has petty police and judicial powers. Usually a local notable, he is elected by the villagers subject to confirmation by the Deputy Commissioner, and he is assisted by an elected village committee. The headman receives as annual salary a percentage of the revenue he collects, the maximum amount being about 500 rupees (\$150). The thirty-three districts are combined into seven divisions, each of which is under a Commissioner who exercises a general supervision over his Deputy Commissioners. The Commissioners in turn are under the control of the Governor.

Safeguards have been provided to protect the members of the government services from political interference. They continue to be appointed by the Secretary of State and may be dismissed only by him. The conditions of service, including pay, promotion, and pension, are regulated by him or by the Governor acting on his behalf, and may not be altered by the Legislature. A Public Service Commission has been appointed to conduct examinations for appointment to the government services, and to advise on all matters affecting them. The members are appointed by the Governor, and at least half must have held office under the Crown in India for not less than ten years.

Minor civil and criminal cases are tried by the Stipendiary Magistrates, the Deputy Commissioner being the Chief Magistrate in his district. Next come the District and the Sessions Courts with wide civil and criminal jurisdiction, the judges



being members of the civil service, and more than half being Burmese. Appeals lie to the High Court at Rangoon, and from there to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. The judges of the High Court may be either European British subjects or Burmese. They are appointed by the Crown, which also determines salaries and pensions. They may be dismissed for misconduct by the Crown after an investigation by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Since this has not occurred from a time when the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, the judges of the High Court hold office until they retire on pension at the age of sixty. The purpose is to ensure that the judiciary shall be completely independent of the Governor and the Legislature. In addition to its appellate jurisdiction the High Court has superintendence over all the lower courts, and the Governor must consult it before appointing judges to them.

The revenue of Burma is about the equivalent of \$53,000,000, or only slightly more than \$3.50 per head of population. About one-third comes from the land tax, the special assessments charged upon irrigated lands, and the royalties paid by oil and mining companies. The land tax itself averages about \$1.25 *per capita*. Excise, income tax and royalties received from logging companies each provide about seven per cent of the total, while the customs duties bring in 20 per cent. Other sources of revenue are stamp duties and the income from the posts, telegraphs and government railways. Expenditure has usually been less than the revenue; and the government debt of \$160,000,000 was assumed as Burma's share of India's net debt at the time of their separation in 1937.

The percentage of literacy is higher in Burma than in any other Asiatic country with the sole exception of Japan, owing to the importance which the Buddhist Church has attached to education. There are about 20,000 monastic schools which give an elementary education in Burmese along with religious instruction. In 1931 the literacy rate was 397 per 1,000, being 600 per 1,000 for men and 182 for women. This may be compared with the rate in the Netherlands Indies of about 100 per 1,000. Apart from the Buddhist vernacular schools there are about 5,600 secular vernacular schools, both primary and secondary, the bulk of them missionary or private schools. The popular demand, however, is for English literary education, and

most of those who attend the English schools hope to become clerks. Education in the past has been predominantly literary; but there is a growing realization that this has created an intellectual proletariat of unemployed lawyers, clerks and persons with university training, while there is a shortage of mechanics and of technically trained men. Trade and technical schools have been established, and attempts are being made to divert students to them from the literary schools. Another problem is the very high rate of wastage in the primary schools: only 18 per cent of those who enter complete the Fourth Standard, and many lapse into illiteracy. Education is not compulsory because the revenue is too small to provide enough teachers.

The medical problems of Burma are those which are usually found in the tropics. The Government has established some 300 hospitals and dispensaries, a research laboratory, and a medical college. Much has been done to provide the towns with pure water and proper sewage disposal, although village sanitation is still primitive. The general death rate fell from 25.4 per 1,000 in 1911 to 20.5 in 1937.

Agricultural betterment has a prominent place in government policy. Since rice is the principal crop, particular attention is given to padi research, and the Field Officers who carry on agricultural propaganda among the cultivators have established cordial relations with them. Irrigation works are needed in Upper Burma owing to the uncertain rainfall. The Department has repaired and extended old works as well as building new ones, and the irrigated area is now 1,514,000 acres. Rural debt and land ownership—the two are closely connected—are perhaps the most difficult problems which confront the government. They have also very serious political consequences since, roughly speaking, the debtors are Burmese and the creditors and landlords are Indian bankers. The rice farmer must have loans to carry him over the period between sowing and harvest; but the Burmese are improvident and less than ten per cent of the loans have been spent for agricultural purposes.

#### IV. BRITISH MALAYA

British Malaya is made up of no less than ten separate governments which fall into three different varieties of colonial administration. The Straits Settlements which alone are British territory are a Crown Colony of the ordinary and traditional type. The nine Malay States are protectorates where sovereign power belongs legally to the sultans but is exercised by the British Government by virtue of treaties negotiated with the rulers. The Malay framework of the states was left intact and the constitutional position of the sultans was legally unimpaired. The practical difference between the protectorates and the Straits Settlements is not very great: in both the administration is largely conducted on Crown Colony lines. Each sultan has a British Resident or Adviser whose advice he is required to follow on all questions which do not affect Malay custom or the Mohammedan religion. British control is particularly evident in the four states of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang. They were the earliest to come under British protection; and in 1896 they were combined in the Federated Malay States. In some of the five Unfederated Malay States the sultan has retained considerably more authority, though much depends upon the personal capacity of each ruler.

The complexity of governmental organization and problems in Malaya is largely the result of the mixture of races. The establishment of British control has been followed by so extensive an immigration of Chinese and Indians that the Malays now form only 44.7 per cent of the population of the peninsula. According to the census of 1931 the total population was 4,385,346, of whom 1,114,015 were in the Straits Settlements, 1,713,096 in the Federated and 1,556,739 in the Unfederated States. The Malays numbered 1,962,021 and had a majority only in the Unfederated States of Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu. In the Straits Settlements they were 22.5 per cent and in the Federated States 26 per cent. There were 1,709,392 Chinese, most of them in the Straits Settlements or in the states on the west coast, which are the centers of the tin and rubber industries. They formed 39 per cent of the whole population of

Malaya, 59.6 per cent of that of the Straits Settlements and 41.5 per cent of that of the Federated Malay States. The Indians in 1931 numbered 624,009, and were most numerous in the Federated Malay States where they were 22.2 per cent of the population. The majority of the Chinese and Indians are migrants who eventually return to their native countries. In 1931 only 534,011 or 31 per cent of the total Chinese population of Malaya had been born there and some even of them eventually returned to China. Only 131,505 or 21 per cent of the Indians had been born in Malaya. The Malays are the only permanent element in the population, although a growing minority of the Chinese and Indians are permanently domiciled in Malaya. The British and other Europeans numbered less than 18,000 in 1931; but their importance was out of all proportion to their numbers since they controlled the production of about half the rubber and two-thirds of the tin.

The British Government feels strongly that its first duty is to the Malays. They are the people of the country, and it was at their invitation and not by conquest that the Malay States came under British rule seventy years ago. At that time the political organization and point of view of the Malays were reminiscent of 13th-century France or Germany. In the next forty years the rapid development of tin and rubber and the influx of Chinese and Indians transformed Malaya into a 20th-century state. The Malays could not keep up with the breakneck speed of the transformation, which is not surprising when one reflects that they would have had to compress into a generation an evolution which took the peoples of Europe seven centuries. The Malays are still one of the least politically minded races on earth: they have a strong aristocratic tradition and they feel that the business of governing should be left to the government. One of them summed up their attitude by saying, "We Malays like to have our interests consulted; but when the Government gives an order we like to obey it." As yet they are incapable of safeguarding their own interests either politically or economically; and unless they receive special protection they will be submerged by the more aggressive and more mature immigrant races. The fundamental problem of government in Malaya is to discharge this obligation, and at the same time give legitimate weight to the interests which have been created by

the Chinese and Indian immigrants and the British owners of tin mines and rubber plantations.

#### THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS<sup>1</sup>

The government is that of a typical Crown Colony with a Governor, an Executive and a Legislative Council. The Executive Council consists of the Governor as president, eight other official members, and one Chinese and two British unofficial members appointed by the Governor for two years. The Legislative Council is composed of the Governor as president, thirteen official and thirteen unofficial members who are British subjects. All legislative and financial measures require its assent; but the Governor has both an original and a casting vote so that there is an official majority. The unofficial members serve for three years and may be reappointed. Eleven are appointed by the Governor—five Europeans, three Chinese, one British Indian, one Malay and one Eurasian. Two additional Europeans have been elected since 1924, one by the British members of the Chamber of Commerce at Singapore and the other by those of the Penang Chamber of Commerce. The unofficial members are chosen to act as spokesmen for the principal races and economic interests of the Colony. There is no attempt to follow the principle of representation by population since the Council is a purely advisory body and has no legal control over the government. Its purpose is to ensure that the Governor is informed of the views of every important element in the Colony. Hence the 12,000 Eurasians and the 152,000 Indians each have one member. A Select Committee of the Legislative Council which has an unofficial majority examines the annual draft estimates of revenue and expenditure before they come before the full Council; and a Finance Committee composed of the Treasurer and three non-officials considers supplementary votes for expenditure before they are laid before the Legislative Council.

The Colonial Office exercises a general supervision over the government of the Colony, and no important measures may be adopted without its approval. The Governor must obey all instructions received from it but at the same time his views carry great weight since he is the man on the spot. Subject to this ultimate control the Governor is legally an autocrat within

<sup>1</sup> Comprising Singapore, Malacca and Penang.

the colony: all power and likewise the sole responsibility are concentrated in him. He alone has the authority to make decisions, even though in practice he is compelled to delegate much of his power to subordinates owing to the impossibility of any one man accomplishing the amount of work which is nominally imposed upon a 20th-century colonial governor. The Governor lays down the policies to be followed, and has control over all officials with the exception of the Colonial Auditor and the Justices of the Supreme Court. He makes recommendations to the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the promotion and dismissal of the higher civil servants, and he appoints and dismisses subordinate officials. His position as commander in chief of the local garrison ensures the supremacy of the civil over the military power. He is supposed to consult his Executive Council on all questions of importance, but he need not follow its advice. In the Legislative Council the unofficial members have complete freedom of debate; but the Governor can control proceedings by the official majority, since official members may be required to vote as he directs. He has also the power to veto all bills, and no financial measure can be introduced without his consent. Both Councils are really advisory bodies: the Executive Council gives the Governor the advice of the leading officials, while the Legislative Council presents the wishes and grievances of the various races and interests. The final decision lies with the Governor; for the essence of the Crown Colony system is that power and responsibility are vested in him alone.

When writing about the British Empire it is wise to remember the warning:

Do I sleep? Do I dream?  
Do I wonder and doubt?  
Are things what they seem,  
Or is visions about?

The Crown Colony system is a case in point: the typical Governor is a benevolent despot in theory and a limited monarch in practice. Before embarking on a course of action he tries to find out what the population of the Colony think of it, and if opposition develops he tries to disarm it by arranging a compromise. The official majority of the Legislative Council is rarely used to pass legislation except on the direct order of the Colonial Office. One important means of ascertaining popular

feeling is through the British and Chinese non-officials on the Executive Council. They are also members of the Legislative Council, and if they oppose a measure in one Council, they will do the same in the other, most probably with the support of the other non-officials. All financial and legislative proposals are brought up first of all in the Executive Council. If opposition develops, the Governor tries to remove it by negotiating a compromise, so that at any rate the majority of the unofficial members in the Legislative Council are satisfied. If he fails, he is likely to drop the measure unless he is acting on the orders of the Colonial Office. Even then he often urges the Secretary of State to reconsider his policy in order to avoid popular opposition. The result is that before a bill is formally introduced in the Legislative Council, substantial agreement has already been reached on its general principles, and discussion is on points of detail. Even at this stage if a single unofficial member brings forward arguments which had not previously been advanced, enactment is postponed until they have been considered. If financial measures brought before the Select Committee or the Finance Committee are opposed by two of the non-officials the Government usually abandons or modifies them. The result is that the most important work of the unofficial members is largely done outside the formal meetings of the Legislative Council.

Several causes explain the difference between the theory and practice of Crown Colony government. The unofficial members of the Legislative Council have full liberty to discuss any phase of government policy, and the colonial press makes vigorous use of its freedom from censorship. The tradition of a century decrees that the Governor and the civil service are the favorite targets; and government is carried on under a steady fire of criticism which sometimes swells to a barrage. This situation is taken for granted; but what every Governor prays to escape is questions in the House of Commons. A really serious controversy is likely to lead to this result, particularly if the unofficial members of the Legislative Council unanimously oppose him. In this event the Colonial Office will support him unless he is clearly in the wrong; but the whole thing takes time and the Colonial Office has enough to do supervising some fifty-odd dependencies without adding to its burdens. It prefers a Governor who avoids quarrels. As was once said of another colony, "We

cannot be always investigating a storm in a teapot where each individual tea leaf has its dignity and its grievance." The result is that there is constant criticism of government in Malaya but very little wish to change the Crown Colony system. Particular acts are condemned; but the tiny handful of Europeans and Chinese who advocate the establishment of a democracy represent no one but themselves. There is general agreement that the administration is impartial and reasonably efficient, and that it relies upon persuasion and compromise far more than on its autocratic powers.

The administration of the three Settlements is in charge of a Resident Councillor at Penang and Malacca and the Colonial Secretary at Singapore. In each of them the urban area is controlled by a Municipal Commission with legislative and executive powers. In Singapore, for example, there are twenty-five Commissioners of whom the Governor appoints twelve directly and another twelve on the nomination of the Chamber of Commerce and other local organizations. The President has for the past thirty years been a civil servant, while the other Commissioners are non-officials. In 1938 the revenue was Straits \$14,838,000 in Singapore and \$4,491,000 in Penang, and the expenditure was about the same.<sup>2</sup> The principal tax is the tax of 20 per cent on the annual rental value of property.

The Supreme Court is composed of a Chief Justice and three or more Puisne Judges. It exercises original civil and criminal jurisdiction, as well as appellate jurisdiction in cases tried in District and Police Courts. An appeal lies from the Supreme Court to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. There are five District Courts, some with civil and others with criminal jurisdiction; and Police Courts exist in varying numbers in each Settlement.

The revenue of the Straits Settlements has fluctuated considerably: in 1938 it reached the unprecedented figure of Straits \$69,955,000. Nearly 25 per cent comes from the government opium monopoly, about 33 per cent from import duties on tobacco, liquors and petroleum, 13 per cent from the interest on the investment of the Colony's accumulated surpluses, and the remainder from such miscellaneous sources as the Posts and Telegraphs Departments, death and stamp duties, licenses, court fees and land sales. In 1937 the revenue surpluses

<sup>2</sup> The value of the Straits dollar is 2s.4d.



amounted to about Straits \$126,000,000. There was no public debt on purely government account, and the *per capita* tax rate was about \$16. Expenditure has usually been less than revenue, and in 1938 it was Straits \$40,698,000. The cost of general administration, law courts and police has usually been about two-fifths of the annual expenditure, and pensions have accounted for another six per cent. Between 12 and 22 per cent has been spent on public works, roughly nine per cent on public health, five per cent on education, and 1.6 per cent on agriculture and other social services. The cost of defense in normal years is \$5,000,000, which is between 10 and 12 per cent of the expenditure. Prior to 1939 Malaya was defended by a small force of Imperial and Indian infantry and artillery, the Malay battalion, a small detachment of the Royal Air Force and the local volunteers. Until Indo-China and Thailand came under Japanese control or the danger of it, an attack could be made only by sea, and the defense therefore depended principally upon the Royal Navy and the Singapore naval base.

#### THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES

The four states of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang were combined in 1896 to form the Federated Malay States. The British official head of the federation was the Resident General or, to give him his more recent title, the Chief Secretary; and the Governor of the Straits Settlements exercised a somewhat shadowy control in his capacity as High Commissioner of the Federated Malay States. During the following twenty-five years the federation gradually became an amalgamation: the four State Councils retained only the most trivial legislative powers, and the sultans and their British Residents had so little authority that they became virtually a fifth wheel to the coach. Executive control over the four States became centralized in the Federal Secretariat at Kuala Lumpur, composed of the Chief Secretary, the heads of departments and their assistants. Control of legislation and finance passed to the Federal Council, which was an advisory body with an official majority like the Legislative Council in the Straits Settlements. The consequences of federation had neither been foreseen nor desired by the Imperial Government; but the same developments which had reduced the states to impotence made it very difficult to restore power to them. During the past decade a

policy of cautious and gradual decentralization has been in progress; but while the first stage has been carried through, many years will elapse before it is completed. The object is to reverse the trend toward overcentralization, and progressively to transfer to the four state governments many of the powers of the federal administration at Kuala Lumpur.

The security which followed the establishment of British control led to so heavy an influx of Chinese and Indians that the Malays have become a minority in their own country. At the same time the investment of several hundred million dollars of British and Chinese capital in tin and rubber transformed the economic character of the peninsula. In less than two generations Malaya was changed from a medieval into a 20th-century state. Sultans who had been brought up in the tradition that war and piracy were the only professions worthy of a gentleman could not cope with fair-wage tribunals, conditions of estate labor or educational policies; and power inevitably passed into the hands of the British officials. A new type of ruler is beginning to appear—the sultan who understands modern problems and insists on having a voice in the government of his state. This is a hopeful sign for the political future of the Malays; but, for the present, decentralization must be slow and cautious lest too hasty a transfer of power should injure the British and Chinese interests which have been built up.

The abolition of the post of Chief Secretary was an essential part of the weakening of the federal government. In his place appears the Federal Secretary, who controls what few federal departments survive, such as railways. He also acts as a channel of communications between the four state governments and the High Commissioner at Singapore; but he has no authority to make decisions in matters transferred to the states. Some of the powers of the Chief Secretary were handed over to the state governments, but a large part of them have gone to the High Commissioner, who will henceforth take a far more important part in the government of the Federated States than he has ever done in the past. There is no federal Executive Council; but there is a legislature, the Federal Council, the assent of which is required to all measures of legislation, taxation and expenditure. It has complete liberty of criticism and debate, but is an advisory body with an official majority which is required

to support government measures. Its power in practice is much greater than in theory, for the same reasons as apply to the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements. There are sixteen official members who include the High Commissioner, the four state Residents, the Federal Secretary and the heads or advisers of the principal departments. The twelve unofficial members are appointed by the Governor and are made up of five European and two Chinese British subjects, four Malays and one Indian. All unofficial members must also be members of the four State Councils.

The government of each of the four states is made up of the sultan, the British Resident and the State Council. The sultan is required to follow the Resident's advice on all questions other than those affecting Malay custom and the Mohammedan religion. The State Council of Perak is typical of the composition and powers of these bodies. It has a membership of twenty-six, composed of the sultan and eleven Malay chiefs, the Resident and six officials, and seven unofficial members of whom three are Europeans, one an Indian and three Chinese. Much to the dissatisfaction of the non-officials, proceedings are conducted in Malay, whereas English is used in the Federal Council. Most of the Malay members are territorial chiefs, too inexperienced to handle their new powers and by lifelong training unwilling to express an opinion until they have found out the sultan's wishes. They are too old to change; but a new type of Malay member is beginning to appear. These are men who have received an English public school education at the Malay college at Kuala Kangsar and have an understanding of modern problems. The unofficial members criticize and debate freely; and any serious disagreement between them and the officials must immediately be reported to the High Commissioner. The relations between the Resident and the non-officials seem to be evolving into something very similar to those between the Governor and the non-officials in the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements.

The effect of decentralization upon the executive was that only a few departments which concerned all the states, such as railways and customs, were retained under federal control. The Agricultural, Co-operative, Educational, Electrical, Forestry, Medical, Mining, Public Works, Drainage and Irrigation, Prisons and Veterinary Departments were broken up and placed

under the state department heads. The latter were under the control of the state governments, and not, as formerly, of the federal administration at Kuala Lumpur. The difficulty is that many of the problems of Malaya such as those of health and education are much the same throughout the country, and that there must not be four separate and perhaps contradictory state policies. To achieve the necessary co-ordination the former federal department heads, now known as Advisers, have been given personal executive authority over the four state departments. This has given them the same control over the state department heads as they formerly possessed. Nevertheless it would be an exaggeration to say that this is merely the old centralization under another name. The Resident, the principal British official in each state, can no longer be ignored as formerly. The state departments are under his control and his approval of proposed policies must be obtained, with a final appeal to the High Commissioner at Singapore if agreement cannot be reached. How far the Resident exercises his new powers varies with the individual; but the general result has been to lessen the authority of the Adviser and strengthen that of the state administration. The intention is that the Adviser shall continue to lay down the broad outlines of policy for the four states while the Resident shall use his new authority in modifying it to suit local conditions, since he has a fuller knowledge of what adaptations are necessary.

The power to legislate has been divided between the Federal and the State Councils, the principal fields assigned to the latter being education, forests, some phases of public health and agriculture, and Mohammedan law. The great obstacle to extending state legislative powers is that the laws must be substantially uniform throughout the federation owing to the similarity of conditions. The financial powers of the states are very circumscribed, although as decentralization progresses it is intended to increase them. At the present time all taxes must be levied by the Federal Council; and the government debt and the financial needs of the federal government are the first charge upon the revenue. The Federal Council grants an annual lump sum to each state to meet the cost of the departments transferred to it. The State Council has the power to apportion this lump sum among the various services. No state may float a loan without the consent of the Federal Council; and the High

Commissioner must approve the annual budget estimates allocating the block grant before they are submitted to the State Council.

The ultimate form of decentralization is as unpredictable as the political future of the Malay. The immediate and inevitable result has been to increase the authority of the Residents and the High Commissioner. The sultans' prestige has also been strengthened and they are consulted more than formerly. How far their views will influence policy must necessarily depend on their ability, experience and training, and on their desire to take an active part in the affairs of their states. The Imperial Government has no intention of restoring the absolute monarchies of seventy years ago: its immediate object is to give the Malays a greater opportunity to share in the government of their country through the policy of cautiously strengthening the power of the state governments. The result of the experiment will depend upon how far the Malays take advantage of the opportunity.

The same motive has dictated the policy of Malayization in the administrative service. Each state is divided into a varying number of districts in charge of District Officers under whom are Assistant District Officers. Their powers resemble those of the Deputy Commissioners in Burma. Until ten years ago almost all these positions were filled by European British subjects. Many of the Assistant District Officers are now Malays, and the policy is to promote them to higher positions as they gain experience. The towns and larger villages are administered by Sanitary Boards, the members of which are partly officials and in part prominent local residents appointed by the Resident of the state. The Boards are responsible for public health and municipal matters generally, and are financed by local taxes.

The Supreme Court of the Federated Malay States is a court of original jurisdiction as well as of appeal, and consists of a Chief Justice and three judges appointed by the High Commissioner. Final appeal lies to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Below the Supreme Court come the Courts of the First- and Second-Class Magistrates which have civil and criminal jurisdiction. The Magistrates are usually members of the Malay Civil Service who have passed their legal examinations. All District and some Assistant District Officers are First-

Class Magistrates *ex officio*. The village headmen have petty civil jurisdiction, and an appeal may be made to the court of a First-Class Magistrate. The courts of Kathis and Assistant Kathis deal with matters of Mohammedan religion and law. Appeals against their decision lie to the State Council and not to a court.

The Federated Malay States derive about 30 per cent of their revenue from the export duties on tin and rubber, and another 22 per cent from a wide range of import duties. The government opium monopoly and the rental from agricultural and mining lands each brings in about seven per cent. The remaining third of the revenue comes from excise, licenses, court fees, the sale of electric light and power, posts, telegraphs and telephones, interest on investments and royalties from logging companies. The railways are owned and operated by the government, and are an important source of revenue. The most striking feature of the revenue of the Federated States is the extent to which it is dependent upon the world and particularly the American demand for the two staple exports of tin and rubber. All the principal taxes depend upon the prosperity of these two industries either directly as in the export taxes, or indirectly as regards the import duties, land rents and to some extent railway receipts. The result is that the revenue has fluctuated sharply in close correspondence with the alternate booms and slumps of the tin and rubber industries. In 1938 the revenue was Straits \$63,053,000 and the expenditure \$101,584,000. The public debt was \$65,286,000, and the accumulated surplus revenue funds \$130,936,000.

About a quarter of the expenditure of the Federated States is on pensions and debt charges, and another 30 per cent is required for general administration, courts and police. The cost of the electrical and other revenue-producing departments is about 10 per cent of the total expenditure. Defense was only 2.5 per cent; prior to the present war the Malay States were garrisoned only by two battalions of Malay and Indian troops, supplemented by local volunteers. Expenditure upon public works has been heavy, varying between a fifth and a tenth of the total. A substantial portion of it should properly be assigned to the Departments of Medicine and Education in the form of anti-malarial works, school and hospital buildings; but the form in which the accounts are kept makes it impossible to

ascertain the amounts which ought to be transferred. The seven per cent of the expenditure which is credited to public health and the five per cent to education are both substantial understatements. Another five per cent is allotted to agriculture, irrigation, veterinary, co-operative societies and fisheries. The Federated Malay States, like all the other Malayan governments, regard the medical department as the most important of the social services. Its medical research and work in public health, particularly the anti-malarial measures, have given the dependency a very important place in the history of tropical medicine. The Malay vernacular school system is excellent, though Malaya has been no more successful than other colonies in solving the problem of adapting Western education to the needs of Asiatic races.

#### THE UNFEDERATED MALAY STATES<sup>3</sup>

The general form of government in the Unfederated resembles that of the Federated Malay States. In all five the government is carried on in the name of the sultan, who must accept the advice of his British Adviser; and all of them are under the supervision of the High Commissioner. All have advisory State Councils composed of the sultan, his Malay ministers and the British Adviser. In Johore, which has a large population of the immigrant races and heavy investments of British capital, there are also British, Chinese and Indian unofficial members. There is a separate Executive Council in Johore, but in the other four states executive and legislative functions are combined in the same body. Each of the states has a varying number of British administrative, judicial and especially technical officers seconded from the services in the Colony and the Federated Malay States.

The difference between the Unfederated and the Federated Malay States is that the sultans have retained a considerably greater degree of authority than in the federation. The Adviser in the Unfederated States has remained an adviser and has not taken the administration into his own hands as the Resident has in the Federated States. He carries the sultan with him and hastens slowly while the Resident takes a short cut and issues orders on his own authority. One might say that the Adviser resembles a business consultant while the Resident might be

<sup>3</sup> Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu.

compared to a managing director. So far as Malaya affords a parallel to the system of indirect rule in the Central African colonies, it is to be found in the Unfederated States. If the sultan refuses to follow the advice given, the question is referred to the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office. If the question is one of Imperial importance, the code regulating the employment of Indian laborers for example, the sultan is required to accept the British proposals. Otherwise he is allowed to have his own way; the Imperial Government is decidedly more reluctant to overrule him than if he were the sultan of a Federated Malay State. A good Adviser must be a diplomat as well as an administrator, and the more infrequently he has to insist on his policy the more successful he shows himself. The same method is used in the State Council: if some of the members oppose the Adviser's proposals, the question is postponed until the following meeting and meanwhile he brings his diplomatic charms to bear.

Malay officials have a much more important position than in the Federated States. Most of the ministers and the administrative officers are Malays; and Europeans are found principally in the technical services, since as yet very few Malays have acquired the training to fill these posts. The Unfederated States are very proud of their more independent position, and are decidedly unwilling to employ additional British officers. The British Advisers strongly support the sultans in this policy.

The revenue is derived from the same taxes as in the Federated States. Johore has a revenue of about \$20,000,000 owing to development of the tin, iron and rubber industries. Great attention has been paid to the social services, particularly health and education. The other states have remained largely undeveloped, and their revenues run between \$2,500,000 and \$7,500,000. Fiscal policy has been conservative, the public debt where it exists is small, and each state has built up a surplus revenue reserve fund. Little money is left after the basic essentials of general administration, police, court, pension and debt charges have been met. On the average, public works account for about 24 per cent of the expenditure and social services for 18 per cent, public health receiving a larger appropriation than education.



## V. HONGKONG

The government of Hongkong is like its trade and banking: all are based on the geographic fact that the colony is within a few miles of the populous Chinese province of Kwangtung. As a result of this propinquity a population of several thousand fishermen *cum* pirates (the terms were at one time almost interchangeable) had grown by 1938 to 1,028,619 exclusive of the 600,000 refugees, of whom 97 per cent were Chinese. Nearly nine-tenths were dependent for their livelihood upon trade, banking or manufacture. The Colony is really a single city of traders, bankers and laborers which has grown up on the island and also across the harbor at Kowloon, which geographically is part of the mainland of China. The farmers number only about 100,000 and the fishermen 70,000. The small cultivators are almost the only section of the inhabitants who are permanently settled in Hongkong, for the great bulk of the urban population is even more migratory than in Malaya. The Chinese come to Hongkong to make money, but the vast majority do not look upon it as their home, and ultimately they return to China. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War there was a constant coming and going by boat and train from Macao and Canton: in 1935 the daily average was 9,171 arrivals and 9,348 departures. According to the census of 1931, only 38.5 per cent of the urban Chinese had been over ten years in the Colony, and only 6.4 per cent over thirty years.

As a result of this the problem of government is to adapt Western standards of administration to a people whose point of view is often diametrically opposite. The British, for example, regard an efficient police as so fundamental that it can be taken for granted; the Chinese tend to look upon a policeman as a man of oppressive habits and depraved inclinations who should be boycotted by all respectable citizens. The Hongkong solution was two police forces—the government police with whom the Chinese can non-co-operate to their hearts' content, and the District Watch Force. The latter is raised and paid by the Chinese and is regarded by them as their own police. They give it information which they would refuse to the official force;

and the two bodies work together excellently under the discreet superintendence of the British Secretary for Chinese affairs.

The form of government is that of a typical Crown Colony with Governor, Executive and Legislative Councils, but the problems are in the main those of a town council owing to the limited area and the predominantly urban character of the population. In many respects the administration is more analogous to the Singapore Municipal Council than to the Government of the Straits Settlements. The Executive Council is composed of six official and three unofficial members appointed by the Governor, one of the latter being a Chinese. The Legislative Council has nine official and eight unofficial members appointed by the Governor. Of these, four are European British subjects, three Chinese and one Portuguese. The Finance Committee is composed of the Colonial Secretary as chairman and the unofficial members of the Legislative Council. There is also an Urban Council which has an unofficial majority of British and Chinese members appointed by the Governor. It is concerned only with public health and can make bylaws subject to the approval of the Legislative Council. The powers of the Governor, Executive and Legislative Councils and the Finance Committee are similar to those of the same bodies in the Straits Settlements. Legally the Governor is a local autocrat subject to the ultimate control of the Colonial Office, and the Councils are merely advisory bodies which have complete liberty to express their opinions but cannot control policy. Actually the Governor rules by compromise and persuasion, and shows the same reluctance to use his legal powers as in the Straits Settlements. The practical working of the two administrations is so similar that it seems unnecessary to duplicate the description already given.

Hongkong, however, has one organ of government, the District Watch Committee, which has no counterpart in Malaya. Legally it is only a committee representing the subscribers to the upkeep of the District Watch Force already mentioned, which meets weekly to manage its affairs. Actually it is the Governor's unofficial Executive Council for Chinese affairs, and the fifteen members are the leading Chinese merchants and bankers of Hongkong. Candidates are suggested by the Chinese from among the most influential members of their community, and are appointed by the Governor. The Chairman is the Sec-

retary for Chinese Affairs; and once a month the Governor himself presides. The growth of function from an obscure police committee to its present all-embracing importance was gradual and is not to be found in any statute. It seems to be based on the typically British principle that if a body appointed for one purpose proves particularly effective for something else, then there is no valid reason for enshrining the *status quo* in formal official regulations. The Committee is consulted on all questions affecting the Chinese, and it has given invaluable help in securing their co-operation in government measures. The members have immense influence over their compatriots, far more so than the somewhat similar advisory committees which exist in Malaya. The reason is that the great bulk of the Chinese in Hongkong come from Kwangtung Province, whereas in Malaya, coming from several different provinces which are hostile to one another, the lack of racial homogeneity has meant that the committees have far less influence over the Chinese.

The Secretariat for Chinese Affairs was established over eighty years ago to deal with all matters affecting the Chinese and to advise the government. A very similar department exists in Malaya. The Secretary for Chinese Affairs and his three European assistants are administrative officers and are required to be fluent in Chinese. Everything possible is done to facilitate easy access of any Chinese to one of the Europeans, to make known his wishes or grievances. The Secretary also takes the initiative in ascertaining them, explains intended policies, tries to gain Chinese co-operation, and is the special Government adviser on all questions affecting them. The confidence which the Chinese have come to feel in the power and benevolence of the Secretary is the basis of his success. For this reason his actual are much wider than his legal powers; the Chinese themselves insist that he arbitrate many disputes which otherwise would be settled by the courts. An appeal against his decision is practically unknown; and at times he has to discourage applicants to prevent himself from being swamped with petitions.

The guiding principle of the government's Chinese policy has been to carry on a Western administration among a predominantly Chinese population with the maximum of co-operation and the minimum of friction and misunderstanding. Where possible the government has modified Western standards, and above all it has tried not to move too far in advance

of Chinese opinion. Obedience is required when compromise is impossible: a pigsty for example is positively not allowed in lodging houses. The Chinese have not been particularly interested in self-government: they came to the Colony to make money and in most cases intend to return home as soon as their purpose has been accomplished. They have no time for extraneous side issues; and they thoroughly appreciate the solid advantages of the security for life and property afforded by British rule. Most of the Chinese support the Kuomintang and contribute liberally to its funds; but they have shown no wish to see the Colony annexed to China. The government for its part has made no attempt to interfere with their membership in the Kuomintang; and many of its most trusted Chinese subordinate officials have not troubled to become British subjects. The result of British policy is that the government can count on the strong support of the leading Chinese and the exertion of all their powers of control over their fellow countrymen. Their interests are bound up with its continuance and they consider that in the past it has treated them with justice and consideration.

The Supreme Court is composed of a Chief Justice and one puisne judge, and sits as a court of original jurisdiction as well as of appeal in civil and criminal cases. Minor offenses are tried by the magistrates; and there are two land courts with jurisdiction over land cases in the agricultural part of the Colony, the local District Officers acting as judges. They also conduct the small debts courts and try minor criminal cases in their capacity as magistrates.

Hongkong has a small revenue: in 1938 it amounted to £2,277,000, which is only about 30 per cent more than that of the Singapore Municipal Council. Import duties, excise and harbor dues together produced about a quarter; and another 16 per cent came from the assessment tax on property, the rates varying from 15 to 17 per cent of the annual rental value. About 19 per cent of the revenue came from the revenue-producing departments, the post office, government radio station and (till 1938) the British section of the Canton-Kowloon railway. The opium monopoly contributed about one per cent, and the rest of the revenue was derived from such miscellaneous sources as fees, interest on investments, and stamp and estate duties. Owing to the policy of free trade, import duties can be

levied only on liquors, tobacco and petroleum oils; and an income tax is impracticable. There are obvious limits to the height of the assessment tax, and the other sources of revenue are also inelastic. Expenditure has normally been less than revenue so that a reserve fund has been accumulated which has been drawn upon when deficits were unavoidable. In 1938 the expenditure was £2,304,000 and the reserve fund £840,575. A small public debt incurred to finance the cost of building water works and other public works, amounted to £1,029,000 in 1938. General administration, courts and police account for about 32 per cent of the expenditure, pensions and debt charges 11 per cent, and the revenue-producing departments 6 per cent. The Colony's share in the cost of its defense is about 19 per cent, the rest of the charges being borne by the Imperial Treasury. Hongkong is an air base and a second-class naval base. It is the headquarters of the British China squadron. Prior to the present war the garrison was composed of several battalions of Imperial and Indian infantry and several batteries of artillery, supplemented by the volunteers recruited from among the British community. During the past two years an air raids precaution service has been organized and shelters built. Expenditure upon public works has never been less than 16 per cent of the total, public health takes about 9 per cent, and education 6 per cent. Expenditure upon agriculture and forestry is less than 1 per cent: Hongkong is so overwhelmingly urban that there is very little agriculture to foster.

## VI. THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

The Dutch Empire has always been divided for administrative purposes into Java and Madura on the one hand, and on the other the Outer Territories (or Outer Provinces) comprising the rest of the East Indian Islands. The reasons for this division have been that Java was the richest, earliest and most highly developed, most densely populated and centrally placed of all the islands. According to the census of 1930 the total population was 60,731,025, of which 41,719,524 or over two-thirds were in Java and Madura.<sup>1</sup> The density of population in the latter islands was 314.5 per square kilometer compared with an average of only 10.7 in the Outer Territories. The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants, 59,143,755, were Indonesians, the number of Chinese being only 1,233,856, and of foreign Asiatics (chiefly Arabs) 111,022. The Chinese as traders and money-lenders have an importance far beyond their limited number; and the National Government of China has attempted to organize and control them in the same way as it has the Chinese of Malaya. They form so small a percentage of the total population however—two per cent compared with 39 per cent in Malaya—that they present a much less serious problem to the Dutch Government than to the British. The Europeans in the Indies in 1930 numbered 242,000 of whom perhaps 65 per cent were Eurasians or Indo-Europeans.

The relations between Holland and the Indies have undergone important modifications during the past twenty years in the direction of increased colonial autonomy. Under the previous system there had been an excess of centralization: the Governor General at Batavia had minutely controlled the whole government of the Empire, and he in turn had been under the strict supervision of the Government of Holland. The reforms gave the colonial government the power to regulate Indian internal affairs, subject to the ultimate control of the Government of Holland which also had charge of imperial interests and foreign policy. All ordinances passed by the Indian Government could be suspended by the Crown acting on the advice of

<sup>1</sup> The total population in 1940 was estimated at 70 million.

its ministers, and the States General retained the right to veto them. The former very wide power of legislation possessed by the Crown was greatly restricted. The States General retained the right to legislate; but it was required first to consult the Indian legislature. The right to draw up the budget was transferred from the Government of Holland to that of the Indies, but the approval of the States General was required before the budget could be put into effect. The Governor General continued to be appointed by the Government of Holland and carried on his administration in accordance with its instructions. He remained completely responsible to the Minister for the Colonies who in turn was responsible to the States General. Under the new regime the minister would lay down the broad outlines of policy and exercise a general supervision, but he would not interfere in the details of the administration which would be left to the Governor General. A strong demand has arisen in the Indies for a greater degree of independence, and the conquest of Holland by Germany has strengthened this development.

The structure of government is still highly centralized and bureaucratic. The Governor General has very extensive authority, administrative, legislative and financial. He is assisted by an advisory body, the Council of the Netherlands Indies, and also by the General Secretariat and the various department heads. His legislative and financial powers are exercised in collaboration with the Volksraad, some of the members of which are elected and the remainder appointed. The possession is divided into six major administrative units with a governor at the head of each. Java constitutes three provinces (not including the native states of Solo and Djokjakarta which are under a separate governor); and in 1938 three governments were established in Sumatra, Borneo, and the "Great East," which includes the rest of the Outer Territories. In the three Javanese provinces deliberative councils exist; but in the three governments the government is autocratic. The governors carry out their duties under the control of the Governor General; and each province or government is divided into residencies under a Dutch Resident. The residency in turn is subdivided into smaller areas, each of which is under a Dutch Assistant-Resident. In Java but not in the Outer Territories there is also a Javanese Regent and a Regency Council. This description applies

to the parts of the Islands where the former princes have been dethroned and direct rule established. About 7 per cent of Java and slightly more than half of the Outer Territories have been left under their traditional rulers. There are 282 native states which differ very widely in size and importance, from the ancient principality of Djokjakarta with 2,500,000 inhabitants to the illiterate raja who rules over a handful of villages with a few hundred inhabitants. In theory the native states conduct their own internal affairs with the assistance of Dutch officials; but in practice they have not much more self-government than the areas which are under direct control.

The Governor General has a burden of work which is almost overwhelming. Decentralization, that is the creation of the provincial governments, has not appreciably lessened his administrative responsibilities, since little power has been delegated to them. The establishment of the Volksraad has made his task heavier, since he has now to answer its criticisms and gain its co-operation. Usually but not invariably he has been in public life in Holland, and he has frequently had previous experience in some branch of the government services in the Indies. He is appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Ministry, and by custom his term of office is five years. The Governor General appoints and dismisses all officials with the exception of a small number who are appointed by the Crown. These are the members of the Council, the Chairman of the Volksraad, the President of the High Court and the members of the Auditing Chamber. The Governor General lays down the policies of the government, subject to his instructions from Holland. He supervises the administration of the governors and also the work of the technical departments. He approves the legislative program and the financial measures which are laid before the Volksraad and keeps in close touch with its proceedings. He has also the right to legislate by decree, and in times of crisis he may exercise wide emergency powers.

The Governor General is advised by the Council of the Netherlands Indies, which is composed of four Dutch officials and one Indonesian member of the Volksraad who are appointed by the Crown. The Governor General is required to consult the Council on certain questions such as the enactment of ordinances upon his sole authority; but on all other matters consultation is optional. The Governor General may disregard the



advice of the Council except in a few cases such as sentences of exile, when its assent is required; but usually he is greatly influenced by its opinion. In times of serious emergency he may act without waiting for its decision.

The General Secretariat has come into being because it is physically impossible for any one man to discharge the multifarious duties of the Governor General. It acts as an intermediary between him and the various organs of government, advises him upon all questions which are laid before him, and has acquired a far greater influence than the Council or the department heads. In its main purpose the General Secretariat resembles the department of the Colonial Secretary in a British Crown Colony. There is however the very important difference that in the latter the principal department heads are members of the Executive Council and can lay their views before the Governor in person. In the Indies they are not members of the Council, and must submit their proposals through the General Secretariat which transmits them with whatever criticism and advice it considers advisable. The lack of direct and frequent personal contact between the Governor General and his department heads is one reason for the lack of closely-knit unity of direction in the central government. Another is that the various departments are divided among the three cities of Batavia, Buitenzorg and Bandoeng, so that the Governor General perforce exercises control at a distance and through writing.

The Volksraad was established in 1918 and is composed of sixty-one members, including the Chairman who is appointed by the Crown. There are 30 Indonesian, 25 Dutch, one Arab and four Chinese members. All must be Netherlands subjects and inhabitants of the Indies; the term of office is four years. Twenty of the Indonesian, 15 of the Dutch and three of the foreign Asiatic members must be elected; while the rest are appointed by the Governor General in consultation with the Council of the Netherlands Indies. The system of election is both communal and indirect. The European, Indonesian and foreign Asiatic members of the provincial, regency and municipal councils form separate electoral colleges to choose their communal representatives. While the Europeans and foreign Asiatics each form a single electoral college throughout the Indies, the Indonesians are divided into twelve electoral circles of which four are in Java, four in Sumatra, and one each in

Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas and the Lesser Sunda Islands. When the Volksraad is not in session its functions are carried on by the College of Delegates, a body of fifteen members elected by the Volksraad from its own membership on the basis of proportional representation. Laws affecting the internal affairs of the Indies are enacted by the Governor General after consultation with the Council and with the concurrence of the Volksraad. Under certain conditions he may pass ordinances on his own authority after consultation with the Council, for example if the Volksraad has not agreed to a bill when urgent circumstances require immediate action. The Volksraad may initiate legislation but usually leaves this to the Governor General. It must approve the budget, and if a deadlock develops between it and the Governor General the question is settled by the States General. The Volksraad has the rights of petition and interpellation, but while it may criticize the executive it has no control over it.

Each of the three provinces of Java is under a Governor, a Provincial Council and a Board of Deputies. The Governor supervises the administration and presides over the meetings of the Council and the Board. He is responsible to the Governor General and also to the Council for the daily policy and administration of provincial affairs. The Council is composed of Netherlanders, Indonesians and other Asiatics, some of whom are communally elected and the rest appointed by the Governor General. The elected representatives are chosen by the members of the regency and municipal councils in the province. The Council may legislate on such matters of local concern as have been delegated to it by the central government. The Governor General must approve all financial measures, and he may also suspend or veto any act which he considers to be in conflict with the general interest. The Council elects a Board of Deputies of from two to six members who may or may not be on the Council. They carry on the provincial administration in collaboration with the Governor and are responsible to the Provincial Council.

The province is divided into a varying number of residencies, each of which is administered by a Dutch Resident under the control of the Governor. He is assisted by Dutch Assistant-Residents, and also by Javanese administrative officers of whom the most important are the Regents. In the past the position and

functions of the Regent have been among the most striking and successful features of Dutch administration in Java. Throughout the greater part of the island the former princes have been deposed and direct Dutch rule has been substituted. To this extent the system of government is the same as in many of the British dependencies; but it differs from it in the use of the Regent as an intermediary between the Dutch official and the Javanese whom he governs. The real power lies with the Resident or Assistant-Resident, but as far as possible he acts through the Regent who receives his instructions privately in the form of advice. His prestige is carefully safeguarded, and to the small cultivators who form the vast majority of the population it still seems that he is actually in control. The Javanese, like the Malays, have a strong aristocratic tradition and vastly prefer to be ruled by a man of good family. The Regents are usually chosen from the former ruling families and often possess much personal influence over their people. They are rarely wealthy and depend mainly on the salary and pension which they receive from the Dutch Government. This factor ensures their loyalty, together with the great prestige which the office carries with it and the care with which the Dutch select officials of whose allegiance they are assured. The Regent is assisted by minor Javanese officials, all of whom have been carefully trained in one of the administrative schools and hope eventually to be promoted to a regency.

The Regency Council is composed mainly of Indonesians, the remainder being Netherlands and foreign Asiatics. Some of the Indonesians are chosen indirectly by electors, who in turn are elected by all Indonesians who paid taxes during the previous year. The other members of the Council are appointed by the Governor General on the recommendation of the Regent. The Council decides questions of local interest, but tax measures require the approval of the Governor General. It also elects a Board of Deputies which together with the Regent supervises the village governments. The Regent is responsible both to the governors and the Council. The substitution of election for appointment of some of the members may in the end radically alter the position of the Regent. He has not been popular with Indonesian nationalists, and some of them who have been elected to the reformed Councils have mustered enough support to overrule him—an unheard-of situation under

the old regime. In the end this is very likely to weaken his position which has rested partly on inherited prestige. The abler descendants of the old aristocracy are showing a tendency to turn away from an official career to others which offer them greater liberty and independence.

Nearly nine-tenths of the population live in villages, which are the basic units of administration. Each village elects its own headman and council of elders, who allocate the communal land and manage local affairs in accordance with ancient customs. The headman collects the taxes, sees for example that sanitary regulations are observed and village roads kept in order, and has petty civil and criminal jurisdiction. *Adat* or customary law governs nearly all cases in the village courts as well as in the superior native courts. Urban areas are excluded from the control of the regency government, and are administered by an elected mayor and municipal council. The municipality is under the supervision of the provincial Board of Delegates and the Governor General.

The government of the Outer Territories is in process of reorganization. In 1938 the area was divided into the three Governments of Sumatra, Borneo and the Great East, each of which is administered by a Governor, who is under the control of the Governor General. The system of organization resembles that of Java, each government being divided into smaller administrative areas under Residents, and these in turn being further subdivided into districts under Assistant-Residents and Controleurs. The Regent does not exist in the Outer Territories, and there is no native intermediary between the Dutch official and the people he governs. Instead of establishing Provincial and Regency Councils the Dutch propose to make use of the existing native political organizations, and gradually to develop confederations of communities where the separate units are too small for effective administration. Councils with an Indonesian majority will be set up in these areas and will be given much wider powers of control over local affairs than have been granted to the Regency Councils.

The most striking feature in the legal field is the very great attention which is paid to *adat* or native customary law. The Dutch have gone much further in this direction than the other colonizing nations; and the result is a strongly-marked dualism in the judicature. Broadly speaking there are two sets of courts,

one applying *adat* law (modified as regards, *inter alia*, procedure and penalties in order to conform to Western ideas) to Indonesians and foreign Asiatics, and the other applying Dutch law to Europeans, most Eurasians, Japanese, Chinese and those natives who have voluntarily transferred themselves from customary to Dutch law. The native courts are (1) the village tribunals with petty powers, (2) the regency and district courts for minor civil and criminal cases, and (3) the *landraad*, which is the general court for civil cases involving natives and criminal cases involving natives and foreign Asiatics. The chairman of the latter is usually a Netherlander who may be either a judicial or an administrative officer, and he is assisted by a Regent and important native chiefs. The lowest court for Europeans is the residency court, from which there is an appeal to one of the Councils of Justice which are established in six of the principal towns. These courts have also original jurisdiction, and hear appeals in customary law cases. The final court of appeal for both European and *adat* law cases is the High Court at Batavia.

The pre-1939 defense system of the empire was weak: a small squadron of cruisers, destroyers and submarines, a limited air force and a standing army of about 37,000 supplemented by some 33,000 reservists. Military service was compulsory for all Netherlanders in the Indies. After 1936 expenditure upon defense was sharply increased; but the outbreak of the war caught the empire unprepared since the program of rearmament was not intended to be completed until 1944.

The ordinary revenue of the Netherlands Indies in 1937 was 402,300,000 guilders (\$221,265,000), the expenditure 366,900,000 guilders (\$201,795,000) and the public debt 1,402,000,000 guilders (\$771,000,000). Over a quarter of the revenue came from the government monopolies of opium, salt and pawnshops and the profits from government industries such as cinchona, tin, rubber, timber and railways. The principal taxes were excise, import and export duties, income and excess profits taxes and land rent. Particularly during the present century the Dutch have achieved impressive results in improving the material condition of the Indonesians, with the result that today Java supports ten times as many inhabitants as it did 130 years ago. Like the British, the Dutch have attached great importance to good roads and railways. The area covered by irrigation works has been greatly extended, and the accomplishments have been

outstanding in agricultural research and propaganda among the Indonesian cultivators. The Dutch have developed an extensive system of government banks and pawnshops to meet the problem of the moneylender with his extortionate rates of interest. Native land rights have been carefully safeguarded, and the regulations for the protection of plantation labor are of a high order although somewhat inferior to those in British Malaya. The medical and health services are very good, although rural has lagged behind urban hygiene as it has everywhere in southeast Asia. Schools are largely a 20th-century development, and in 1937 six per cent of the expenditure was upon them. The Dutch policy has been to provide vernacular education for the masses and Western education for the future leaders. Entrance to the Dutch-language schools has been restricted, a high proportion of the Indonesian pupils admitted being the sons of Indonesian officials.

The democratic reforms have far from satisfied the nationalists. A high proportion of the elected Indonesian members of the councils and the Volksraad are officials, the same man often serving on several of them. One reason is the small number of educated Indonesians outside the ranks of the civil service. The system of indirect election also has the effect that the majority of the elected Indonesian members of the Volksraad are chosen by the provincial and regency councils, many of the members of which are officials, and not by the municipal councils. The nationalist movement has its strength mainly in the towns and has little support among the agricultural nine-tenths of the population. About 1938 only eight of the thirty Indonesian members of the Volksraad were nationalists. This was by no means an accurate representation of the small minority of politically-minded Indonesians. The nationalists have also complained loudly about the very limited powers of the Volksraad, and the extent of the authority retained by the Governor General and the Government of Holland. There has been a feeling of ineffectiveness and uselessness; though careful examination of the facts shows that the Volksraad has had a considerable degree of influence. The Governor General has made only a sparing use of his independent powers, and in the vast majority of legislative measures he has acquiesced in the wishes of the Volksraad. The nationalists have also attacked the strict censorship of the press, the rigid control of freedom of speech and

freedom of assembly, and the extensive use of police surveillance, arrest and imprisonment to control suspect political societies.

Java and Burma form an interesting contrast: in both nationalism is a development of the past thirty years, and the number of politically-minded natives is only a small proportion of the total population. The British policy has been one of self-government by large installments: first the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of twenty years ago, then the present constitution, and in 1941 the promise of complete self-government after the war. A more rapid advance would have been impossible in view of the lack of training in democratic government; and at times it has seemed that the size of the doses has rather overtaxed the political digestions of the recipients. The Indonesians were as inexperienced as the Burmese; but the Dutch have been far more cautious in their attitude. Their declared policy has been to grant increasing autonomy as the Indonesians become capable of assuming responsibility; but they feel that it is for Holland to determine the speed of the advance. Their judgment of native capacity is apparently far more pessimistic than that of the British; and they consider that it is the duty of government to give its people what is best for them and not what they themselves may want.

## VII. FRENCH INDO-CHINA

The French territories collectively known as Indo-China comprise the colony of Cochin China, the protectorates of Tonkin, Annam, Cambodia and Laos, and the small territory of Kwang-chowwan which was leased from China. The total population was approximately 23,500,000 in 1938 and includes some 400,000 Chinese.

The dependency is under the ultimate direction of the Ministry of the Colonies in France. Comparison with the British Empire shows some important differences in the extent of central control and the methods by which it is exercised. The Governor General is allowed far less local independence than, for example, the Governor of the Straits Settlements. The Ministry of the Colonies has a very important department, the Direction of Control, which has no parallel in the British Empire. Members of the staff, known as Inspectors of the Colonies, periodically visit the dependencies and make searching investigations into their affairs. They report directly to the Department in France, and the colonial authorities are not informed whether their criticisms are favorable or the reverse. The theory is excellent: the Ministry is constantly apprised of colonial conditions by a perambulating corps of professional critics. The result in practice is to discourage initiative: colonial officials adhere closely to their instructions whether they are really suited to the colony's needs or not, since any deviation from them will be reported upon adversely to headquarters. The Ministry of the Colonies is also assisted by a very elaborate organization, the *Conseil Supérieur des Colonies*, composed of ex-Governors and colonial experts and of persons with important colonial interests. It advises the Minister on political, military, economic and legal questions. Unfortunately it is seldom consulted and the membership is far too large for an effective consultative body. The closest analogy in the British Empire is the Colonial Office Conference, a meeting of colonial governors which has been held periodically since 1927 to discuss problems of tropical administration, economic development and scientific research.

One of the most striking differences between the two empires



is that the British Governor is usually a professional colonial administrator, the only exceptions being that important figures in English public life are appointed to a few positions such as that of Governor General of India. The typical Governor begins his career as a probationary cadet in one of the tropical colonies, and some twenty-five years later has risen to the Colonial Secretaryship, the position which stands next to that of Governor in the British colonial service. For a capable official the next step is the governorship of one of the smaller colonies, the Bahamas for example; and ultimately the most successful may be appointed to one of the principal tropical dependencies such as Malaya or Nigeria. By contrast the Governor General of Indo-China has usually been a French politician with no personal knowledge of the problems of tropical administration. The shortness of his term of office—frequently about two years as compared with five under the British system—means that he is replaced just as he is beginning to understand the local situation. Legally his powers are as sweeping as those of a British Governor; but in practice the inevitable result has been that control has lain very largely with his subordinates, the permanent officials of the dependency.

The British and French attitude toward colonial self-government is also strikingly different. British policy during the past twenty years has been that the ultimate goal is autonomy within the Empire, and that self-government will be introduced in installments as rapidly as is advisable. The tropical dependencies are in varying stages of evolution, from the Straits Settlements, which are still a Crown Colony of the traditional type, to Burma or Ceylon, which have extensive powers of control over their internal affairs. The development of colonial self-government has no place in French policy. The powers of the legislatures in Indo-China are much more limited than in Malaya or Hong-kong; and the intention has been that the dependency should be drawn progressively closer to France as an integral part of a closely-knit empire dominated by the mother country. In pursuance of the same policy the colony of Cochin China was represented in the Chamber of Deputies in Paris by one deputy elected by the French citizens in the colony. They are only a small fraction of the 3,800,000 in Cochin China, the majority being French officials and merchants. Few natives are French citizens and have the franchise; and no deputies are elected

from the other divisions of Indo-China. In the British Empire no colonial representatives are returned to the Imperial Parliament. On the other hand, in a Crown Colony like the Straits Settlements, which corresponds to the Colony of Cochin China, all persons born there are equally British subjects by birth whether they are Europeans or Asiatics. There is not the distinction which France makes between French citizens and subjects. An Asiatic British subject is eligible for election to the House of Commons: during the 1920's the solitary Communist in Parliament was Mr. Saklatvala the member for Bermondsey, a Parsi from Bombay.

At the head of the administration in Indo-China is the Governor General. His powers are very extensive and he exercises general supervision and control over the governments of the colony and the protectorates. He is assisted by the Grand Council of Economic and Financial Interests, an advisory body with an annual session. Half of the members are officials of high rank or representatives of the Colonial Council of Cochin China and of the Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture, and the remainder are Indo-Chinese who are chosen by a limited number of natives holding high positions. This Council merely gives advice on such economic and financial subjects as are referred to it by the Governor General. He must, however, submit to it the budgets of the General Government and of the various divisions of Indo-China, as well as all proposals for taxation. Unlike the practice in the British Legislative Councils, the unofficial members are not free to introduce any subject for debate. The government retains effective control of revenue and taxation; and the legislative powers of the Council are more limited than in a British colony, since many of the laws are enacted by the French Parliament or are extended to Indo-China by presidential decree, i.e., by the permanent officials of the Ministry of the Colonies, a method which has its British counterpart in the legislation passed by Order in Council. There is, however, the difference that in the British Empire only a minor part of the legislation is enacted in this manner, the bulk being passed by the colonial legislatures; while in the French Empire the proportions are reversed.

The Colony of Cochin China is under a Governor who is responsible to the Governor General. He is usually appointed for five years and has, generally speaking, the same authority

as a British Colonial Governor. He is assisted by a Privy Council which closely resembles the Executive Council in a British colony, and by a Colonial Council which corresponds to the Legislative Council. The Privy Council has an official majority and also includes two French citizens and two native notables appointed by the Governor General. It is purely advisory but is consulted on all important questions, particularly financial ones. The Colonial Council is composed of twenty-four members of whom ten are elected by French citizens, two each by the French Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture respectively, and ten by an electoral college of French subjects. These are native merchants, landowners, officials and local notables. The Council virtually controls the direct taxes of the colony but otherwise is an advisory body for the expression of unofficial views, and its decisions can be overruled by the Privy Council. In the intervals between its brief annual sessions it is represented by a permanent advisory commission of five members of whom two must be natives elected by the Council. The Chambers of Commerce and of Agriculture, composed of French and native merchants and planters, are frequently consulted by the government on economic matters and their representations carry great weight. The colony is divided into provinces at the head of each of which is an administrative officer who closely resembles a British District Officer save that he rarely combines judicial and executive duties. The subordinate officials include a much larger number of French than would be found in a Dutch or British colony, where most of the minor posts are filled by natives of the country.

Cochin China is under the direct control of French officials; but the other four subdivisions of Indo-China are protectorates. In Tonkin, Annam and Cambodia the chief executive officer is a *Résident Supérieur*, while in Laos he has the title of Administrator. In each of the three first there is a Privy or Executive Council and a Protectorate Council, the composition and duties of which resemble those of the similar bodies in Cochin China. The traditional native administration continues to exist alongside the French. The rulers of Annam and Cambodia still maintain their courts and the old hierarchy of officials. In Tonkin the former viceroy of the Emperor of Annam has been replaced by the French *Résident Supérieur*. Laos had never been brought under a single government prior to the French

occupation; but the native prince of Luang Prabang still reigns over part of the country. The distinction between direct and indirect rule in Indo-China is more legal than actual. The mandarins or traditional officials are not entirely figureheads; but the powers of the French administrative officers are much the same whether they are exercised in the Colony of Cochin China or in one of the protectorates.

Cambodia may be taken as an example of the French form of indirect rule. The King of Cambodia placed his dominions under French protection in 1863; and in 1884 he accepted a treaty by which he virtually handed over all effective power to France. He agreed to accept whatever reforms might be introduced and to transfer the control of taxation and public works to French officials. French administrative officers were to be responsible for the maintenance of order and to supervise and control the actions of the Cambodian officials. The King was given an ample salary, the elaborate ceremonials of the court were maintained, and the Cambodian mandarins continued to hold office. Superficially the facade of the old monarchy was preserved. The substance of power was transferred to the *Résident Supérieur* and to the French *Résidents* who administer the residencies or provinces of Cambodia. The powers of the *Résident Supérieur* are very similar to those of a British Governor and the duties of a *Résident* resemble those of a Resident in Malaya. The *Résident Supérieur* is assisted by a Consultative Native Assembly, most of whose members are elected. The franchise is carefully restricted to Cambodian officials and others whose loyalty to French rule is assured. The Assembly is not allowed to debate political subjects, but may express its wishes on other matters if the *Résident Supérieur* has agreed to the debate. The budget estimates are also laid before the Assembly.

Alongside the French is a staff of Cambodian officials, rising in gradations from the official who superintends the elected headmen of a group of villages to the governor of a province who is the Cambodian equivalent of the *Résident*. They are never allowed to forget that they owe their positions and prospects entirely to their French superiors, although the King of Cambodia is the titular head of the state. The French administrative officers rule the country indirectly through these native auxiliaries, who are entirely under their control and guidance. The relations between the two corps of officials are reminiscent

of those existing between the Dutch and the native officials in Java. The French administrative officer limits himself as far as possible to the role of guide and private director, strengthening the public prestige and position of his Cambodian colleague, and taking the settlement of a question into his own hands only when it is unavoidable. The French justification of the system is that it has combined the advantages of direct and indirect rule. It has given the country a more efficient and less corrupt form of administration—the venality of the mandarins in the old days could almost be described as monumental—and at the same time it has provided a camouflage for French control which has made foreign rule much more palatable to a very conservative people.

Native Cambodian judges trained in the School of Law at Pnom Penh decide cases between Cambodians, in accordance with the traditional code which has been somewhat modified to bring it more into accordance with French law. Their decisions are supervised by French judges, who also try cases involving Europeans or those where the parties concerned are of different races. The legal department of Indo-China is under the Director of Judicial Administration who is one of the chief advisers of the Governor General.

Each of the five subdivisions of Indo-China has its separate budget and in 1935, the latest year for which statistics are available, the total expenditure was 54,747,000 piastres (one piastre equals ten francs). Local receipts come from income and poll taxes, charges for concessions, land taxes, fishery taxes, etc. The Government General has its own separate budget, the expenditure in the same year being 55,000,000 piastres and the revenue 51,422,000 piastres. The revenue is derived chiefly from customs duties, government monopolies of alcoholic liquors, opium, salt, tobacco and matches; registration and stamp duties; and receipts from the post and telegraph departments. The principal items of expenditure are debt charges (27 per cent of the total), administration (47.6 per cent), public works (7.6 per cent), and subsidies to the local budgets (11 per cent). These figures do not include the large loans floated in 1931 to 1936 to cover public works and other expenditures.

## VIII. TAIWAN

Taiwan, or Formosa, is the oldest Japanese colony, having been ceded in 1895 by China in the Treaty of Shimonoseki which ended the Sino-Japanese War. The island has an area of 13,807 square miles, slightly more than that of Holland, and the population in 1938 was 5,747,000. Formosan Chinese, now Japanese subjects by birth, numbered 5,240,000 or 93 per cent: foreigners, mostly Chinese citizens, were 43,000, Japanese 309,000, and Formosan aborigines 150,000. Of these last about 50,000 are assimilated but the remainder, while conquered, are about as primitive as formerly. The Chinese citizens are traders and coolies allowed to enter for a limited period: permanent immigration from China has been forbidden since the conquest. The Formosan Chinese are descendants of the immigrants who settled in the island during the two centuries that it was under the control of China. Japan's attempt to settle large numbers of cultivators and fishermen here has had no more success than in Manchukuo. The distribution of occupations in Taiwan is similar to that in other tropical dependencies. The Japanese fill almost all the important positions in administration, trade and industry; while the Formosan Chinese are cultivators, fishermen and laborers, apart from a handful who fill subordinate government posts. In 1930, 41.5 per cent of the Japanese were in official or professional posts, 20 per cent in trade, 10.1 per cent in communications (e.g. railways), 16.8 per cent in industry and mining, and only 6.4 per cent in agriculture and fishing. Of the Formosan Chinese 73 per cent were cultivators or fishermen, 9 per cent in trade, 8.6 per cent in industry and mining, 3 per cent in communications, and 2.2 per cent in government service and the professions.

The Governor General of Taiwan is appointed by the Emperor, and prior to 1919 he was always a general or an admiral who was commander in chief of the armed forces in addition to his civil duties. Since 1919 civilians have often held the position, and in this case naval and military officers hold the immediate command although the Governor General may require their services for the maintenance of order. He is under the

control of the Minister of Overseas Affairs in Japan, while finance is supervised by the Treasury, and roads, railways and harbors by the Minister of Communications. Within the colony he has very extensive powers, directing the administration and recommending officials for promotion or dismissal. He may suspend or cancel any order or administrative measure of the provincial governors; and he may impose a fine of 200 yen or a prison term of one year without recourse to the courts. This power of summary jurisdiction has no parallel in American, Dutch and British colonies. The average tenure of office has been only two years and one month, too brief a period adequately to discharge the very important duties confided to him. The Governor General is assisted by an Advisory Council of forty-two members, he himself being chairman and his secretary-general vice-chairman. The members include officials and non-officials, among the latter being a number of Formosans whose term of office is two years. The Council is purely consultative, and its sole function is to give an opinion upon matters referred to it by the Governor General. Its position is far less important than that of a British Legislative Council or the Dutch Volksraad. The Japanese say that they regard Taiwan as an extension of the homeland, but they do not give the Formosans any representation in the Imperial Diet nor a local legislature in which they can effectively express their views. The press is very strictly censored, and no Chinese newspapers have been allowed to appear since 1937, although the majority of the population cannot read Japanese. Attempts to express dissatisfaction through political societies have been suppressed.

Taiwan is divided for administrative purposes into five provinces each under a Governor and three prefectures each under a Prefect. The prefectures comprise the less-developed regions along the east coast, and have a larger proportion of aborigines among their population than the provinces. The Governors and Prefects are under the control of the Governor General, and within the limits of their territories their administrative, legislative and judicial powers are similar to his. Each has an advisory council of from twenty to forty members, half of whom are appointed by the Governor General and half elected by the municipal and village councils. The provinces and prefectures are divided into districts which are administered by Sub-Prefects. The nine principal cities have mayors

who are appointed by the government as are the village headmen. The municipal and village councils are advisory only, and have from eight to forty members depending upon the population, half being appointed by the government and half elected. The electors are male subjects of the Japanese Empire who are twenty-five years of age, live continuously at least six months in the locality and pay at least five yen in municipal or village taxes. The effect of this last requirement is to exclude the majority of the small landowners as well as tenants and laborers, and to confine the franchise to a minority of the well-to-do. The whole administration of Taiwan from the Governor General to the village headman is essentially an executive one. The various councils are advisory only and are intended to enable the government to gauge popular opinion. The strict control of the press and of associations shows the determination of Japan to prevent if possible the growth among the Formosan Chinese of sentiment hostile to her rule. The very large number of Japanese officials is one striking feature of the administration. They hold not only the higher but also many of the subordinate positions; and while some of the minor posts are held by Formosan Chinese there is no policy of gradually training them to fill more important positions.

The Japanese have had a difficult problem in the aborigines; but it cannot be said that their handling of it has been a success. The 100,000 unassimilated aborigines are divided into tribes and are of Malay stock. Their stage of civilization as well as their practice of head-hunting bear certain resemblances to those of the pagan tribes of northern Luzon or the Muruts of British North Borneo. The Chinese had gradually driven them from the fertile plains to the jungle-clad mountains, and two centuries of brutal oppression had caused them to regard every stranger as a probable enemy. To win their confidence and gradually civilize them would not have been easy; but in similar cases British District Officers in Borneo and American officials in Luzon have accomplished this task successfully. Japan's record is forty years of desultory warfare with heavy loss of life, and at the end of it an uneasy pacification which leaves the aborigines as unreconciled as when the Japanese landed in Taiwan.

The gross estimated revenue of Taiwan in 1939 was 280,173,000 yen (\$78,448,000), of which 203,602,000 (\$58,408,000) or 74.4 per cent was the revenue of the Government General



and the remainder that of the provinces and municipalities. Three-fifths of the net revenue of the Government General came from taxes, about 12 per cent from the government railways, and 14 per cent was surplus revenue from the previous year. There was a deficit of 6,400,000 yen (\$1,800,000) which was met by a loan that raised the government debt to 94,213,038 yen (\$26,379,000). Out of the revenue raised by taxation about 21 per cent was provided by corporations and wealthy individuals through, for example, income and special profits taxes, mining royalties and inheritance tax, while the remaining 79 per cent came from the mass of the population. The most important items under this head were the government monopolies of opium, alcoholic liquors, tobacco, salt and camphor, the land and house taxes, the sugar tax, stamp duties and customs receipts. Owing to the policy of tariff assimilation, customs duties produced less than 2 per cent of the revenue, whereas in the Federated Malay States, for example, they amounted to over a fifth of the total. Provincial taxes were derived principally from surtaxes to the land, house and income taxes, and were supplemented by grants from the Government General. The estimated expenditure of the central, provincial and local governments in 1939 was 197,600,000 yen (\$55,328,000). The share of general administration was 8 per cent, debts and pensions 12 per cent, subsidies to local governments 8 per cent, education 11 per cent, health 3.5 per cent, defense 14.6 per cent, public works and railways 18.6 per cent, assistance to Japanese industry 10 per cent, agricultural and industrial research 2 per cent, and other expenditure 10.9 per cent.

Japan has been very thorough and efficient in developing the natural resources of Taiwan and has provided it with good means of communications. In many ways the Formosan Chinese are better off than before the Japanese conquest; yet one cannot escape the feeling that Japan rather than the colony has chiefly benefited from the development of rice and sugar. In particular the Japanese companies engaged in colonial exploitation seem to have earned remarkably high dividends and to have received far more government help than would have been granted them in a British or American dependency. The improvement in medical and health services has been noteworthy: as in other tropical colonies conditions are very far from perfect, but the change compared with forty years ago is remarkable. One of

the clearest evidences of the Japanese reforms is that owing to the lowered death rate the Formosan Chinese increased from 2,979,000 in 1905 to 5,240,000 in 1938. There is a very extensive system of government schools in addition to the missionary and private Chinese schools. The government has given great attention to primary education, the object being to assimilate the children through the medium of the school. In 1938, 49.8 per cent of the Formosan Chinese and 99.4 per cent of the Japanese children of school age were in primary schools. In the secondary and technical schools and the university, the majority of the pupils were Japanese and the enrollment of Chinese was apparently discouraged. The educational policy seems to be to give the Formosan Chinese a primary education but strictly to limit the number who are allowed to proceed beyond this point.

## IX. THAILAND

The revolution of 1932 transformed Thailand (called Siam before 1939) from an absolute monarchy into an oligarchy. With the wisdom of hindsight one can now see that this was the logical development of the process of modernization which began about seventy years ago under King Chulalongkorn. He and his successors changed a monarchy of the traditional Asiatic type into an enlightened despotism; but their very reforms created the instrument which was to overthrow them. This was the Western-educated intelligentsia, the same new class which in varying degrees has threatened the continuance of foreign political control in almost every part of Asia. The Siamese revolution shows that the emergence of this class is not merely the native reaction to Western rule. It goes deeper than this and is one of the consequences of the remodeling of Asia which is being brought about by the impact of Western civilization. The new rulers of Thailand declare that they will create a genuine democracy in ten years, or alternatively when the people are sufficiently educated to be capable of self-government. A decade seems distinctly optimistic when one remembers that in 1934 over 95 per cent of the electorate was illiterate; and doubts have been expressed by Thai whether the new governing class will abdicate. This at least is clear, that during the transitional period there will be a one-party government which does not permit the formation of opposition parties and which carefully limits freedom of speech and of the press. In some respects the regime seems like a very mild version of the totalitarian systems in Europe.

Most of the Thai are small cultivators, absorbed in their own local affairs and with a strong veneration for their monarchs. They had no part in the revolution which was the work of a small minority, most of whom were army officers and civil servants. Some of them were graduates of the schools and colleges established by the kings, and others had been sent to Europe to complete their education. They brought back with them the idea of democracy, and the People's Party which they founded spread through all the branches of the government

services. Their discontent was aroused by the King's policy of frequently appointing members of the royal family to be department heads instead of promoting permanent officials. Also every Western-educated Thai aspired to enter government service; and by the 1930's so many were graduating from the schools that they exceeded the number of vacancies. The decline in revenue during the great depression compelled the King in 1932 to dismiss many officials and reduce salaries. This brought matters to a head, and the absolute monarchy was destroyed by the new class which it had created to be its instrument in the modernization of the country.

The constitution established in 1932 transferred authority to the leaders of the People's Party, retaining the King as a constitutional figurehead with very little power. King Prajadhipok had accepted the bloodless *coup d'état* without attempting to resist; but in 1935 he abdicated and was succeeded by Ananda Mahidol, a child of ten. The constitution created an Executive State Council of ministers and a unicameral legislature named the People's Assembly. The composition of the latter was to pass through three stages as the Thai became capable of governing themselves. As originally set up in 1932 it contained seventy members, all of them appointed by the leaders of the revolution. The second stage began six months later when the first election was held. During this period half the members were to be appointed by the King on the recommendation of his ministers and the other half elected by the people. The third stage was to begin when over one-half of the electors had received a primary education. If this goal had not been reached in ten years the final stage would nevertheless be introduced, and all the members would be elected.

The King can dissolve the Assembly but new elections must be held within three months. He retains the rights of pardon and veto, but the Assembly can override his veto by a majority vote. He can propose legislation, and can issue emergency decrees which must however be countersigned by one minister. The King acts on the advice of his State Council, whose membership may vary in number between fifteen and twenty-five. The President and fourteen other ministers must belong to the Assembly, and the King may appoint up to ten additional ministers who are not members. The Council is responsible to the

Assembly and must resign if a vote of want of confidence is passed. The Assembly controls legislation, taxation and expenditure, and has the right to interpret the constitution. Amendments must be passed twice by a three-fourths majority. The Assembly is elected every four years, and candidates must be Thai over twenty-three years of age, who are literate and reside in the district for which they stand. Both male and female Thai have the vote, and there are no literacy requirements. The restrictions upon political freedom are stringent. The Press Act of 1933 established a strict censorship, and after a few newspapers had been disciplined under its provisions the government had little further trouble. No political meeting may be held without government permission, which is difficult to obtain; and the formation of political parties is not allowed.

The leaders of the revolution are assured of a majority in the Assembly during the ten-year transitional period. Through their control of the King and the State Council they control the appointment of half the members. The character of the electorate and the severe restrictions on political freedom combine to ensure that a considerable part of the elected members will be supporters of the government; so that it can usually count on a majority. The vast majority of the voters have shown very little interest in elections and seem to lack any clear conception of what the whole procedure is about. In the election of 1937 there seems to have been a generous distribution of small bribes: one candidate distributed a shoe to each voter and promised the mate if he were elected. Liberal promises were made, and the candidates who talked the most glibly received more votes than those with a record for past achievements. In the absence of organized parties everyone used his own methods of campaigning. "Only 26 per cent of the total population voted. It was a Sunday; it rained; people couldn't be bothered; and anyway they had other things to do. Moreover in spite of extensive publicity, the procedure was still a general mystery and many ballots were spoiled. There were no counterfeit votes, no brawls or assaults; the atmosphere was one of calm indifference. . . . There was little realization generally that the votes cast had any bearing on the lives of the voters. It was simply thought that they were giving away a good job, and they voted for the younger candidate on the principle of giving the

lad a chance."<sup>1</sup> Only eleven out of the ninety-one elected members had been in the previous Assembly.

The elected members have shown somewhat of a tendency to oppose those nominated by the State Council; but the principal development has been the domination of the Assembly by the government. Owing to the inexperience of the elected members they have wasted much time in debating trivialities; and also they have been influenced by the Thai tradition that the inferior should show proper subservience to his superior. Many sessions have been held in secret, and this combined with the censorship has led to a general lack of healthy publicity about the debates. "High officials were openly contemptuous and publicly stated that they could only get down to business of state after the Assembly had adjourned. Certainly the Assembly suffered from inconsequential verbosity, excessive devotion to trivialities, and chronic inaction. . . . The Assembly chairman frequently called down members for irrelevance, for overcriticizing the government, or for making his own position uncomfortable. The Council treated the Assembly like school children."<sup>2</sup>

A struggle for control went on within the ranks of the government itself. The surviving adherents of the old régime were eliminated and the radical wing of the People's Party was reduced to a minor position, although their leader, Luang Pradit, is still a member of the Council. The victors in the struggle have been the army officers, who from the very beginning have had a dominating position in the State Council and the Assembly. An increasing number of the ministers and the appointed members have been officers of the army and police, and they have also filled many of the principal posts in the civil service. Since 1933 the two Premiers of Thailand have been Phya Bahol and Luang Pibul, both of them army officers. Another evidence of the growing power of the army has been the great increase in naval and military expenditure which in 1939 was 28 per cent of the estimated expenditure.

For local government Thailand is divided into seventy counties, each of which is subdivided into a varying number of districts. They in turn are divided into smaller areas and finally into villages with elected headmen. Each county is

<sup>1</sup> Thompson, Virginia, *Thailand: The New Siam* (New York, 1941), Chapter V

<sup>2</sup> Thompson, *op. cit.*, Chapter VII.

administered by a committee composed of a provincial commissioner, the district heads and the local chiefs of the government services. All these officials are appointed and controlled from Bangkok. Each county has a council with an adviser who has been trained in the University of Moral and Political Sciences and appointed by the Minister of the Interior. The theory behind this tutorial system is that the councils will remain under the control of the central government until they have learned to govern themselves. Half the members of the council are appointed by the committee of officials administering the county, and the rest elected by the local population. All the members will be elected when the voters have attained ordinary standards of education, a development which will take many years at the present rate of progress. The councils are restricted to local affairs and are not allowed to discuss political questions. The central government has assured itself of a firm grip on local administration for many years to come. In 1937 municipal councils were created in the towns, composed of a small body of councillors appointed by the central government.

The bulk of the civil and criminal cases are decided in the district courts, appeals being taken to the provincial court and from there to the court of appeal in Bangkok. Above this comes the Supreme Court. The salaries of judges are very low, but honesty is probably the rule and the acceptance of bribes the exception. It is said, however, that the judges are too prone to give way to pressure in any case in which politics are involved.<sup>8</sup>

The revenue of Thailand comes from import, export and excise duties, the opium monopoly, the tin royalty, the land tax, and the income and inheritance taxes. In the estimates for 1939 revenue was 124,061,000 ticals (\$55,800,000) while the expenditure was 124,059,000 ticals. There was an additional estimated expenditure of 22,889,000 ticals (\$10,300,000) for economic development, 9,000,000 ticals (\$4,000,000) of which was to be raised by a loan while the remainder came from the Treasury reserve. The national debt in 1938 was \$36,600,000, of which about one-twelfth was internal while the remainder was foreign loans. Expenditure upon the army, navy, and air force has very greatly increased since the revolution. In 1939 the appropriation for the army was 28,700,000 ticals

<sup>8</sup> Thompson, *op. cit.*, Chapter VIII.

(\$12,900,000), or 23 per cent of the estimated expenditure, and the number of troops was about 40,000. The navy has also been considerably enlarged, and now has a strength of two cruisers, twelve destroyers and eighteen small craft. In 1939 the appropriation for education was 14,553,000 ticals (\$6,547,000) or about 12 per cent of the total expenditure. The census of 1937 showed a total literacy of 31.1 per cent, the rates being 47 per cent for males and 14.9 per cent for females. Somewhere between a third and a half of the children of school age were actually attending school, over nine-tenths being in the primary schools and three-quarters in the two lowest grades. On the whole the schools were of poor caliber and the teachers badly trained and poorly paid. Educational expenditure has quadrupled since 1932, and a determined effort is being made to increase the number of schools and improve the standard of education. The government is also building vocational schools, and is trying to divert pupils to them. In the past there has been a very marked preference for a literary career, the goal being government employment; and the government has been perturbed by the overproduction of would-be clerks. Medical and health services are very inadequate, the total number of qualified doctors being only about 700 for a population of some 14,500,000. The number of hospitals is far below the needs of the country, and public health conditions are very bad, particularly in the rural areas.





*Part III*

NATIONALISM AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS  
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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## I. INTRODUCTION: COMPARATIVE NATIONALISMS

The striking similarity displayed by the nationalist movements throughout southeast Asia, allowing for variations in intensity and timing, derives from their common inspiration in Western ideology and their largely identical economic bases. Of these two largely alien forces, the former has guided the intellectuals who lead the movements in their respective countries; the latter has supplied the driving power from the masses. Yet one must not think that these nationalist movements have the support of more than a very small fraction of the native peoples, who for the most part are not aware that the question of autonomy even exists, and whose major concern is simply survival. Native nationalists probably number no more than a few hundred thousand in Java and the Philippines, and less than a quarter of that number in Thailand (Siam), Burma, Indo-China and Malaya. Nevertheless, foreigners by their very presence have accentuated a sense of apartness from themselves and have even created a sense of unity among native peoples. This has been strengthened indirectly by the development of a system of communications, and more directly by an increasingly widespread system of education, which automatically disseminates Western concepts of nationalism and democracy. Nationalism has run ahead of reforms granted by the authorities. The increasing concessions, fairly grudgingly made, no longer keep pace with the demand; and because even these concessions represent a compromise, they are essentially dangerous to the governing power.

The East India Companies of Holland, Great Britain and France were born of the same 17th-century mercantilist doctrines. They aimed to establish trading posts along Oriental sea lanes where Eastern goods could be exchanged for European gold. Recurrent warfare in Europe periodically interfered with this program by cutting off these outposts from both the bullion and the provisions required for their commerce and even for their survival. Commercial competition among these European rivals often developed into open warfare, either as a result of local disputes or, more frequently, as a repercussion of con-

temporary European hostilities. Profits from this Oriental trade, which at best suffered from the current maritime hazards and at worst from naval attacks, risked additional handicaps in the East through private competition from "interlopers," and the arbitrary exactions of local potentates.

These trading companies, which had been organized along national lines of monopoly and privilege, inevitably strove to reproduce their dominant position in the East, and so in the course of time one company drove another out of a certain area. But to safeguard the monopoly of regional trade thus acquired, they soon found that they had to intervene increasingly in local disputes, and to keep order by exercising dominion over large areas. But the partition of Eastern trade and territories locally determined was, more often than not, set at naught by the fortunes of war in Europe and the exigencies of European diplomacy, and was ultimately settled by the resources in money and manpower at the disposal of the companies' respective governments. By the second half of the 19th century, national governments had been forced to replace these obsolescent companies, which had shown themselves unequal to the political tasks that circumstances had compelled them to assume, and the remaining years of the century saw spheres of commercial influence clearly defined in southeast Asia, and the foreshadowing of areas marked out for imminent political control.

In the meantime, the changes wrought in Europe by the industrial revolution and the growth of political democracy and economic liberalism altered the interest which European governments took in their tropical dependencies. On the economic side, native populations began to be looked upon as a market for European manufactures, and their countries as a source of the essential raw materials. And regarded from the viewpoint either of labor or of purchasing power, the native standards of living had to be raised. Democratic theories of government prevalent in Europe concurred in wanting to stimulate native participation and welfare through the development of public services. Economic liberalism, which favored the passive policeman role of government in Europe, was nevertheless willing to concede the necessity for a stronger administration over alien and distant colonial peoples. So both official policy and private enterprise in the colonies endorsed the development of means of communication, sufficient public health and social welfare

measures—supplemented by discreet missionary effort—to keep the native populations expanding numerically and politically quiescent, and just enough education to train them to fill subordinate positions. Beyond this point their paths diverged.

Officialdom in the colonies has ever been more liberal in its native policy than has the resident European mercantile community. The latter group lives in the colonies simply because more money can be made there than at home, and its attitude toward the natives is dominated by their utility in furthering this end. While it may be said that officials are likewise higher paid than for similar services rendered in their own countries, yet the scale is a fixed one, and their responsibilities cover a field far wider than that of economic enterprise. Usually, too, they are of a different social status and cultural background than the traders. Yet in considering this aspect of European officialdom, one should note how English colonies differ from the Dutch and the French. The two-party system which flourishes in Great Britain and the United States has produced far less divergency of political viewpoint than the multi-party system of France and the Netherlands. Though this has nowhere obliterated the essential cleavage between the Occidental bureaucracy and the non-officials, it has stimulated a far greater division of opinion and consequently less co-operation in action among French and Dutch officials, and this in turn has had an important influence in strengthening native nationalism. In the British colonies, public-school educated officials and their social and cultural inferiors among the non-officials may wrangle among themselves in legislative councils and in the correspondence columns of the local English press, but they stand together as one man on most questions affecting imperial versus native interests. Moreover, the British system of representative government organized along communal lines has furthered these racial demarcations. In the French and Dutch colonies, political coloring is more varied, and native nationalists are far more likely to find their most powerful allies among sympathetic radicals in the administration and in the mother country.

Despite a limited transplantation to the colonies of Western party divisions and political bias, the fact that most of the imperialisms of southeast Asia are political democracies at home and authoritarian states in their dependencies, has bred a large degree of uniformity in the type of education and legal codes,

in the form of representative institutions, and in the scope allowed for missionary enterprise in their colonies.

Educational systems in southeast Asia have ranged all the way from the major governmental efforts of France and the United States, through the state grants-in-aid to private schools in the British colonies and free primary education for the Malays, to the expensive, excellent and very limited public instruction offered by the Dutch. But the similarity of the needs from which they arose, and of the circumstances that conditioned their growth, and finally of the native reaction to them, has produced a curious identity and an only superficial diversity of effort. In all of the colonies, and in Thailand, missionary instruction antedated the state schools, and while the efforts of both are not even now mutually exclusive—since there are at most educational facilities for only a third of the children of school age in any of these colonies—the trend has increasingly been in the direction of state control or monopoly of such education as is offered, whether the motivation be anticlerical, as in Indo-China, or distrust of foreign influences, as in Thailand, or the fear felt by all of these governments lest native religious susceptibilities be offended by overzealous Christian proselytizing. The same tendency can be seen in social welfare and public health work, in which the missionaries were likewise pioneers in this officially long-neglected field. The universal need for an inexpensive clerical staff in government bureaus, the cost of importing trained teachers from the West, and finally the reorientation toward vocational and technical instruction—arising from a growing realization that the transplanted Occidental education system had been fostering dangerous political and economic problems by the creation of overlarge white-collar and professional classes—have produced everywhere the same educational developments.

Native reaction has likewise followed much the same pattern everywhere. At first, the general Oriental xenophobia and pride of race that resulted from the geographical and intellectual isolation of southeast Asia, made the natives disdain to learn of the West, which seemed to them superior only in terms of brute force. But with the withdrawal of the older generation of irreconcilables, after a realization of the futility of further resistance had taken hold, and with the creation of new opportunities through the radical changes effected by alien control,

the younger native elite turned their backs on the ancient Oriental culture and demanded more and better Occidental training. The education they now wanted, however, was eminently utilitarian, and here they and their foreign masters found a common meeting ground. So long as those trained in the new schools were assured of clerical positions, no matter how humble, the native intelligentsia was satisfied, for in the East government employment has ever enjoyed the highest prestige. But soon a plethora of clerks and embryo lawyers began to flood what was essentially a limited market. The unemployed—especially the Eurasians whose linguistic advantage had given them almost a monopoly of the clerkships—began to crystallize into a group of malcontents, and this situation was dangerously aggravated by the depression. The new trend toward semi-industrial production, which in the 20th century became the dominant European interest in tropical colonies, stimulated the governments of southeast Asia to reorient their education systems toward a vocational and technical training. Here, however, these governments—whether indigenous or alien—came up against native indifference and even hostility toward a type of instruction which involved sustained intellectual or competitive effort, and which led to employment involving manual labor. The general formula now evolved by colonial governments for native mass education is instruction in the vernacular related directly to agriculture, the lifework of the vast majority of these tropical peoples, who will not or cannot afford to leave their children in school for more than three years.

Aside from the modifications voluntarily introduced into the Buddhist education system in Cambodia and Thailand, the only constructive indigenous efforts at self-education within the traditional orbit are the Taman Siswo schools of Java, which vary according to the particular culture of the locality, and the Wanthanu schools of Burma, which were short-lived as independent institutions. Everywhere that Western education has been extensively instituted, formalized native culture has died, and this has been regarded as only an incidental misfortune by both the governing powers and by the vast majority of the native elite.

The evolution of legal codes in southeast Asia has followed an analogous course. At first Western laws were transplanted bodily. In their application, however, it was found that the



safeguarding of individual liberty and of equality before the law, on which they were built, embodied concepts that were meaningless to Oriental peoples, who usually conceived of no life outside of the strictly hierarchical family or communal groups, and regarded exile therefrom as a punishment far worse than decapitation. Legally instituted means of attacking established authority, and the separation of secular and religious powers, which came with Western domination, undermined Oriental society even more completely than had the drastic displacement of their indigenous culture. Moreover, it was incompletely applied, for the principles underlying Western institutions were largely frustrated in practice in the East. The reign of law was incompatible with continuation of the authoritarian government to which these Orientals had been accustomed, and which their numerically insignificant imperialist masters felt forced to perpetuate in order to safeguard their personal safety and power. The native leaders, when their immutable political and social order collapsed and they were suddenly confronted with this paradox, readily grasped at the principle of equality and liberty for the individual in a democratic state, and resented its betrayal in colonial application.

This disparity between theory and practice came to a focus on the institutions of representative governments. Even in the Philippines, where the sovereign state had from the outset promised the country democratic self-government, the impetuosity of the native leaders in forcing the issue periodically threatened to terminate their co-operation during the interim period. In Indo-China, representative government has generally been expanded only as the result of concessions forced by some exigency either in the colony or in the mother country, and then not in respect of the powers exercised, but by a widening of the base of the electorate. The case of Malaya is a special one. While representative machinery has been set up, it is along communal lines. As this is par excellence the country of minorities, and no group—least of all the passive Malays themselves—can wholeheartedly press for an increase in democratic institutions, they all prefer to let a strong paternalistic government administer the colony, nominally in behalf of the Malays but far more in support of vested interests. Throughout the whole region, the native franchise has been successively extended, but it still rests on education and property qualifications, and can

be said in no way to represent directly the needy classes. Until this group becomes a political force, opposition to the administration will remain artificial in the sense that it still represents largely theoretical wrangling by mutually jealous leaders and their adherents. The younger generation of natives everywhere in southeast Asia is demanding, not a return to their ancient civilization, but the more complete introduction of Western institutions, whose full consequences they do not as yet foresee, except perhaps in the Philippines. In the interval their complaints are directed against discriminatory practices, in both the social and the professional spheres. The lack of outlets in business and the professions has reinforced their traditional disinclination for such employment, and a disproportionate number of educated natives turn to the law as the gateway to a political career. The cost of professional training and the resultant accretion of prestige is such that they refuse to work in rural regions, and insist on remaining in the towns where Europeans prefer to employ their own compatriots and where there are comparatively few natives wealthy enough to pay for the professional services of so many lawyers. The central problem of higher native training is the creation of a widespread, paying demand for such professional services.

Geographically, southeast Asia falls into two main divisions. On the landward side of Singapore, the high mountains of southern China sweep down the Indo-Chinese and Malay peninsulas in parallel lines, broadening out when they touch the sea to enclose deltas of great rivers. While these mountains cut the peninsular countries off from one another by almost impenetrable forests and jungle, they also isolate regions within the same country. From the highlands of Tibet and Yunnan, waves of immigrants, probably dating from prehistoric times, filtered down the five great rivers of Further India. These newcomers exterminated or drove into the most inaccessible mountains the indigenous populations, and created along these liquid highways riverine civilizations which, though mutually isolated, produced a virtually uniform type of subsistence agriculture. With the exception of the Red River delta of Tonkin, the population of each of these colonies is so small that there has never been any really widespread pressure on the abundant natural resources.

In the second main geographical division, the Indian empire

of the Dutch and the Philippines are two widely scattered island domains which 300 years of Western imperialism have made into administrative entities. Here, too, overwhelmingly agricultural peoples live unevenly distributed, concentrated chiefly along the seacoasts and river valleys, with the outlying islands sparsely inhabited by a medley of races of unequal cultural and economic development. Though these two island groups had a vague Malaya-Indonesian social unity and though they were far more accessible to world trade than were the countries to the north of Singapore, the monopolies enforced by Dutch and Spanish rule largely cut them off from international currents. Despite the geographical, racial, cultural and religious diversity of the whole area, southeast Asia has uniformity of tropical climate, a common agricultural civilization built on rice and fish consumption, a basic similarity in family and village organization, and a strongly animistic undercurrent of religious belief and folklore on which the various creeds imported from Arabia, India and China were superimposed. And finally at the apex, the whole social order was held rigidly static by a theocratic sovereign. The governmental unit was small and such political cohesion as this region has since acquired is the artificial result of European domination.

What profoundly changed southeast Asia was far less the imposition of alien political control, or even contacts with Western ideas which have affected only the educated few, than the economic revolution effected by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the development of steam navigation. Theretofore only a limited amount of small articles of high value had been exported from this region, but now it became profitable to ship bulkier produce like rice, tin, rubber, teak and sugar, in increasing quantities. New means of communication between production centers and port towns drew together hitherto isolated and inaccessible districts; land, which had been swamp or jungle, attracted not only newcomers from among the few and scattered indigenous peoples but also immigrants from the great human reservoirs of India and China, to form a labor supply which could meet the growing demand for the region's raw materials. Countries which had sufficed unto themselves began to raise commercial crops and become dependent on world markets, both to sell their products and to supply their hitherto unsuspected needs.

The change from subsistence agriculture and barter exchange to a money economy caught these conservative peasant peoples unawares. Uncomprehendingly they took advantage of the new and easy credit facilities offered by the Indian and Chinese moneylenders who came in the wake of the European conquerors and merchants. With an unthinking disregard for the morrow, they became indebted only now to find themselves in large measure dispossessed of their ancestral lands. The dangers of this widespread rural indebtedness and of a landless peasantry have been recognized since the late 19th century, but only the Dutch then took effective legal steps to safeguard native properties. It took the depression to awaken the other governments of the region to step in tardily to try to control a situation already well out of hand. The co-operative movement has been most effective—and then only in a limited degree—in those countries where it has been most carefully supervised, and where the principles of scientific agriculture, of group responsibility and of individual thrift were instilled at the same time that credit for productive purposes was dispensed. Though the vast mass of the peasantry remain untouched as yet, there is general agreement among both colonial and native statesmen that here, if anywhere, lies the solution of the major agrarian problems.

Southeast Asia, excepting certain inaccessible regions which still practice subsistence agriculture, has come to be dangerously dependent on world markets. The favorable trade balances, prosperous budgets, and growing native purchasing power which characterize the whole region depend upon two or possibly three products finding ready sales in foreign countries which are increasingly addicted to policies of economic nationalism—a trend which the present war has accentuated while also creating a shipping shortage. The impulse toward self-sufficiency and industrialization throughout the region preceded, but was greatly accelerated by, the outbreak of wars in Europe and in Asia, and it has been handicapped locally by the lack of appropriate fuel, technical experts, and native capital. A further factor, in the case of dependencies, has been the home governments' refusal until very recently to permit the growth of competitive industries in the colonies, and in the case of Thailand by the absence of a protected market in Europe. The trend in each country of the region is now definitely away from free

competition, even in its ancient stronghold of the Straits Settlements, and toward increasing governmental financing and control of such industries as have developed.

Everywhere economic functions tend to follow racial alignments, not through deliberate design but because of identical circumstances. The native masses have from choice remained the agricultural producers; they resent any intrusion on this monopoly, and are reluctant to learn scientific methods of production. Until recently it has not been necessary to stress these matters. Land was still plentiful and the Asiatic market for which they catered cared more for quantity than quality production. But increased competition from neighboring rivals and the phenomenal growth of population throughout the entire region, during the past half-century, now make efficiency imperative. Fishing, the other major native industry, has been invaded by both Chinese and Japanese, to such an extent that Thailand, which has developed the most aggressive economic nationalism of the region, has by law reserved a large percentage of this industry to her own nationals.

All the southeast Asia governments are trying to bolster up the minor native industries, which have either declined or expired since the region came into contact with world markets. Such indigenous industries as boatbuilding, weaving and dyeing of textiles, and craft work, have lost their domestic market through the invasion of cheap Japanese and Indian manufactures and through changing fashions. The present trend toward state subsidies and protective tariffs to foster these industries means a higher cost of native living that largely counteracts their direct benefit to the populations. This parallels the general situation produced by colonial governments throughout the whole region—the benefits accruing from the enormous economic development of these countries have not percolated down to the base of the social pyramid. Cash payments of higher taxes, the loss of peasant lands, the increased rural indebtedness, the acquisition of new tastes and wants, the rapid growth of population—all these factors in native life have counteracted the effects of a higher standard of public health, increased native purchasing power, and the growing dependence on world conditions beyond local control. The need for further measures of self-sufficiency to foster native production and to preserve native holdings, and the necessity for acquiring new

markets for indigenous produce have been stimulated by the war, but simultaneously the war has undermined their potential benefits to the masses by stimulating production of more food crops and war materials through increasing alien encroachments on native land reservations; by creating a shipping shortage which makes it ever more difficult to reach world markets and to get needed supplies of machinery and capital; and finally by increasing defense budgets which necessitate higher taxation.

Added to the continued native acceptance of the role of agricultural producers and to the decline of small-scale domestic industries is the failure of the indigenous peoples of this region to enter commerce and to form a middle class. By tradition government employment was reserved for the native aristocracy—not always that of birth, for the absence of an hereditary aristocracy in many of these countries permitted the rise of the most capable and enterprising among even those of humble birth to influential positions in the civil and ecclesiastical hierarchy. Under native sovereigns, foreign trade was never encouraged because contacts with other lands were regarded as treachery, and such commerce as was indispensable was jealously controlled by the local monarchs and their ministers. The failure to develop indigenous commercial talent opened the way for Chinese, Arab and Indian traders, whose presence in south-east Asia long antedated that of Europeans. Their role as middlemen and retailers grew with the greater opportunities brought by European domination of the region. In those countries where the native population was either too small or too disinclined to labor for wages, Indians were imported and Chinese came of their own volition to work temporarily as coolies, and later to rise into different strata of the mercantile class. In those regions where there was a dense native population, the Asiatic immigrants directly entered the merchant class, and the local governments or private capitalists attempted at great expense either to transplant the natives to underpopulated areas of rich economic possibilities, or to send them temporarily to work outside of their countries. Everywhere, sooner or later, the Chinese, and to a lesser extent the Indians, came to form a fluid middle class, whose activities encroached on the native end of the economic scale, in terms of wage labor, and on the European end through the development of their own capitalist enterprises.

For many years, Europeans and natives alike welcomed the annual influx of thousands of Chinese into their countries, and while their entry and activities were increasingly controlled, they were long permitted to retain their traditional overseas organization into groupings under their own appointed leaders. This development of a state-within-a-state came to be regarded as a great danger to local governments, especially after the awakening of a Chinese nationalist consciousness in 1912, and after the arrival of Chinese women immigrants had increased Chinese aloofness from the native masses. The growing interest taken in overseas Chinese by the mother country whose recent tribulations have gone far to break down the linguistic and regional barriers among her emigrant children; the increase in emigrant remittances to the homeland; and above all the boycotts, enforced often by terrorist methods and directed exclusively against their own compatriots; all these things aggravated the anti-Chinese trend. Indian emigration was from the outset officially controlled and regulated, and only in Burma and Malaya has the Indian problem assumed similar proportions, and then almost wholly as an economic issue. Only in Malaya, where foreign Asiatics can acquire real property, and where the recent necessity for creating a permanent labor supply has forced the issue of citizenship privileges for the domiciled foreign Orientals, have further complications set in. The majority of the Chinese and Indians of other regions are still transients in the countries of their adoption. Restriction of this immigration is being increasingly enforced throughout the region, by both colonial and native governments, and the latter administrations are also attempting the forcible assimilation of those immigrants already domiciled in their countries.

Though varying in degree of animosity according to the foreign Asiatics' grip on the local economy and their political activities, the nationalism of all the native peoples is directed more against them than it is against Europeans, either as imperialist masters or as capitalist exploiters. In each instance the question bears directly on the degree of contact, and this in turn depends on the relative numerical preponderance of each racial group. In the Netherlands Indies, which in 1930 had both the largest native (59,138,000) and European (240,000) communities, the Chinese in 1930 numbered only 1,233,000 or about 2 per cent of the total as contrasted with Malaya where the

Chinese in 1931 formed 39 per cent of a total population of 5,397,000. In Indo-China there were in 1936 about 326,000 Chinese in a total population of 23,030,000, including 43,000 Europeans. The Chinese in Thailand totaled about 500,000<sup>1</sup> in a country of 14,464,000 inhabitants (according to the 1937 census) of whom 1,600 were Occidentals. Burma's total population was approximately the same—14,647,000, in which there are 1,018,000 Indians, 194,000 Chinese, 12,000 Europeans, and 19,200 Eurasians. The Philippines' total population of 16,000,000 for 1939 slightly exceeded that of Burma and Thailand, and there the Chinese numbered about 117,000 while the Americans came to about 8,600, the Spanish to 4,600, and the Japanese to about 25,000. In all these countries the Chinese have penetrated the rural areas but their greatest concentration is in the chief cities.

The only common denominator—and it is the lowest—for all these groups is the economic one. The profit motive is responsible for the presence of all the foreign Orientals and all the non-official Occidentals excepting the missionaries, and it is beginning to dominate the native viewpoint. Until the native attitude began to be affected, the resultant social structure was fairly harmonious because it was kept within watertight compartments. The Occidentals remained at the top of the pile in managerial, administrative and technical posts; the Chinese and the Indians, on a smaller and carefully controlled scale, usually started as laborers and rose to midway positions as retailers and middlemen; while the natives remained in agricultural production. It is due to the growing nationalism and individualism of native society that this artificial mosaic of juxtaposed races, lacking real homogeneity and community responsibility, is breaking up.

Because of the basically similar economic conditions throughout southeast Asia, and because of the largely identical strands of Western ideology that have been woven into native life, nationalist movements everywhere reveal many of the same constructive and destructive features. On the debit side, native nationalists have been more resentful of foreign domination than eager for constructive change. Native statesmen have de-

<sup>1</sup> Other estimates have been as high as 800,000, depending on how "Chinese" is defined. People of Chinese descent in Thailand have been estimated at 2 to 2.5 million.



veloped little sense of responsibility, and particularly so in the countries where they have been allowed the fewest representative institutions. Where they are in a position to criticize the administration without assuming the risk of replacing it, as in the Netherlands Indies and Indo-China, native nationalists show a separatist tendency to subdivide into a number of small groups, along personal or regional lines. Burma reveals the same symptoms, though her self-government is more advanced, whereas the inarticulate and unorganized Malays have not produced more than an embryonic nationalism. Thailand and the Philippines, which have gone farthest along the path of political though not economic autonomy, have developed a one-man, one-party system, which is carrying on most of the paternalistic policies of the authoritarian governments to which they made themselves heirs, and only a thicker veneer of democratic institutions differentiates them from their predecessors.

Symbolic of the irresponsibility of native nationalists is their attitude toward minority groups, whether imported by alien governments or already coexistent in the country. The Filipinos and Annamites, who have struggled for their own independence, show no inclination to treat the Moros or the Cambodians as equals or to endow them with the rights and institutions which they have indignantly demanded for themselves. This is even truer of their attitude toward the immigrant Asiatics, with whom they are beginning to compete and whom they insist upon assimilating. These minorities, for their part, prefer to improve their political status as a group, to retain their economic hold on the country, and to continue to evolve within their own separate cultural orbit. Warfare and bad economic conditions in their homelands, and the higher standards of living in southeast Asia, are making them ever more permanent fixtures there, and this is bringing nearer the time when the issue of their future status *vis-à-vis* the indigenous peoples will be joined. The Eurasian groups differ as regards their alignment with native nationalists; socially they aspire to identification with the Europeans but when frustrated in this, tend to join with the nationalists. It is significant that in the most autonomous countries, Thailand and the Philippines, the Eurasians have thrown in their lot with the indigenous elements.

Not only in their dealings with the local minorities but in their preoccupation with domestic politics and agrarian issues, native nationalists have revealed an abysmal ignorance of their

country's role in world affairs, but this has found puerile rather than violent expression. This is due in some cases to geographical isolation, and in others to an artificial link with world imperialisms. Such international influences as have penetrated—Pan-Islam, the Indian Congress movement, the Chinese Kuo-mintang, and communism—have from the nationalist angle been dominated by the position and attitude of those countries' representatives who are domiciled in southeast Asia. Alien influences have flourished only temporarily in native soil; the vast bulk of the peasantry has never understood their ideology, and such growth as they have had was due to the prestige of their individual European or Asiatic proponents. As for the permeation of these ideas among the Asiatic minorities of southeast Asia, it has been subsidiary to their all-absorbing concern with money-making and conditioned by their generally low cultural level.

In contrast with the Chinese, the Japanese are few everywhere but in the Philippines. They are generally not competitive with the natives, whom they have made a definite attempt to win over. Pro-Japanese parties certainly exist in each country of the region; in some cases they are strengthened by a religious tie and in all cases by the universal native dislike of the Chinese. Native nationalists might like to see an Asiatic power triumphant over the West, but the fate of Korea and Manchuria has sobered those who put their country's independence above race brotherhood. They fear that once the Japanese enter the country, they are there to stay; the Japanese would mix with and assimilate the native population to the extinction of its national personality, whereas the Europeans have remained a group apart and at worst are transients in the country. Yet all southeast Asiatics would welcome closer trade relations with Japan, whose economy is peculiarly complementary to that of the entire region, though they see disadvantages to incorporation within the yen bloc. Their general attitude toward Japan might be said to be one of suspicious waiting. Native nationalists everywhere have shown a propensity for restricting the immigration of all foreign Orientals, and before they have prepared themselves adequately to replace them—a fact of which they are not properly aware.

If the nationalists' animosity has been directed chiefly toward alien Oriental minorities, it is because they are more directly competitive and because they feel themselves more able to

move effectively against them. They are quite as concerned, but not so optimistic, about ousting the Occidentals from either the political or the economic fields, whether it be from the need for protection against another, possibly worse, imperialist master, or because they realize that they lack the means and men to substitute for Western control. Admittedly there has been a deterioration in the standard of administrative bureaus under native control, notably in Burma and the Philippines. Sympathizers with nationalist aspirations believe, however, that such deterioration is transitory, and that in any case it is the inevitable and cheap price that must be paid to acquire first-hand administrative experience. Less excusable is the prevalent corruption in governmental services, a chronic Oriental problem, and one which has not been eliminated by native assumption of the responsibilities of government, as witness the recurrent scandals in the sale of public lands, the handling of opium monopolies and the general graft and nepotism that honeycombs native administrations. Because tradition condones such a means of eking out the low salaries of most native officials, and because of the small scale on which corruption flourishes when compared with Western standards, there is a tendency to look indulgently upon this frailty as merely an evidence of native growing-pains.

On the constructive side, native nationalism has found a number of ready-made advantages on which to build. The absence of a caste system and, in many countries, of an hereditary aristocracy; the existence of certain democratic features in both native society and local government; the tolerance which Buddhism has engendered in its adherents; and the generally high place assigned to women throughout the non-Muslim areas—all of these factors have permitted Western ideas to take easy root.

In those countries where representative institutions have been given the widest range, nationalist movements have developed within the governmental framework, and they have been most prone to violence—and incidentally to ineffectual subdivision—where such machinery has been most inadequate. It is a curious fact that wherever native statesmen have been relatively unhampered, they pursue—even more ardently—the policies they have inherited from either indigenous or alien predecessors. They do not want a reversal of policy which in all

cases is directed toward economic nationalism and state socialism, but more of it. The result is a vicious circle. They are thwarted in pursuing this policy by the absence of indigenous capital, which forces them to continue depending on foreign markets and investments despite fear of the ensuing entanglements. They give lip-service to democracy, but they indefinitely prolong franchise restrictions, especially when a reversal of this policy would curtail their present domination of the administration. The perpetuation of their own power and inherited programs cannot be simply attributed to Machiavellian motives, but arises from the same economic and social causes which produced the original policy. The plural society that has grown up in these countries is too irresponsible, too illiterate and too heterogeneous to permit otherwise.

The germ of a real opposition can be discerned, throughout most of this region in merely embryonic form, in the needs and grievances of the poorest classes. Labor is for the most part inarticulate, little given to self-help, and peculiarly a prey to not always disinterested demagogues. The governments, with their paternalistic and authoritarian cast, and as the single greatest employers of labor, have been in a position to protect and to organize it. This has been done to a minor degree, and more for urban than for the far more numerous and generally worse off agricultural laborers. The governments' motives are naturally mixed. There is a genuine desire on their part to raise the depressed status of the native peasantry and proletariat, and in this the indigenous administrations have shown a commendable zeal in tackling problems which had been allowed to drift along during prosperous years. Yet social welfare has been promoted largely as the result of outbreaks of mass violence, or from intervention by governments whose nationals form the local laboring classes. There is, likewise, the desire not to let labor get out of hand, and whenever strikes are called the cry goes up that communists are using the illiterate and easily intimidated masses as their tools. The administrations' difficulties in finding responsible labor leaders with whom to deal is another motive in their promotion of trade unionism. One may safely say that labor legislation and labor organizations have everywhere throughout this region preceded labor's demand for them. What has lagged behind is a serious attempt on the part of the governments, either alien or native, to tackle the fundamental problems underlying agrarian discontent.

Native nationalism has been the forced growth in tropical countries of a transplanted Western seed. Despite the centrifugal forces of a plural society artificially bound together solely by the profit motive, nationalism has taken root among the indigenous peoples and to a lesser extent among the alien Oriental immigrants, all of whom live aloof from one another in separate cultural and racial groups. It has penetrated most deeply among the native peoples who are united by a common language, pride of race and—to them—glorious historical traditions. Within each group it has proved to be a cohesive force, welding people who were until its advent hardly conscious of the existence of compatriots beyond their own village, absorbing disparate religious and regional loyalties, and nationalizing such international influences as they experienced. But from the viewpoint of these countries as individual units, nationalism has proved a disruptive force. It has made each racial group more self-conscious, more prone to assert itself at the expense of other groups, and either tends toward a disastrous break-up of the present mosaic by some vigilant outsider playing upon this grave weakness in the body politic and social, or leads toward the forced assimilation of the weaker minorities by the most powerfully placed group.

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In the following pages a brief survey is given of the history and present status of the nationalist movements in the countries of southeast Asia. Hongkong and Taiwan (Formosa) have been omitted. The former, though essentially a Chinese municipality under British rule, has not hitherto had any serious problem of Chinese nationalism to face as a political force, though in the opinion of some observers this situation may be changing as a result of developments in the present wars. Taiwan, though its people are overwhelmingly Chinese, is kept under such severe control by its Japanese rulers that no legal opportunities are permitted for the growth of a nationalist movement and the few illegal underground movements that Chinese have started (often from headquarters in China) have been ruthlessly suppressed when discovered. The removal of Japanese control would probably result in the reabsorption of Taiwan by China rather than in the rise of an independent Taiwanese nationalism.

## II. THE PHILIPPINES

In southeast Asia the Philippines is unique in representing the ultimate stage of a colony on its path toward full autonomy. A further differentiation from neighboring countries lies in the greater permeation of Filipino life by European culture as a result of Spain's long religious offensive. Nevertheless, during Spain's 300-year domination of the Philippines, there were 30 major revolts among the Christianized Filipino lowlanders, arising chiefly from the burdens of heavy taxation, forced labor, governmental commercial monopoly, and the twin autocracy of Spanish officialdom and Church.

Under the influence of 19th-century developments in Europe, the port of Manila was opened to foreign trade, the Islands' resources began to be developed, the population increased rapidly, and the hitherto unconquered pagan tribes of the interior and the Moros of the southern islands began to feel the governmental hand increasingly. The Spanish administration, in turn, became slightly more liberal under the pressure of rising Filipino discontent, which had been stimulated by the new contacts. The measures taken subsequently, however, to resist the reform movement led by Filipinos returning from study in Europe culminated in the attempted suppression of an insurrection in 1896. Two years later the United States came on the scene to assume, in Filipino eyes, the erstwhile role of Spain.

An inquiry into the causes of the ensuing revolt against the United States, conducted by the Schurman Committee in 1899, led to the conclusion that the Filipino people—so politically inexperienced, so polyglot, so mutually isolated and divergent in culture and manner of living—did not generally desire independence, and that their revolt had arisen out of definite grievances for which they sought redress, as well as from a misunderstanding regarding the American promise of independence.<sup>1</sup> Even while this revolt was being forcibly suppressed, concessions were proffered through the establishment of an American civil commission, which began at once to dispense

<sup>1</sup> Forbes, W. Cameron, *The Philippine Islands* (New York, 1928), II, 334.

autonomy in local affairs and educational facilities, in accordance with McKinley's instructions to give good government to the Islands and at the same time to prepare them for democratic self-government. As an inevitable result of the dualism inherent in these instructions, and also of Filipino aspirations, there arose disagreements—not as to the ultimate goal, but rather as to what constituted good government, and above all as to the means and time in which it was to be achieved.<sup>2</sup>

In its immediate emphasis upon training a dependent people as rapidly as possible for self-government along the lines of its own political system, the American colonial policy differed from those of neighboring imperialists at this time. Further, in providing a central administration, encouraging the use of a common language, and setting up an educational system impregnated with democratic principles, the United States deliberately laid the foundation for real national unity. Yet, while fostering ultimate political independence, the American tariff policy was simultaneously drawing the Philippines closer into economic dependence on the sovereign state. Both the smallness of the total American investment in the Islands—not totaling more than \$225,000,000<sup>3</sup>—and the benefits which have accrued therefrom illustrate and reflect the fundamental contradiction between the American political and economic policies in the Philippines.

When the Filipinos revolted against Spain, there existed only two parties:<sup>4</sup> the pro-Spanish group with pro-clerical proclivities, which later became known as the Conservative Party, and the Katipunan, an organization which in contradiction to its predecessor (*La Liga Filipina*, a patriotic movement founded by the Filipino martyr-hero Rizal, which tried to effect reforms by petitioning the government) developed revolutionary aims under the leadership of Bonifacio. Spain made a few liberal gestures when it was too late, and the only consequence of these tardy concessions was a series of revolts serving to unify Filipino opinion and to strengthen national aspirations which, however, met with further disappointment after the American occupation.

<sup>2</sup> Hayden, J. R., *The Philippine Policy of the United States* (New York, 1942), Chapter II.

<sup>3</sup> "The Philippines as an American Investment," *Far Eastern Survey*, September 25, 1940.

<sup>4</sup> Forbes, *op. cit.*, II, 101.

The Federal Party, whose organization was encouraged by Governor Taft, produced an unpopular platform favoring annexation by the United States. Of the Conservatives and Federalists, only the latter party, under the leadership of Dr. Trinidad de Tavera, won followers outside of Manila, or as a matter of fact survived at all. And even within it a section calling itself the Peace Party was formed, as a reaction to the continuance of provincial guerrilla warfare. Even more ephemeral had been the Philippine Republic created by General Aguinaldo out of the dictatorial government he had formed at Malolos during the insurrection. This essentially Tagalog organization, though recognized throughout most of the Christianized Archipelago, was too short-lived for much actual accomplishment, but it served to attract individualistic Filipinos to the common ideal of independence and to offer opportunities for leadership.<sup>5</sup> Yet such leadership became mutually exclusive and tended to eliminate itself. In a clash of wills Aguinaldo dispensed with Bonifacio, and later himself retired from the political scene, after having issued a manifesto subsequent to his capture in 1901, urging the Filipinos to follow his lead in accepting the American peace. Thus the Filipino people were without accepted leadership until the inauguration of the Philippine Assembly in 1907, which provided a vehicle for the expression of such public opinion as then existed. At the time of the organization of the Federal Party no popular elections of any sort were held, and those instituted in 1901 for municipal offices were largely contests between individuals along the lines of local and not national preference or principles.

In 1902 a group of Filipinos, unwilling to subscribe to the Federal Party's annexation policy, proposed vainly to Governor Taft the organization of a *Partido Democrata*, pledged to the country's ultimate independence. Though the Philippine Commission was not yet ready to permit the organization of two opposing parties at a time when peace was not firmly established, yet it was not the official policy to suppress political activities. Such activity as existed centered about rival individual leaders who were unanimous in advocating eventual separation from the United States, and differed only as to the time in which it was to be achieved. Certain groups wanted independence

<sup>5</sup> Malcolm, G. A., *The Commonwealth of the Philippines* (New York, 1936), p. 96.



under American protection; such, for example, was the Republican Party of the Philippines, whose manifesto in 1905 contained—in addition to the customary complaints about high taxation and undue administrative costs—advocacy of a political, commercial, industrial and agricultural alliance with the United States. This manifesto was signed by Bishop Aglipay, who during the insurrection had broken away from the Spanish church to form the Independent Philippines Church.<sup>8</sup> In 1906 this manifesto was followed by another declaration of policy, which included demands for public works, free trade with the United States, labor laws, and a more rapid Filipinization of the administration—but still under the American aegis.

That same year witnessed increased political activity in preparation for the first elections for the Assembly. The Federal Party, recognizing the impracticability of its annexation platform, revised it in favor of a declaration for ultimate independence. This indicated the growing popularity of the independence ideal, but the perennial differences in regard to the time element were revealed in the multitudinous parties that sprang up like mushrooms at this time. Thus the *Nacionalistas*, who were among the first to demand ultimate independence, were succeeded by the *Independistas*, the *Immedialistas*, and the *Urgentistas*, whereas advocates of immediate independence adopted the conservative name of *Union Nacional*. Most of these ephemeral parties were grouped around self-chosen leaders who early in 1907 were brought together in the *Partido Nacionalista*, under the guidance of Osmeña, Quezon, Palma and Baretto. By this time the chief issues and leaders who were to form the conservative policies in subsequent years had already appeared upon the scene, thereby setting a record for stability and singleness of purpose unique in world political history. With virtually identical backgrounds, the two chief protagonists—Osmeña and Quezon—entered the Assembly at the same time: the former was chosen Speaker and the latter Floor Leader. While Osmeña remained in Manila to lead the Filipino element in the government there, Quezon worked for the same goal as Resident Commissioner in Washington, and they later rotated in office. Perhaps it was inevitable because of the highly personalized character of Philippine politics that this team should have broken up. Osmeña and Quezon

<sup>8</sup> Keesing, F. M., *The Philippines* (Shanghai, 1937), p. 47.

came to head rival parties, were reconciled, only to split again and then once more come together.

With the partial transfer of legislative power to the Filipino people in June 1907, the main issue in the first general elections revolved about the future political status of the Islands. At this time the Federal Party, though still appealing to the conservatives, changed its name to the *Partido Progresista*, with a platform calling for increasing autonomy to be eventually crowned by independence. Since Taft had favored making appointments from among the Federal Party members, as a reward for their aid in pacifying the Islands, the contest was chiefly between Filipinos already in office and those who wished to replace them, and it resulted in the defeat of the office-holding *Progresistas* and a decisive triumph for the *Nacionalistas*. Registration for this election was disappointingly smaller than those for provincial and municipal contests had been in 1903 and 1905, largely because of the timidity or indifference of the population in regard to national compared to local issues. A ten per cent increase in registration marked the next election for Assembly delegates, held in 1909. By this time the *Nacionalistas* had further consolidated their party organization by extending it to the provinces, leaving in opposition only the *Progresistas*. Their substantial gains were maintained in the 1912 Assembly election, and even more markedly in 1916, during the elections for the new Legislature provided for by the Jones Act. This time the *Nacionalistas* elected almost every one of their candidates, and from 1907 through 1935 remained entrenched in power. This record so discouraged the *Progresistas* that they disbanded as a separate party and united with another minority group to form a new *Partido Democrata*.

With the replacement of the Republican by a Democratic administration in Washington in 1913 came a marked change in American Philippine policy.<sup>7</sup> The Republican régime had established municipal self-government at the bottom of the Philippine political pyramid, with an appointive Filipino minority in the Philippine Commission at the top. There still remained, however, a goodly sprinkling of American officials in the intermediate provincial and insular positions. Inevitably friction developed between the rival Commission and Assembly, notably over the appropriations act, which threatened to

<sup>7</sup> Hayden, *op. cit.*, Chapter II,

terminate Filipino co-operation in the American program and necessitated the radical redistribution of power, as suggested by Wilson's investigator, H. J. Ford, in 1913. Between 1913 and 1916, under the Harrison regime, Americans were virtually eliminated from direction of the administration. Filipinos were given a majority on the Commission; and the Governor General came to exercise the powers of his office upon the advice of the leader of the dominant Philippine party, who thereby initiated the policy of "national leadership."

On the principle that the government should be turned over to the Filipinos as quickly and as fully as possible, the Jones Act of 1916 created a Filipino-dominated Legislature, and Filipinization of the services was accelerated. The interpretation of this Act by Governor Harrison accorded with that of the Filipino leaders,<sup>8</sup> and it resulted in a diminution of the chief executive's powers and the enhancement of those of the Speakers of both Houses of the Legislature, who were also the principal officers of the *Nacionalista* Party. The Council of State, ironically called the fourth side of the triangle, was created to institutionalize and make responsible the authority of those two officials over the government as a whole, and also to provide an organic link between the executive and legislative branches of the government. An appraisal of this period, embodied in the Wood-Forbes report made during the Harding administration, admitted substantial progress in the political and economic fields, but noted a serious deterioration in many government services.

With the passage of the Jones Act, Philippine elections took on greater significance because of the provision for an elective senate to replace the appointive commission. The *Nacionalistas* continued their triumphant progress, despite their professed goal of immediate independence, while the *Progresistas* themselves—although avowed supporters of the regime—in practice opposed it. This period witnessed the formation of a new opposition party, the *Democrata Nacionales*, comprising dissatisfied members of both major parties under the leadership of Teodoro Sandiko and Judge Sumulong. Its platform included the usual appeal for immediate independence and a protest against alleged dictatorship within the *Nacionalista* fold. In 1917 this party joined with the *Progresistas* to form a new *Partido*

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter VI.

*Democrata*, on a platform calling for immediate and absolute independence, amendment of the libel law, and social and labor legislation. The general elections of 1919, which were governed by the Jones Act reducing the age and educational requirements, increased the number of voters nearly three times over the 1912 total.<sup>9</sup> The new party polled more votes than its few representatives in the Legislature indicated, and further illustrated the Philippine political weakness for too many over-ambitious leaders intractable to party discipline and sustained co-operation.

With such undisputed control over both houses of the Legislature it was natural that the *Nacionalistas* should split into factions, as they did in 1921, under their perennial leaders, Osmeña and Quezon. Those following Osmeña regarded themselves as the orthodox *Nacionalistas*, while the Quezon group formed themselves into the *Partido Nacionalista Collectivistas*, whose name tersely embodied a protest against alleged one-man rule, and whose platform in addition to the inevitable plea for independence included an elaborate social program, extension of the suffrage, and complete trade reciprocity between the United States and the Philippines even after independence was achieved. The ensuing election campaign of 1922 aroused more popular interest than before because the personalities of the rival leaders had now become well known, and because of a further extension of the suffrage. The results were a majority for neither party in either house of the Legislature, and substantial gains registered by a now better-organized *Democrata* Party. The increasing strength of the opposition was a contributing factor toward reuniting Osmeña and Quezon, once the bitterness of the campaign had been forgotten, in a *Partido Nacionalista Consolidado*, advocating, in addition to immediate and complete independence, the continuance of the Council of State, the suppression of the military and extra-legal advisers to the Governor General, the maintenance of the integrity of Philippine territory, the adoption of English as the official language along with a development of the vernacular, and the nationalization of public utilities—many of these desiderata representing concessions to the program of the opposition.

The opposition, for its part, claimed to have taken up the

<sup>9</sup> Forbes, *op. cit.*, II, 113.

torch of independence that had fallen from the *Nacionalista* hand. They attacked the party in power, criticized the Governor General, advocated suppression of the Council of State and the re-establishment of the Court of Land Registration. But in spite of a more formidable opposition, the *Nacionalista* Party, now reunited after its schism, continued to hold the senior partnership in a two-party system. Both sides were committed to Philippine independence and their differences were mainly those of leadership and not of principle. Popular participation in the government was expanding with the electorate. While little over one per cent of the total population had registered as voters in 1907, there were more than eight per cent registered in 1925, and while the proportion of those registered to the total number of inhabitants was low, the percentage of voters from among those registered was consistently very high.<sup>10</sup> The conduct of the Philippine electorate has been generally exemplary, even in the early days when there was a residue of bitterness between the irreconcilables and those of their compatriots who had accepted the American regime. On the other hand, Filipinos regularly have been reluctant to accept the official election returns, alleging frequent fraud and corruption. The successive expansion of the franchise and the increasing literacy of the electorate are perhaps making it progressively easier to secure a more honest vote. Filipino society, however, still remains feudal and easily led and intimidated.

The creation in 1926 of the *Consejo Supremo Nacional*, under Quezon's presidency, was an event of great importance, for it was the first organized coalition of the major parties and their leaders to take joint action in all matters concerning American-Philippine relations and conservative interests as a whole. Though the immediate cause of this union was the threatened dismemberment of Philippine territory contained in the Bacon Bill, it was directed more against the strengthening of American authority in the Governor General's powers under the Wood regime, which was interpreted by Filipinos of all political colors as an attempt to decrease the Legislature's authority and thus Philippine autonomy. The opposition suffered from making common cause with the reigning party against American imperialism, and this period saw the resumption of a one-party system and a clearer assertion of the national leadership policy

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 117.

by Quezon at Osmeña's expense. In spite of setbacks both in Washington and Manila, Philippine nationalism became more militant both within the party and throughout the country at large.

During the succeeding Stimson and Murphy regimes, the prevailing spirit of compromise prevented an open rupture between Filipino leaders and the sovereign state, and permitted progress in internal administration.<sup>11</sup> The elimination of the *Democrata* Party furthered the trend toward a one-man, one-party system under the virtually unchallenged leadership of Quezon, who now combined the presidency of the *Nacionalista* Party with that of the Senate. In the United States a growing weariness with the Philippine question was evident, and the entry of new economic factors into the situation laid the ground for a fundamental change in the direction of an autonomous Philippine state. The campaign which began in Washington in October 1929, and culminated four years later in the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth, was marked by the growing pressure of the sugar and farm groups in the United States which felt their interests injured by Philippine immigration and the free-trade policy. They were pushing their own interests, according to President Hoover when he vetoed the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, at the expense of national welfare both in their own country and in the Philippines. After a struggle in the Islands over acceptance of this Act, in which Quezon and Osmeña once more found themselves in opposing camps, the Philippine Legislature rejected independence under conditions which lacked a positive assurance of reciprocal trade relations, permitted the United States to retain military and naval reservations, and were vague regarding the High Commissioner's powers. Yet ultimately, upon Quezon's insistence, the Legislature accepted essentially the same terms, now embodied in the Tydings-McDuffie Act, with Roosevelt's added assurance that such "inequalities and imperfections" as it might be found to contain would be ironed out before the consummation of independence in 1946.

The destructive alternation of their respective Philippine policies by the two major American parties, and the customary indifference and irresponsibility of American opinion, culminated in the overwhelmingly non-partisan vote in the United

<sup>11</sup> Hayden, *op. cit.*, Chapter VI.

States which passed the independence measures. This triumph of highly localized interests in the United States, as well as the resultant American assumption of "responsibility without authority," marked simultaneously the abandonment of traditional Republican policy in the United States and the victory for the *Nacionalista* Party in the Philippines which had for years been the most determined advocate of immediate independence. Since 1907 this party had shown a remarkable consistency in ideals and leadership, and since the establishment of the Commonwealth it has undergone no truly fundamental change.

With the liquidation of the independence issue, the *Nacionalista* Party's triumph was almost at once tempered by the entry onto the political scene of local economic issues which had been in abeyance during the general preoccupation with political problems. These issues concerned not only the ultimate fate of the Islands' economy, after independence had shut off the free American market, but the growing unrest of an increasingly numerous body of economically depressed Filipinos, some of whom were organizing themselves into the *Sakdal*, Communist and Labor parties.<sup>12</sup> Surprising evidence of the growth of this opposition was the vote polled by the *Sakdalistas* in the 1934 elections, followed by the bloody uprising of May 1935, which served to heal the wounded feelings of Quezon and Osmeña after their split over the independence issue. It was becoming increasingly clear that the two major parties represented almost exclusively the Philippine aristocracy and intelligentsia, and that finally the germs of a real opposition were generating in the totally unrepresented and largely unorganized and inarticulate needy classes. The Murphy regime had done something to awaken social consciousness among the Filipinos, but it took the *Sakdal* movement to force the concept of social justice, and an appreciation of the problems which political independence entailed, to the forefront of President Quezon's Commonwealth program.

The early withdrawal of the insurrectionist leaders from the political scene (only to reappear in 1935 with an attack on the *Nacionalista* Party and all its works as their one constructive contribution), and the perennial tendency of Philippine politics to devolve into a contest between personalities rather than principles, had resulted theretofore in creating only an artificial op-

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter VII.

position. The chief protagonists were wont to argue about the theoretical advantages of a one-party over a two-party system, but they were agreed on the central political issue of independence. The electorate had indeed participated in elections proportionately as the franchise was expanded, and it had given consistent approval to the independence stand of the major parties. But until the early 1930's the economic issues which closely touched the lives of the masses had been ignored, and it is significant that the *Sakdal* Party under Benigno Ramos was formed during those depression years at the same time that labor was being organized in both urban and rural districts.<sup>13</sup> The *Sakdalista* program dealt with the tenant-landlord relationship, agrarian indebtedness, the revision of taxation, the teaching of native dialects in schools, the formation of a Filipino army of 500,000 men, and the reduction of high officials' salaries with corresponding increases for those ministering directly to the people.

Because the *Sakdalistas* had shown themselves willing to resort to force, they were accused despite their denials of having communist affiliations. A communist party, however, does exist in an embryonic state, led by Crisanto Evangelista and other Filipinos who have studied in Russia and are rumored to be in Moscow's pay. The Philippine Proletariat Congress alone has a membership of 20,000, and in March 1935 it revealed as its platform the rejection of the Philippine Constitution (in which the *Sakdalistas* concur) and demands for the establishment of a soviet form of government in the Philippines. A virgin field certainly exists in the Philippines for radical propaganda among the unemployed laborers of the commercial centers and disgruntled tenants on the larger estates, notably in Manila and in the central Luzon provinces, but less so in those regions where Filipinos are small landholders. At the door of the communists are laid the strikes in Iloilo and the Tenganan uprising of 1931 which aimed to overthrow the government. To date the radical movement is still only a major police problem, but it has potentialities for growth into a revolutionary opposition if the grievances which nourish it are not attacked by an adequate government program, and if the international situation does not permit the growth of a democratic free oppo-

<sup>13</sup> Malcolm, *op. cit.*, p. 281.



sition and crystallizes the present one-man rule into a dictatorship.

The Philippines is predominantly an agricultural country, and the growth of trade unions has been slower in the rural than in the urban centers.<sup>14</sup> Through its own efforts and through governmental agencies membership in the 274 registered labor unions totaled about 70,000 in 1939. Labor has gradually obtained some concessions. But recently increased unrest and rural strikes show that the tempo of reform does not keep pace with the demand. The chief government effort has been directed against the fundamental evils of usury and tenancy, which have reduced the agricultural masses to virtual serfdom or forced them to work for a bare living wage in rice and sugar-cane cultivation. In 1939 the first important step to unify labor was taken with the establishment of a National Labor Commission embracing both conservative and radical unions, and an impetus was given to the development of rural organization by the formation of a National Commission of Peasants, including 300,000 tenant farmers and field laborers all over the country. But in spite of marked progress, both rural and independent labor movements still leave three-fourths of the Filipino working classes unorganized, and such unions as exist are financially unable to support a general strike, which the number of unemployed available would in any case break.

In 1939 the government made an effort to keep ahead of the movement by setting up the first large-scale co-operative, a Rural Progress Administration to promote land ownership, and a National Land Settlement Company to organize the transfer of peasants from the densely populated areas to undeveloped islands. Legislation has been passed to protect and define the rights of tenants and landlords, to control hours and wages, and to provide for compulsory arbitration. Yet the success of this official attempt will depend on the time element, on how long the conservative unions can continue to dominate the increasingly aggressive radical groups and, finally, on how involved these unions become in local politics. Despite the recent fusion of communists and socialists, mutual jealousy still reigns among their not always disinterested leaders. All of them are suspicious of the too-little-and-too-late tactics of a "reactionary"

<sup>14</sup> "Philippine Labor Policy in the Making," *Far Eastern Survey*, April 10, 1940.

administration as well as of the individual officials charged with handling labor questions. There is certainly a tendency to confuse the issue by attributing subversive political motivation to demands for the redress of just grievances; there is also disagreement between officials as to the best way of improving the laborers' lot; and finally there is a trend toward more personal intervention by Quezon, and hence one-man government, in the form of temporary measures of alleviation.

The history of political parties in the Philippines is one of fusion, mergers and the consistent absorption of minorities. This has been effected by the able strategists who have for 35 years led the Nacionalista Party in its new rise to a monopoly of political power and patronage. The concept of national leadership which has been thus evolved is probably the chief essentially Filipino political contribution. It derives from Malay-Spanish concepts, has no direct legal authorization, and rests upon a vital, albeit tacit, mandate from the illiterate masses who are impregnated with feudal traditions propitious for the growth of a paternal government of personalities. The United States administration gave unparalleled opportunities to young Filipinos and they replaced, almost overnight, the older irreconcilables who were lacking in the flexibility required to adjust to the new order.<sup>15</sup> Politics so became the breath of life to the younger generation, trained in American schools and methods, that it displaced the priesthood as the highest calling to which the best local brains could aspire. Youth movements in the Philippines are generally anti-fascist to the point of radicalism, and their activities have ranged from campaigns for civic improvement to demands for an investigation of Japanese activities in Davao, and openly expressed fears of a Quezon dictatorship.

A new appreciation of their international situation and its relation to Philippine minority problems has come with the Islands' emergence from an oversuccessful campaign for liberation. A sobering realization has come of the relationship between agrarian unrest and the Philippines' dependence on the American market; between the lagging reorientation of planned local economy and closer ties with Japan, involving the undefended resources of the rich underpopulated Islands; and in general an appreciation of the fact that retention of the political

<sup>15</sup> Lopez, S. P., *Literature and Society* (Manila, 1940), p. 75, *et seq.*

independence for which the Filipinos have fought so hard and so long may depend on factors beyond their control.<sup>16</sup>

The national defense program is obviously directed against Japan whose geographical proximity, population problems, and colony of 18,000 already established in Mindanao, where 700,000 potentially hostile Moros might be used as tools for Japanese penetration, give the government cause for anxiety.<sup>17</sup> A small, possibly subsidized, group of Filipinos are pro-Japanese, and this group is swelled by a far greater number who fear Chinese commercial competition and increasing political activity, who point to the Japanese colony at Davao as a model of good citizenship and scientific industry, and who regard economic *rapprochement* with Japan as inevitable after 1946.<sup>18</sup> A frankly fascist element exists in the Philippines, headed by ex-Representative Cornejo, who is harkening not only to Japanese courtship but to the recently increased propaganda of the *Falangista*. The 5,000 Spaniards in the Philippines are few in number but they still exercise great cultural and social influence, and they are susceptible to appeals for closer relations with countries of Spanish traditions.<sup>19</sup> In general, however, Filipinos see that the Axis ideal jeopardizes the independence toward which most of their efforts have been directed for nearly half a century, and while there has been no general plea for more consideration of the Tydings-McDuffie Act there is an ever larger group in both the Philippines and the United States which would like to have the question reopened.

<sup>16</sup> "Philippine Trade Returns Disclose Lag in Planning," *Far Eastern Survey*, July 3, 1940.

<sup>17</sup> Hayden, *op. cit.*, Chapter XIV.

<sup>18</sup> "Japan in the Changing Philippine Scene," *Far Eastern Survey*, January 31, 1940.

<sup>19</sup> *Far Eastern Survey*, April 7, 1941; Malcolm, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

### III. BURMA

The presence of a largely homogeneous, predominantly agrarian population, with proud historical traditions reaching back over the centuries and a sense of unity developed by strife within and without its frontiers, would seem to have made Burma an ideal country for the development of pure nationalism. Yet the introduction of alien elements, largely as a result of British control, and their racial organization along economic lines in which non-Burmans predominate have deflected Burmese nationalism from its natural course.

The English occupation of Burma, achieved in three successive stages from 1824 to 1886, was the inevitable result of the clash between Britain's expansion from India and Burma's encroachments on Arakan, and of the British fear of being forestalled by the French who were simultaneously expanding in Further India. The character of the Burmese dynasty at Ava did not lend itself to the role of puppet kings, so the British set up direct rule in Burma with no separation of the powers exercised by officials—in contrast with the indirect rule established over the equally autocratic but more malleable Malay sultans. No nationalistic movement has centered around the numerous and highly revered members of the Burmese royal family,<sup>1</sup> and this is almost equally true of dynasties all over southeast Asia; they have either become the instruments of alien rule or been swept away among the debris of the ancient Oriental order.

Burma had no Legislative Council until 1897 when she became administratively a part of India, thirty-six years after such councils had been created for most of the Indian provinces. In fact, despite successive increases in membership, Burma's Council in 1922 contained only two elected members, who represented dominant European interests.<sup>2</sup> This Council had been created in the interests of efficiency and decentralization and not of autonomy; yet it served as the basis for constitutional evolution. In the main, Burmese municipal commissions were nomi-

<sup>1</sup> Christian, John, *Modern Burma* (New York, 1942), Chapter XIII.

<sup>2</sup> *Rangoon Times*, April 14, 1939.

nated and had official chairmen, while no district councils were created before 1921. So the country had little experience in representative government until the diarchy system of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms was, after much hesitation, extended to Burma. Then, in 1923, the Legislature was suddenly increased from 30 to 103 members, of whom 80 were elected by two million men and women out of the total population of eleven millions. The Burmans appointed were largely from among judges of the High Court.

Though some observers trace the nationalist movement back to 1905, it may be said generally that the Burmans showed no interest in politics until the World War. The great Hindu-Muslim and caste problems of India did not affect Burma, and the Congress movement found barren soil there. After the 1923 reforms, nationalist Wunthanu organizations were formed and fostered demands for a greater share in local administrations. At about the same time independent Burman schools began to cultivate pride of race, but later they succumbed to state grants-in-aid. So when diarchy was applied to Burma, the chief problem was to find suitable political leaders, and this serious lack was offset only by the skill with which Sir Harcourt Butler, Governor of Burma from 1923 to 1928, shepherded the experiment through its initial stages.

The Simon Commission's recommendation that Burma be separated from India largely reflected popular opinion in the country. Need was felt for a more equitable distribution of the revenues, and there was appreciation of the difficulties involved in giving Burma a more appropriate share in the proposed federal government for India, an administration which would function from an alien capital 2,000 miles away. An anti-separationist movement, however, was started on the ground that Burma's subsequent status as a Crown Colony would cut her off from India's more rapid evolution toward self-government. But the new constitution was soon found to be more liberal in some respects than that which had been given to India, so that when the anti-separationists under U Chit Hlaing unexpectedly found themselves in a majority, after the general election of 1932, their leaders refused to take office. The Legislature then declined to give a clear vote in favor of federation and the home government was compelled to resolve the question in favor of separation, which became an accomplished

fact in 1937, leaving Burma's political parties with no fundamental divergency in policy.

In the 1936 elections for the new House of Representatives, the United Party under U Ba Pe, which had favored separation, gained control of 45 out of 132 seats. The anti-separationists held only 25.<sup>3</sup> After three months of effort, U Ba Pe not only failed to form a government but he could not keep his own party together. So a coalition under Ba Maw was formed from the two groups which had been anti-separationists along with a few independent Burmans and representatives of the Karen and Indian minorities who were elected on a communal racial basis. From the opening session, the opposition began its purely obstructionist tactics by summarily rejecting the budget, and this forced the Governor, Sir Archibald Cochrane, to use his special powers at once. The coalition, however, remained in office despite its dependence on the barest majority.

Ba Maw and his *Sinyetha*, or poor man's, Party were committed to a program of advanced socialism which he was unable to carry out without parliamentary support. Yet he showed marked political skill in referring to House and Senate committees important questions of fiscal policy, agricultural indebtedness and land tenure, contenting himself legislatively with the gradual abolition of the unpopular poll taxes. Unfortunately, Ba Maw revealed his administration's lack of a coherent policy by letting private members regularly initiate bills; his majority was always uncertain and dependent on the support of dissenters from the United Party. Extremists from this latter group had by now broken away to form the *Myochit*, or patriotic, Party. Allegations of graft and nepotism by the resigning chairman of the Public Services Commission<sup>4</sup> precipitated one of the numerous no-confidence votes, which have become a feature of almost every Burmese legislative session. Moreover, Ba Maw's personal unpopularity became such that he was forced out of office when the anti-Indian riots broke out in July 1938, followed by strikes, notably in the oil fields.

The country remained for months in such a state of active unrest and the elements in the cabinet of the new Premier U Pu were so discordant that it was remarkable that the United Party government lasted till September 1940. Its ability to

<sup>3</sup> See the article by F. Burton Leach, *ibid.*, June 23, 1939.

<sup>4</sup> Report of the Public Services Commission, *ibid.*, January 28, 1941.

retain control, however, was probably due to the even greater disunity of the opposition. New political parties were formed in this period, the most important, aggressive and coherent among them being the Freedom Bloc<sup>5</sup> led by Ba Maw, which comprised the *Sinyetha* Party, the All-Burma Cultivators League, the All-Burma Workers League, and the *Thakin Dobiame Asiayone*, thus including most of the extremist elements ranging from university students to political-minded Buddhist monks. U Pu succeeded in restoring superficial order, and for some time he held in check the civil disobedience movement which started in December 1938 under U Saw, the present premier and head of the *Myochit* Party. This movement, however, soon gathered such momentum that the Governor was forced to declare a state of emergency.

The anti-Indian riots of 1938,<sup>6</sup> only superficially religious in motivation, focused popular attention less on the government's inability to cope with the situation than on the underlying cause of agrarian discontent.<sup>7</sup> After the British Government had failed to attract agricultural colonists from Upper Burma to develop the newly opened rice fields of the Irawaddy delta for the rapidly expanding export trade, it began in 1874 to encourage Indian immigration.<sup>8</sup> With the aid of this imported labor, and under the impetus of European and Indian investments in the rice, timber and mineral industries, the whole economic system of the country was revolutionized. Subsistence crops gave way to commercial crops, a process which was taking place all over southeast Asia at about the same time. The needs and tastes of Burmese farmers developed even faster than did their rice crops, on the easy credit terms offered by Indian moneylenders, and the sums they blithely borrowed were not spent for productive purposes. The result was the gradual transfer of land, especially in Lower Burma, from its peasant proprietors to absentee, alien and generally nonagricultural landlords—a process greatly accelerated by the collapse of rice prices during the depression and by the progressively uneconomic

<sup>5</sup> Christian, *op. cit.*, Chapter XIII.

<sup>6</sup> *Rangoon Times*, May 26, August 3, 1939; May 2, June 16, October 9, 15; February 10, 1941.

<sup>7</sup> Grant, W. J., *The New Burma* (London, 1940), p. 19; *Rangoon Times*, February 18, 1940.

<sup>8</sup> Furnival, J. S., *An Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma* (Rangoon, 1931), p. 71 *et seq.*

fragmentation of such properties as remained in Burman hands under the Buddhist laws governing inheritance.<sup>9</sup>

Indians acquired not only a stranglehold on the land of Lower Burma, but they swamped the agricultural and industrial labor market, government bureaus, and communications services of every kind.<sup>10</sup> Only in Upper Burma were the Burmans able to hold their own economically. The question was further complicated by Burma's dependence on India as both her chief market and provisioner. In attempting to regulate the status of Indians in the country and their entry into it, Burma has been, and is, handicapped by the relatively unimportant place she holds in India's foreign trade—7 per cent as opposed to India's 60 per cent in Burma's total foreign trade—and by the aggressive interest which Indian nationalists are taking in their compatriots' position in Burma.<sup>11</sup> Remittances by Indians to their homeland constitute another Burmese grievance analogous to the Thai and Malay resentment of Chinese earnings which, in the same way, are drained from those countries to China. Part of the Burmese agitation for Indian immigration restriction and for revenue-bearing duties on Indian imports derives from the desire to strike back at foreign exploitation, and also from the current vogue to industrialize Burma to the point not of total self-sufficiency perhaps, but so that it may be less dependent on rice exports.

In measures proposed to this end in the Legislature, Burman nationalists have exhibited a remarkable overestimation of Burma's wealth and an ignorance of her position in the world, as well as an almost total preoccupation with local agrarian and unemployment problems to the exclusion of the commercial issues involved. It is doubtless true that while foreign capital and labor have greatly developed Burma's resources, the Burmans are none the richer for it. Indigenous industries have either stood still or gone backwards under British rule. Burmans lack capital either to develop their country along modern lines or to invest in profitable foreign enterprises. But the absence of coal and iron deposits, the lack of indigenous technical knowl-

<sup>9</sup> Report of the Agricultural and Finance Committees, *Rangoon Times*, June 29, 1939.

<sup>10</sup> Bennison, J. J., *Report of an Inquiry into the Standard and Cost of Living of the Working Classes in Rangoon* (Rangoon, 1928).

<sup>11</sup> *Rangoon Times*, April 29, May 10, July 18, 1939; October 9, 1940; February 10, 1941.



edge, the smallness of the local market and labor supply, and above all the absence among the people of the characteristics and the inclination required for a business career, vitally handicap Burma's industrialization program.<sup>12</sup>

A limited support of the nationalist party has been forthcoming in the form of the State Aid to Industries Bill of 1939, but like most of the proposed nationalist measures (such as those limiting immigration, regulating working hours, and the Burmanization of all public services up to 50 per cent), draft laws have not yet emerged from the legislative committees. Bills to insure political control over the university and to repeal censorship of the press have been defeated. Delays have retarded application of the Insurance Bill to protect indigenous firms and policy holders, and that of the Rangoon Municipal Bill to give 50 per cent control to Burmans who are in a minority in their own capital. Such measures as have been passed and enforced have proved of extremely doubtful value and have not increased popular confidence in the hasty legislative activity of the new Burmese representatives and senators.

Despite the handicaps of inexperience and the political instability characterizing the three coalition ministries which Burma has experienced since separation from India, the government of U Pu and the United Party succeeded in passing two important pieces of economic legislation on land alienation and tenancy.<sup>13</sup> These bills, however, have worked out in most instances to the dissatisfaction of tenants, landlords, and even the administration, and they have now been referred back to drafting committees. All are agreed that the attempt to give tenants security of tenure at a fair price is long overdue, but in application the officers determining "fair" rents, and the land distribution to landless farmers which the government is to acquire by compulsory purchase from nonagricultural landlords, have run into serious difficulties. The problem of how to finance the future peasant proprietors has recalled the failure of the co-operative movement in Burma which suffered from lack of adequate supervision and an appreciation of the general principles underlying co-operation. The government is now trying

<sup>12</sup> Christian, *op. cit.*, Chapter VIII; *Rangoon Times*, September 28, 1939; March 30, 1940; February 4, 19, 1941.

<sup>13</sup> See articles on the Tenancy Act, *ibid.*, May 10, April 14, 1939; March 12, April 10, November 20, 1940. And on the Land Purchase Bill, *ibid.*, August 29, 1939; February 20, September 24, 1940.

to put the co-operative societies back on their uncertain feet<sup>14</sup> and has tied up both questions with the land mortgage banks recently created for experimental purposes at three urban centers.

The frequent changes in both tenants and landlords in the delta and the attendant and perpetual shifting of an increasingly irresponsible rural population have resulted in such a growth of crime<sup>15</sup> that now one out of every 215 persons in Burma is in jail. Hence the police and judicial services have required as much money as is spent on all the more constructive departments such as agriculture, education, and public health put together. The anti-Indian riots were but one manifestation of the general breakdown in the Burmans' respect for authority, whether religious, family or governmental. They were also indicative of the need to revise the taxation system.<sup>16</sup> Burman farmers not only contribute too much of the state revenue—25 per cent of the total, at the high rate of about five rupees per head in Lower Burma—but the whole taxation system is too rigid. There is some remission of taxation in the case of crop failures, but no allowance for any serious fall in the price of rice. Though individual ministers have committed themselves to a tax revision program, the Burma governments to date have shown no indication of tackling the problem.

Internal economic issues, with international implications, have dominated the development of nationalism in Burma. The continued clash of national and foreign interests has reduced the working of the constitution to a farce, principally by bestowing responsibility without power on the ministers. Assorted third-party interests have stood in the way of peaceful progress. Yet Burma's increasingly aggressive nationalism has been directed primarily against the million or so Indians in the country, rather than against the 30,000 Europeans who are responsible for their overwhelming presence. Such bitterness as has been expressed against the administration has centered on matters like the inability of the Legislature to control the increasing defense expenditures. This was not because Burmans do not want adequate defense. Rather, they have used this issue as an excuse for attacking a constitution that gives them an unworthy com-

<sup>14</sup> See the history of the co-operative movement in *ibid.*, August 9, 23, 1929.

<sup>15</sup> Christian, *op. cit.*, Chapter XIV.

<sup>16</sup> *Rangoon Times*, October 16, November 2, 1940.

promise between an authoritarian and a democratic form of government. Burmans had the additional grievance that for many years prior to the present war, there had been no Burman recruits in the army at all. Other vexatious issues of long standing center around the use of the Burmese language in the Legislature, the renaming of Rangoon streets for Burman patriots, and the expense of transferring government offices to the summer capital at Maymyo.<sup>17</sup> In general, however, there has been little open expression of anti-British sentiment, probably because the administration has adopted the position that, law and order being maintained, Burmese nationalists—unless they are violent extremists—are morally right. The European bloc in the Legislature votes independently as a unit and is solidly in favor of any Burmese ministry which gives promise of stability.

In spite of Burma's unenviable record of having been until the Separation the most crime-ridden province of India, Burman nationalists have not been generally addicted to violence or political assassinations. Yet disorders of an increasingly serious nature have taken place during the past decade. The Saya San rebellion of 1930, which counted 2,000 participants and degenerated into a looting campaign directed against Indians, had much to do with the subsequent growth of anti-Indian feeling. However, anti-Chinese riots which took place at about the same time did not leave traces of such strong antagonism.

Most of the Chinese in Burma have been regarded as good citizens, and such as were not were deported with the co-operation of their own community.<sup>18</sup> In fact, there has been a good deal of intermarriage with the Chinese whom the Burmans regard as cousins. The Chinese in Burma, numbering 193,594 in the 1931 census, control a fifth of the country's commerce: they hold the lion's share of the rice-milling and timber trades, and share profits with the Indians in the retail business. Yet the fact that wealthy Chinese are in a minority and do not enjoy the same prominent positions as do their compatriots in Malaya, Thailand, and even Indo-China, brought down on them far less than on the Indians the brunt of Burmese nationalists' displeasure until the opening of the Burma Road. Since that development there has been a strong element

<sup>17</sup> Christian, *op. cit.*, Chapter XIII.

<sup>18</sup> *Rangoon Times*, July 27, 1939; February 7, 1941.

of Burmese opinion opposed, not only to the highway which has made Lashio a potential target for Japanese attack, but also to any increase in communications with China that may attract more immigrants to Burma and further complicate the local race problem. Burmans feel that the already declining peacetime overland commerce between China's Yunnan Province and Burma will not grow sufficiently after the war to compensate for the risk of being flooded by hordes of demobilized Chinese soldiers who may intensify the already established drift of refugees from hill tribes across the border. These fears, which have increased with the arrival of every batch of Chinese volunteer road-workers, have not been allayed by official Chinese gestures of goodwill and they have radically altered Burmans' attitude toward the Sino-Japanese war. Persons collecting for China relief funds in Rangoon have been virtually boycotted by the Burmans. Although a few years ago one might have said that the only Japanese question that existed in Burma concerned the textile import quota, nowadays there is certainly a pro-Japanese group in the country, notably among the extreme nationalists, who would prefer a supposedly temporary Japanese tutelage to continued British rule in Burma.

Three years of separation from India have disappointed advocates of even so partially democratic a constitutional regime as that of Burma today. Not only have the three different premiers been extreme nationalists who are avowedly out to wreck the constitution, but they disagree destructively among themselves, and such economic legislation as they have passed has broken down in application. Nor has the standard of local self-government been encouraging as regards either efficiency or accomplishment.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, the Burmans have never been allowed to acquire much useful experience and are making a courageous effort to tackle problems which they inherited from an earlier regime, notably the restoration of land to the cultivator and the allotment to Burmans of a greater share in their country's economic and political development. Burmese self-government is still inchoate, but its path is clearly marked toward control of alien immigration, the organization of more trade unions, the Burmanization of the army and public services, and eventually the achievement of dominion status. Thoughtful persons—and their number is as small in Burma as elsewhere—

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, editorial, October 16, 1940.

realize that their compatriots are handicapped by an insular outlook, the lack of any sense of civic responsibility, and above all by the absence of an enlightened public opinion. Further, the influential priestly class, traditionally prone to political agitation, has joined forces with the extremist elements among Burmese politicians and student groups. Such Burmese leaders as have emerged to head the country's twenty-two political parties are acquiring experience in statesmanship at the country's expense. Party organization still centers around personalities rather than policies, and party intrigue consumes a disproportionate amount of the leaders' time and energies. There is no native aristocracy accustomed to govern, but this immediate disadvantage is offset by definitely democratic features in Burmese social and religious life on which true self-government may be built. There is also a heartening unanimity regarding the solution desired for Burmese domestic problems; the cleavage concerns the means and the men to accomplish it.

As regards external policy the outcome is more obscure. So far the present European war has been only slightly felt, chiefly in the form of price and currency control. The Burmese are quick to resent any infringement on their newly acquired civil liberties. Thus any application of the Defense of Burma Act, under which Ba Maw and Thein Maung were arrested for seditious utterances, heightens nationalistic consciousness. Contributions toward the empire's war effort have been used as a bargaining point for political concessions and have intensified the Burman's desire for all varieties of self-sufficiency. The war in Europe has likewise strengthened the previous trend toward greater economic dependence on India and less on Far Eastern countries. Incorporation in the British Imperial Eastern Group program, organized at Delhi in the fall of 1940, has furthered this imperial coalition.

#### IV. BRITISH MALAYA

The Malay states, along with Cambodia and Laos in Indo-China, have the distinction of being the only dependencies in southeast Asia which sought the protection of European powers against the encroachments of foreign Asiatics. This has affected not only the type of indirect rule subsequently applied to them but, more important, has created a loyalty or rather an absence of resentment toward the sovereign power.

The English East India Company concentrated its energies on consolidating its position in India after vain attempts to break the Dutch monopoly in the Indian Archipelago during the 17th and most of the 18th Century. The French Revolutionary Wars brought with them a realization of the need for greater protection for the eastern coast of India, and Napoleon's occupation of Holland gave the British a second chance to gain a foothold in the Archipelago and to share in the rich trade between that region and Europe and the Farther East. With the gaining of Penang in 1786, the capture of Malacca from the Dutch in 1791, and the acquisition of Singapore by Raffles in 1819, the English Company followed its traditional policy of establishing, albeit hesitatingly, a string of strategic trading posts along a world commercial sea lane. Its sole purpose at the time was to wrest the rich Straits entrepôt trade from the Dutch by the revolutionary means of free-trade ports, but in so doing to avoid the complications that would result from penetration of the hinterland.

The settlement of the centuries-old Anglo-Dutch rivalry in this region<sup>1</sup> by the treaty of 1824, followed by the substitution of state for company control after the Indian Mutiny in 1857, and the transformation of the three ports (Singapore, Penang, Malacca) into the Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements in 1867, set the stage at last for effective intervention in the increasingly chaotic affairs of the Malay states.<sup>2</sup> Here was repeated the old story of rival factions within each of the sultanates call-

<sup>1</sup> Mills, L. A., *British Malaya* (Singapore, 1925), pp. 1-79.

<sup>2</sup> Swettenham, Sir Frank, *British Malaya* (London, 1929), p. 111 *et seq.*

ing on an alien power for aid against internal enemies, even at the price of losing all but nominal sovereignty.

On the British side the impetus within the Straits Settlements was strong enough by then to overcome the aversion of the home government to territorial expansion with the cogent argument that the peninsula's rich resources might otherwise be lost to Siam in her current southward drive. Individual agreements made with the sultans of Selangor, Perak, Pahang and Negri Sembilan, stipulating that they would ask and accept the advice of British Residents on all questions not pertaining to Malay custom and religion, were followed by the Treaty of Pangkor which molded these states in 1874 into an increasingly centralized federation. Johore's proximity to Singapore led its sultan to follow the same path independently, though he did not accept an adviser until 1914. The remaining unfederated states, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu, came under British protection subsequent to a treaty made in 1909 with their suzerain, Siam. Thus in the small area (50,976 square miles) that comprises British Malaya are nine states with a corresponding number of customs barriers and three types of British administration.

The explanation of this state of affairs lies in the geographical and cultural, as well as the historical, background of the region. Pre-British Malaya was colonized along the seacoasts and river valleys by successive groups of Malays who had been migrating thither from the nearby Archipelago for centuries.<sup>3</sup> The jungle-covered hinterland of the peninsula remained the uneasy preserve of scattered and nomadic tribes of indigenous Sakais, Semangs and Negritos. The Malays were the controlling power in the peninsula for only about a century;<sup>4</sup> their decline dated from the Portuguese capture of Malacca in 1511. Thereafter states like Perak and Trengganu achieved a certain degree of independence only spasmodically, while refugees from Malacca maintained a pseudo-sovereignty over Johore. The northern countries became the quasi-vassals of Siam in the degree to which geography and the means at Bangkok's disposal permitted the enforcement of suzerain powers. The southern peninsular states were periodically overrun by Malays from Celebes and Sumatra, and later by Chinese immigrants who

<sup>3</sup> Wheeler, L. R., *The Modern Malay* (London, 1928), p. 52; Wright, A. and Reid, T. H., *The Malay Peninsula* (London, 1912), p. 313.

<sup>4</sup> Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

came to work the tin mines, principally in Perak. The golden age of Malacca was subsequently never equaled by any of these states, which passed through centuries of subjection, degeneration and internal dissension. Three centuries prior to British sovereignty the older Indian rajahship of the peninsular Malays became influenced by the Islamic concept of the ruler not merely as a monarch, but as God's shadow on earth, and this idea with the loyalty it inspired remained the most fundamental force in Malaya's history until modern times, imbuing Malayan Islam with a national rather than a purely religious force.

The religious intolerance of the Portuguese aroused such hostility on the part of the few Malays who came into contact with them that they made common cause with the Dutch.<sup>5</sup> When the latter became masters of Malacca in 1641, they treated native rulers with as much deference as seemed necessary to secure their co-operation. In 1874 the Malay chiefs acquiesced in British supervision, albeit without enthusiasm, while the masses remained indifferent. The sole Malay revolt against British rule, discounting the Nanning War of 1832, was the assassination of Resident Birch of Perak,<sup>6</sup> whose well-intentioned but overenergetic interference in the ancient Malay institution of debt-slavery was considered by a small group of the local ruling class to be an infringement on their treaty-established control over Malay customs and religion. After the quelling of this revolt and the simultaneous suppression of piracy in the Straits, the *pax Britannica* was established in the peninsula, to the relief of the Malay peasantry and to the ultimate contentment of the sultans who came to enjoy greater prestige, security and wealth under Britain's suzerainty and through the rapid development of the peninsula under both British and Chinese auspices.

Despite the strongly adverse impression created in England by Birch's assassination, the government sanctioned continuance of the system of Residents and the institution of State Councils, with a few Malay representatives, in the protected states. Although the British made use of the existing governmental machinery in the Federated States and reiterated their intention of safeguarding the prestige of Malay rulers, the three types of administration that have evolved in Malaya have simply

<sup>5</sup> Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Swettenham, *op. cit.*, p. 138.



strengthened European control, and the only difference lies, as it does in French Indo-China, in the degree of their intensity.<sup>7</sup> The Straits Settlements merely represents the most direct form: it has a Legislative Council dominated by an official majority with unofficial representatives chosen or nominated according to their commercial or communal interests. In spite of frequent, vociferous criticism by Malays of administrative autocracy in such matters as income tax and the Malayan union, the chief protagonists have no real desire for representative government, in which they would be numerically swamped by other racial groups. They quarrel solely among themselves and with the administration. When it comes to any issue vitally affecting the colony as a whole, British, Chinese and Indian vested interests line up as a unit.

In the Federated States the decentralization aimed at by the Guillemard<sup>8</sup> and Clementi reforms theoretically restored greater prestige and autonomy to the sultans and their councils in relation to the increasingly centralized and rigid bureaucracy at Kuala Lumpur, which was governing efficiently enough in the interests of the country's economic development. Actually what conflict there is has remained an inter-British struggle of the producing regions against the commercial and fiscal domination of Singapore. The remarkable economic prosperity of the Federated States has never sufficiently tempted the sultans of the Unfederated States to permit themselves to be drawn into a common economic and political framework that might jeopardize their pseudo-independence and the more purely Malay character of their states. Such obviously commonsense arrangements as a uniform administration and a single tariff for the whole of so small a country as British Malaya have been blocked by the competition of rival groups, not always drawn up along racial lines, for the retention of political or economic power, and the whole struggle has been fought out above the heads of the ignored Malay majority.

This Malay majority comprises both the apathetic peasantry and a small but growing middle class of professional men and government employees which feels that such privileges as have been left or granted to Malaya have benefited solely the ruling

<sup>7</sup> Emerson, Rupert, *Malaysia* (New York, 1937), Chapters IV, VI.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 330; Guillemard, Sir Laurence, *Trivial Fond Records* (London, 1937), p. 91.

class.<sup>9</sup> The middle class shares the view of the "Malayans" and some British that the government policy of bolstering up an anachronistic sultanate and Malay way of life is futile because it is doomed inevitably to destruction in the modern world. The sultans naturally support British rule, direct or nominally otherwise, because under it they enjoy a position far above that of their "sovereign" ancestors and have indeed become parasitic upon it. What the middle class demands is a sincere British effort to train Malays in self-government beyond the subordinate sphere since government employment still enjoys the highest prestige in Malay tradition. But their more recent desire for sharing in the economic plums as well reflects the growing materialism of the younger Malay generation. The radical fringe of this group demands further the exercise of actual sovereign powers by Malay rulers, a Malay majority in the legislative councils, and the use of Malay as the official language.<sup>10</sup> There is a distinct feeling on the part of the few but vocal Malay nationalists that British policy in respecting the Malay cultural pattern has deliberately retarded vital national growth and that the perpetuation of the different forms of protected and directly administered states has simply strengthened Malay regionalism.

The current British policy of Malay preference did not characterize the early administration of the Malay states. The Malays' traits of timidity and courteous conservatism—characteristics which antedated British intervention—kept them for many years spectators and not participants in the changes overwhelming their country. Muslim mentality was bewildered by the spectacle of man's domination over nature and by the separation of secular and religious powers, but it acquiesced in this eclipse of the Malay-Muslim culture because the Oriental believes that temporal prosperity is the visible sign of divine favor. New means of livelihood developed under British control were theoretically open to all alike, but the passive Malays did not seek them, while Chinese and Indians swarmed over their country as clerks, overseers, laborers, policemen and schoolmasters.

In the early 20th century the Malays sought compensation for this implied English deprecation of their natural life in a

<sup>9</sup> Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

<sup>10</sup> See articles and correspondence in the *Straits Times*, October 24—December 98, 1938.

renewed allegiance to Islam. In this period Malay national ceremonies were being discarded, their venerated natural laws set aside in favor of an alien code, their inherited superstitions undermined by the march of Western science, their culture often ridiculed as a futile devotion to outmoded trivialities and combated as interfering with the spread of English institutions.<sup>11</sup> Even loyalty to their own sultanates was condemned as the perpetuation of arbitrary territorial distinctions in what had now become a federated whole. Malay allegiance was thereby temporarily transferred from the local sultan to Pan-Islamic ideals, emanating from Turkey and Egypt.

Pan-Islam in British Malaya, in the pre-1914 period, took on an imitative and defensive character and was followed by a quickening of religious zeal throughout the peninsula.<sup>12</sup> Muslim and study clubs dedicated to reading the Koran and exclusively religious schools sprang up. The Malay press was flooded with translations from Egyptian journals, materially affecting Malay literary style by the introduction of Egyptian and Arabic expressions and by the boycotting of English words.<sup>13</sup> The movement was defensive in its fear lest the Malay and Muslim way of life be irreparably and adversely altered by the materialism pervading the peninsula. Its importance lay in its awakening of the Malays and in the termination of their traditional role as "frogs beneath a coconut shell" knowing nothing of the world outside.

But Malay interest in Pan-Islam largely evaporated as a consequence of Turkey's disregard of tradition between 1922 and 1924.<sup>14</sup> The abolition of the caliphate removed the political bias from the movement, while the British policy of non-interference and even endorsement of their religion did much to win over the orthodox group. Since Pan-Islam is regarded as less dangerous to the British government than a national loyalty would be, the Malays were encouraged to remain Muslim: the British shared in the cost of mosque construction, subsidized religious schools, reorganized the curriculum of state schools to permit religious observances, and they even prohibited Malays from entering public drinking and gaming establishments.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Wilkinson, R. J., *Malay Beliefs* (London, 1906), p. 80.

<sup>12</sup> Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

<sup>13</sup> Wilkinson, R. J., *Papers on Malay Subjects* (Kuala Lumpur, 1907), p. 62.

<sup>14</sup> Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

<sup>15</sup> *The Malays in Malaya* (Singapore, 1928), p. 93, *et seq.*

Inevitably the Muslims of Malaya have divided into modernist and orthodox camps, and their views are respectively expressed in the two Malay religious journals, *Lembaja Melayu* and *Pengasoh*, which are read all over the peninsula. As in other Muslim countries, modernism has little hold on the masses or the uneducated chiefs; its adherents are chiefly the younger, English-educated men of the towns.<sup>16</sup> The strongholds of orthodoxy are found in the religious seminaries of Perak and Kelantan, while those of modernism center chiefly in Singapore and the western states. Even in these areas, however, the old ideas are still powerful. In July 1925 a wildly enthusiastic gathering of 2,000 Muslims at Singapore denounced the modernists as being worse than idolaters and Christians. As modernist ideas have been making headway, so the opposition has gathered strength.

In the early postwar period the modernists were represented by *Kaum Muda*, a party of about 100 young Malays from the growing middle class who advocated progress along Western lines despite the blind prejudices of their elders (*Kaum Tua*), who wanted to return to the old ways.<sup>17</sup> *Kaum Muda* wanted more democracy rather than the revival of an obsolescent aristocracy, and they tried to inspire in their apathetic compatriots a desire to rise to the new economic and cultural opportunities.

A strong branch of the *Anjaman-i-Islam* exists in Singapore, and the *Ahmadiya* movement has many sympathizers. Most of the Western-educated Muslims have followed the lead of Sir Syed Amier Ali and Mira Ghulam Ahmed, whose influence, directed toward the restriction of unduly easy divorce and the promotion of higher education among Muslims, has undoubtedly increased liberalism among Malays who have hesitated to identify themselves openly with an organization so abhorrent to the orthodox. The generally broader outlook of the urban Malays was evident in 1938 in their opposition to the reimposition of the Muslim Offenses Laws in Selangor and other states, involving such questions as whether a Muslim should be fined for absence from the mosque, or a Muslim woman imprisoned for six months because she had had relations with a non-Muslim, and generally whether Muslims should be still subjected to laws inspired by the hierarchy of the *kathis*. That same

<sup>16</sup> Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

<sup>17</sup> Sidney, R. J. H., *Malay Land* (London, 1926), p. 49.

year witnessed the appointment of a Malay judge to the Federated Malay States Supreme Court, the admittance of two Muslim lawyers to the Bar, the promotion of a Malay to a high engineering post, the selection of a Malay woman for the first time as supervisor of a Perak school, the appearance of the first Malay woman golf champion, and the formation of the first tin company by Malay enterprise—all small achievements in themselves but marking a great triumph for the influence of *Kaum Muda*.<sup>18</sup>

The Muslim struggle in Malaya has remained essentially a communal one. Both traditionalists and modernists live on good terms with the foreign Malays, who have come increasingly to the peninsula and are eventually absorbed by their fellow-Muslims, and with the Christian British, who have found it in the interests of peaceful government to encourage the Muslims to continue living in their traditional and isolated fashion. In 1926 the government set up a Mohammedan Advisory Board only three of whose fourteen members have been Malays. The nationalistic reorientation of Malayan Islam is shown by the latter's growing resentment of the domination of this Board by Indian and, above all, by Arab Muslims who for centuries were revered in Malaya as quasi-divine beings.

In the past decade a number of Malay associations and journals have appeared. The Malay Association for the Advancement of Learning, founded in 1924 by two Malay officials, has only Malays as members: its proceedings are held in Malay, but political and religious matters are barred by its constitution. This interesting effort of the Malays to educate their own people has been taken up by the more nationalistic Malay associations which have been founded recently in Perak, Pahang and Selangor. In Singapore there is the Malay Union with over a thousand members and branches all over the island. Members of these groups have come to realize that the Malays—aristocrats, peasants and fishermen alike—have been relegated to the background while wealth and power and position are enjoyed by the more vigorous and money-minded immigrant races. They see the need for organization and discussion of mutual problems, and for the protection of their common interests. Their most interesting venture is in the field of improving the Malay home by the spread of vernacular education, especially for girls

<sup>18</sup> *Straits Times*, November 21, 1938.

whose status Islam has seriously depressed. Parallel with this growth toward organization and education along Malay lines has come a crescent Malay press. Now there are twelve Malay journals published in British Malaya, whereas during the last war there was only one. Probably 60 per cent of the village Malays, at least in the more accessible western states, read these papers, of which *Majlis*, printed at Kuala Lumpur, is outstanding as a nationalist organization. Malays in increasing numbers listen to Malay broadcasts from Singapore, which have grown in number with the war. A definite religious, racial and national feeling is taking shape, and while Malay public opinion is far from articulate, it is being formed. Its tempo was accelerated by the economic troubles arising from the depression, and it has been sharpened by national demarcations which have come in the wake of war.

The chief Malay grievance is economic and only secondarily political. Malays are beginning to feel that the innumerable changes that have come to their country have been for the benefit of foreigners; that the British, despite lip-service to the principle of Malay preference, are no longer protecting Malay interests against inroads by the immigrant races but are simply using it to check the political demands of the latter groups; and finally that they are not being prepared either for self-government or for participation in their country's development.

As is true everywhere in southeast Asia, agrarian indebtedness, though less acute in Malaya, underlies the impoverishment of the farming class. When the law safeguarding their land through the creation of Malay reservations was overhauled in 1933, it was hoped that the dangers of a landless peasantry had been averted, and that henceforth it would be impossible for the gullible and easily intimidated farmers to pledge their land as security for loans.<sup>10</sup> But time has proved that the peasant is still handing over his title to Indian moneylenders, albeit illegally, and that often the actual occupants of the land are secret nominees of the real owners. The government cannot, for its part, outlaw the moneylender, because the peasant still needs credit. The co-operative movement, though slow, has been in many ways successful, but least so in the rural districts where the membership for both the Federated States and Straits Settlements totals just over 2,000 peasants. The British are making

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, August 3, 1938.

an effort to train the stubbornly conservative peasantry in better agricultural methods and to relate elementary education more closely to the Malays' main life work. By attacking the fundamental problem—i.e., educating the people to exercise co-operation and thrift—British policy offers a marked contrast to the purely credit function of the more numerous and better-organized agricultural banks of the Netherlands Indies.

Another seemingly simpler form of protection that the government might offer the peasant involves protecting his land against the encroachments of tin companies and Chinese agriculturists. But the pressure of war needs has greatly complicated the government's policy of reserving the monopoly of rice cultivation to the Malays, and of holding the balance between peasant and prospector. Tin interests point to the imminent exhaustion of those peninsular mines that are now being worked to capacity. The country is dependent on foreign sources for two-thirds of its food supplies and at present it is impossible to repatriate unemployed Chinese coolies, as was done at high cost during the depression. Nevertheless war production has absorbed most of the unemployed, and Malay opinion was so unanimously against reorientation of the land policy that it has secured its indefinite postponement. Malay nationalists believe the only permanent solution of the problem lies in a government program which would allot funds to the impoverished Malay peasantry, improve the health of village Malays, and above all restrict alien immigration.

Indian immigrant laborers are placed under an All-Malayan Controller of Labor, who strictly regulates their working hours, wages and living conditions in conjunction with the Indian Agent. The latter official represents the Government of India, which takes so active an interest in the welfare of its overseas nationals that it is responsible, as in Burma, for such progressive measures as have been adopted. The Chinese laborers enjoy no such benevolent supervision. They work independently, and as they are more efficient laborers they secure higher wages than the Indians. The Protector of the Chinese is an official who, it should be noted, protects local society against the turbulence of Chinese strikers, Communists and secret societies, which in the last few years have included a gangster element functioning under the cloak of patriotism. Despite Chinese consular representation, the government effectively uses the

arbitrary weapon of banishment against Chinese whom it considers undesirable. By virtue of their right to acquire real property, the Straits-born Chinese have become a far more influential group than Chinese in other neighboring countries, and they differ from the China-born in respect to occupation, in patriotism toward the mother country, and above all in having predominantly local interests. The far less wealthy and influential permanent Indian communities are almost untouched by the Congress movement in India, while the Tamil laborers, who form the great bulk of the Indian element in Malaya, are mostly illiterate transients. In either case, intellectual contacts between these alien groups and the Malays are so slight that Malay nationalism owes little to them.

Numerically the Malays consider themselves an island which is being fast submerged by the flood of aliens that have been encouraged to enter their country contrary to their best interests. Though native Malays still predominate in the Unfederated States, in the Straits Settlements they are the most numerous race only in Malacca, and in the Federated States only in Pahang—in all accounting for only 37.5 per cent of the total population, according to the 1931 census. The basis of their existence everywhere is agriculture, and their standard of living is low. In the Straits Settlements, where the proportion of Malays engaged in commerce is highest, only one in twenty-five is so employed, and in the remainder of the country only about one in seventy. Nationalists claim that it is impossible for Malays to get either commercial training or employment because all business firms are run by non-Malays. The administration is absorbing them in increasing numbers, but the total is still very small, and only in the Unfederated States do they outnumber the non-Malay civil servants. Malays have virtually no share in the tin industry, and only a limited one in rubber cultivation, accounting for only 24 per cent of total production as contrasted with half in the Netherlands Indies.

There are no statistics published on the income of Malay farmers, but it is obvious that agricultural profits are not sufficient to induce them to cultivate food crops beyond their personal needs, despite increasing governmental pressure to make the country more self-sufficient. The total revenues of the Federated States, in particular, show phenomenal increases, but in their development the Malay plays neither a creative nor a



service role. He goes his accustomed way, in which religious and agricultural duties regulate most of his waking hours and which bears no real relation to the country's economic or political life. In the village the Malay respects his hereditary chief, but is spectator to the chief's struggles with the religious element; the latter, which offers the humble their only path to power, includes all that is energetic and capable in the village.<sup>20</sup> The shortsighted greed of both ruling forces, united only in their oppression of the peasant, made it pointless in the past for the farmer to earn anything beyond his subsistence. Religion enjoined the simple life and the sultan and chiefs made any other life impossible for the peasant, who was forced to shift for himself with but little concern for his neighbors, and was never allowed to develop any luxurious tastes for whose gratification he would be willing to work hard.

Since Islam was brought to the Malays not by the sword but by merchants who were conscious of their position as a minority in the country, it never developed fanaticism or hatred of foreigners, but only a religio-racial feeling of apartness. The Malay is vaguely aware of the existence of non-Muslim countries outside the Archipelago, but his ideas of China and India are derived wholly from their unwanted representatives in his country. Islam is a further barrier to social contacts as it debar marriage with Chinese or Hindus. Since 1905 there has been a growing consciousness of the might of Japan, but the concentration on Singapore Island of 4,000 out of the 5,000 Japanese in British Malaya has prevented transforming contacts. When the Chinese coolies boycotted Japanese mines, plantations and shipping, the Malays indifferently took their places, insofar as they felt inclined. Malay addiction to the easy life has reinforced their contempt for the alcohol-drinking, pork-eating and usurious aliens and their foolish striving for material gain.

Alien enterprise has been concentrated in the more accessible western states of the peninsula. Only Perlis and Kedah, in addition to the eastern states of Kelantan and Trengganu, have retained their essentially Malay structure. Chinese and Indians, when confronted with nationalistic Malay demands, reply with some justice that the shiftless and unenterprising Malays alone

<sup>20</sup> Wilkinson, R. J., *Papers on Malay Subjects* (Kuala Lumpur, 1907), Vol. III, p. 10.

are responsible for their backward position, and that their unprogressive pride in race and religion has kept them a static group apart, preferring the monotony of village life to working during fixed hours as coolies on other men's plantations and mines. Only in Kelantan, where alien labor is unavailable, has local labor been tested and, under special conditions, it has been found reasonably adequate.<sup>21</sup> In short, according to the alien groups, the spoils belong to the laborers, whether foreign or indigenous, and in the case of Eurasians and second-generation Chinese and Indians this means access to the higher realms of government employment without distinction as to race and color.

The ban imposed on Indian emigration since May 1938, and the war in China, have posed the problem of retaining a permanent labor force in Malaya, and the price demanded for this is citizenship rights for self-styled "Malayans" in the country of their birth if not of their culture. These demands have in turn heightened Malay fears, and have made racial issues out of the apparently unrelated questions of admission to the civil service, the establishment of a Malayan university, and the opening of rice lands to agricultural colonists. It is already obvious that the main problem of the future will be the preservation of harmony among the domiciled communities, who are no longer content with a semi-alien status and are in Malaya to stay.

Years of British paternalism have been built on the barrier which Islam erected between the Malays and other races so effectively as to preclude, at least for the present, any possibility of Malayan cohesion and unity. Malay nationalists want more benevolent autocracy by the British rather than the replacement of it. Leadership as well as unity of thought and aim are lacking in the steady growth of Malay nationalism. There is no organization, or a will to organize, nor is there co-operation between the Malays of the Federated States and the Unfederated States. The aloofness of Kedah, the superciliousness of Johore and the apathy of Kelantan and Trengganu reinforce the isolationist outlook of the Federated States.

<sup>21</sup> See *Straits Times*, August 6, 1938.

## V. THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

The Netherlands Indies presents several features unique in southeast Asia: it is a colony that except for a few years (1798-1816) has been controlled for three centuries by the same European power; it has the largest aggregation of Europeans—240,000, of whom only 60,000 are pure blooded; it is an island empire with rich resources, exploited by the most scientific means and with a labor force recruited locally from a most densely populated area. But Dutch contacts with the Netherlands Indies have not been everywhere uniform in degree or time. Conquests in the early 17th century led the Dutch to concentrate on the Spice or Moluccas Islands and Java. Not until almost a century after the Netherlands Government had succeeded the corrupt and oppressive East India Company in 1798, and not until Holland's hands were freed for expansion in Sumatra by her treaty with Great Britain in 1871, did the Dutch begin effective occupation of the underpopulated Outer Islands,<sup>1</sup> and then the chief stimuli of this expansion policy were the interests of the new economic forces in the mother country and the fear lest other greater powers forestall her there.

The Dutch Company had devoted itself wholly to monopolizing the local trade, and all its relations with the native states, and with Great Britain and Portugal were shaped to that end. The course of events in Europe in the early 19th century, though not directly related to the Indies, altered the trend of the Company's policy. On the administrative side, indirect rule through feudal native regents, which the Company had adopted as the method most economical in men and money for its purposes, was temporarily replaced by a more centralized state. On the economic side, the Culture System was developed<sup>2</sup> by which, for half a century, Java's wealth was drained into Holland's treasury through the intensive cultivation of export crops. Local food production and native welfare were generally neglected. On the social side, the native feudal system was left largely intact.

<sup>1</sup> Emerson, Rupert, *Malaysia* (New York, 1937), p. 43, *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> De Klerck, E. S., *History of the Netherlands East Indies* (Rotterdam, 1938), pp. 178-201.

Holland's financial stringency and her lack of suitable officials for the Indies checked the application of home liberal views to the colony. But late in the 19th century changes in the political structure and public viewpoint in the Netherlands, joined to the growing demands of the Dutch bourgeoisie for greater participation in the profits being made in the Indies, led to the government's adoption of a more humanitarian and liberal policy, which came to be known as the Ethical System.<sup>3</sup> This involved the replacement of the Culture System by economic liberalism, which gave free rein to the growing number of Dutch capitalists resident in the Indies to develop the Outer Islands. This in turn offset local deficits resulting from various punitive expeditions there and above all from the long war against the stubborn natives of Atjeh in northern Sumatra. Simultaneously the government was made more efficient; there was a return to indirect rule through an increase in the number of indigenous officials, and native warfare became a cardinal consideration in the new colonial policy. Inevitably there followed a greater penetration of native life, though continuation of the policy of indirect rule and of dispensing the least possible public instruction retarded the growth of native nationalism.

As with the French in Indo-China, the Dutch had no sooner improved their native policy than they had to cope with the new element of nascent nationalism which after a late start swiftly gathered momentum. All over the East the legendary invincibility of the white man had received a shattering blow from Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, and successive repercussions emanating from popular movements in India and China forced the growth of native nationalism which, despite a late start and limited scope in southeast Asia, proceeded at a far swifter pace than it had developed in the West.

When the Dutch came to the Indies they had found, as had the Spaniards in the Philippines, that not a single one of their widely scattered islands—which at their farthest points are over 3,000 miles apart—had any political or economic coherence.<sup>4</sup> But in the small, isolated and primitive villages there was a fundamental Indonesian social unity. The religio-racial separatism in the Philippines is more clear-cut than in the

<sup>3</sup> Furnivall, J. S., *Netherlands India* (New York, 1939), pp. 225-86.

<sup>4</sup> Bousquet, G. H., *A French View of the Netherlands Indies* (Shanghai, 1940), pp. 84-98.

patchy Hindu-Muslim-Christian veneer which has spread over the Indonesian racial groups in the Dutch islands, but both Spain and Holland showed themselves equally chary about giving their subjects the unifying element of a widespread educational system through the medium of their own languages.<sup>5</sup>

In Netherlands India, Java's relationship to the other islands gave a special character to the nationalism that developed there.<sup>6</sup> Not only were two-thirds of the total population of the empire concentrated within one-fifteenth of the whole area, but the greater religious, racial and cultural homogeneity of the Javanese had remained largely intact thanks to indirect rule and in spite of the minute regulations of Dutch officials. Also the fact that Java was the seat of a centralized government, and the center of investment and residence of almost all the European, Eurasian and Chinese elements in the Indies, made for greater penetration of native life there, and for greater contrasts between the status of native and non-native groups. Thus Java became the center of nationalism's growth, in spite of the fact that Java's leadership came to be resented by the other islands. This lack of fundamental native unity was well illustrated by the nationalists' difficulty in finding a name for all the island peoples under Dutch rule; their ultimate choice of "Indonesian" proved unsatisfactory in that it included populations stretching all the way from Madagascar to Formosa and the Philippines.

Although nationalist sentiment inspired the publication of a Javanese periodical as early as 1864, thirty more years were to elapse before permanent impetus came from the work of Princess Kartini, the remarkable daughter of the Regent of "Japara. This European-educated woman opened a school for the daughters of native officials in 1900. Instruction was given in Dutch, "not to make the Javanese an imitation European, but that they may better understand their own people, and that the Indies and the Netherlands may be ever more closely associated."<sup>7</sup> Though nationalist forces had long been at work, it was Princess Kartini's writings that prepared a great response to the campaign for the advancement of Java conducted in 1906 by a Javanese doctor, W. S. Desada. He organized the first nationalist society, *Boedi Oetomo* or Glorious Endeavor, which

<sup>5</sup> Vandenbosch, Amry, *The Dutch East Indies* (Berkeley, 1941), p. 310.

<sup>6</sup> Furnivall, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 242.

held its first congress in 1908 and followed the Kartini principle of training native intellectuals to take the lead in working for the economic and, above all, educational advancement of the masses. The movement grew so rapidly that by 1910 the society had 10,000 members enrolled in 40 branches, but it was confined almost wholly to Western-educated Javanese officials. Originally without religious color or political bias, it gradually took on a moderate political character. It has, however, continued its useful educational work, and it also has representatives in both the *Volksraad* and provincial councils of Java. While demanding certain reforms under the stimulus of more radical groups, *Boedi Oetomo* continues to support the Dutch Government.

*Boedi Oetomo* was suddenly eclipsed by a very different movement—one that was primarily economic and popular. *Sarikat Islam* had its origins in the depressed condition of the batik industry in central Java, which was attributed to Chinese exploitation, and the antagonism which this belief created was aggravated by the increased national consciousness of the Chinese after the Chinese republican revolution in 1912.<sup>8</sup> Capitalizing the symbolic unity of Islam, this society's objective was to effect native economic independence of the Chinese, against whom a boycott was followed by riots in 1912. After a temporary ban by the government the movement grew rapidly, so that by 1915 there were 56 local societies which had taken a more distinctly religious and political turn under the new leadership of the educated classes. As a result of the double impetus of stiffening Muslim resistance to increasing Christian missionary activity and the restlessness engendered by the European war, this society grew definitely more radical. Its first congress, held in 1913, had expressed loyalty to Holland along with a resolution for a self-governing Indonesia to be achieved by evolutionary means. But the second congress, held in 1917, reflected a far more revolutionary tendency: independence was now the goal to be achieved, and by violence should parliamentary methods prove ineffective. This new spirit was revealed in the encouragement given by *Sarikat Islam* to a strike by the personnel of the government pawnshops.

Likewise during the same period trade unions experienced a rapid growth, favored by the growing concentration of capi-

<sup>8</sup> Vandenbosch, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

talist enterprise and the postwar depression.<sup>9</sup> In 1919 a central union was organized and this was followed by a wave of strikes in widely separated parts of the Indies. The strikers at first were successful, largely because the "ethical" government, recognizing that working conditions for native laborers were bad, exerted pressure on the manufacturing interests. But the following year, with the calling of a general strike, the administration changed its tone and took steps to prevent the strike. Eventually, in 1923, the more radical elements were expelled from *Sarikat Islam*. The extremists went over to the communist movement, formalized by the creation of the Indonesian Communist Party, under the leadership of Samoen and Moscow, which was to give violent evidence of its growth during the coming five years.<sup>10</sup>

In the meantime a third current had entered the nationalist stream with the organization, in 1912, of the Indian Party, comprising primarily Eurasians, or Indo-Europeans, who advocated brotherhood with Indonesians in an independent Indies. This movement was led by the Indo-European journalist Dekker,<sup>11</sup> a great-nephew of the author of *Multatuli*, the book about the Indies which had so moved Netherlands opinion half a century before. Later he was joined by two prominent Indonesians, Dr. Tjipto and Soewardi Soeryan, who gave the movement so radical a turn that these three leaders were exiled in 1914. This left their party to continue a less radical and more placid existence in association with *Insulinde*, an older, non-political group. But on Dekker's return to the Indies in 1923, his Indian party was revived.

The entry of Indo-Europeans into nationalist politics was followed in a wholly different way by that of Europeans, whose numbers in the country had greatly increased. By 1918 the highly-centralized government bureaucracy was feeling the effects of a decentralizing policy. In the early 1920's local councils were instituted; in conjunction with this the laws prohibiting freedom of the press and of assembly were somewhat relaxed. While this had been done almost wholly in the interests of the European community, nationalist organizations profited by it. In December 1916 a long-overdue legislative body

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 321, 338; Furnivall, *op. cit.*, p. 355.

<sup>10</sup> Bousquet, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.

was created, the *Volksraad*, which, however, did not open until May 1918.<sup>12</sup> The small powers entrusted to this body represented a compromise between the "ethical" advocates of greater native participation in the government, and the conservative European elements, both in Holland and the Indies, who clung to the ancient shibboleth of *rust en orde* (peace and order).

In the tumultuous opening sessions, extremist members demanded that the use of native dialects as well as Dutch should be permitted in the Legislature; they blocked a message of homage to the Queen, and generally attacked the government with violence. In the second session, held toward the end of 1918, at the instigation of Dutch radicals a "radical concentration" was formed in the *Volksraad*, composed of leftist members of the *Boedi Oetomo*, *Sarikat Islam* and *Insulinde* parties. This in turn gave a marked anti-capitalist and ultimately communistic orientation to the policies of those parties. This radical bloc scored a great victory two days after it had been formed, when the fiery address of an Eurasian member, coinciding with news of a revolutionary movement in the Netherlands, provoked the Governor General on his own initiative to promise far-reaching reforms. Shortly afterwards he appointed a revision committee, a gesture which relieved the current tension and aroused nationalist hope for further imminent changes—this time of an economic rather than of a purely political character.

An intermittently revolutionary period from 1920 to 1927 culminated in a communist insurrection and its violent suppression. The nationalist assault on the government now followed economic lines, and revealed the ascendancy of the movement's European partisans over the Indonesian nationalists whose program, however, had a far more fundamental appeal to the masses. The natives naturally understood nothing of Marxist theories, but they were at this time experiencing so radical a transformation of their village and patriarchal society that they were peculiarly susceptible to communist propaganda. The administration during this period had been growing increasingly impersonal through the creation of more government bureaus, and its failure to keep in touch with native life permitted radical agitators to make such headway that strikes grew in frequency, area and violence, culminating in two serious outbreaks in 1926 and 1927. This finally aroused an indecisive

<sup>12</sup> Vandenbosch, *op. cit.*, p. 319.



and passively liberal administration to take such repressive measures that communism was either extirpated or forced far underground. Its leaders were interned in New Guinea and the government machinery of control greatly strengthened. Nevertheless an Indonesian communist, Roestum Effendi, was permitted to sit in the Netherlands States General. In Netherlands India, the repression of the communist movement inaugurated a definitely reactionary governmental policy,<sup>13</sup> and also terminated the dependence of local nationalists upon foreign support.

The resumption by *Sarikat Islam* of the leadership of the nationalist movement coincided with a return to its original educational and religious orientation, and this was achieved principally under the guidance of native students who had returned from Europe. The Dutch had never encouraged natives to acquire education in the Indies, and even less so in Holland.<sup>14</sup> But from 1900 on, the number of native students in Holland grew until in 1908, when they numbered 23, a student society was formed in The Hague. Originally this society was open to all residents of the Indies living in Holland, but its increasingly nationalist character soon caused the withdrawal of all but the Indonesian elements. Its change of name in 1923 to *Perhimpunan Indonesia* underlined its new revolutionary nationalistic spirit. It adopted the principle of non-co-operation with the government, its leaders established contact with international communist organizations, and its propaganda extended to Indonesians in Cairo and Mecca. Repatriated members of this society exercised a growing influence over the nationalist movement at home, particularly among the masses. Basically the grievances of both students and masses were economic; in the case of the former it was chiefly the growing difficulty of entering even the native branch of the civil service, while the strike movement among the masses was largely an outgrowth of the postwar depression. But with the reorientation of the nationalist movement in the postcommunist period, these students turned their energies to organizing study clubs throughout the Indies.

In 1923 a League of Intellectuals was established at Soerabaya, on the basis of revolutionary Javanese nationalism, but this league was soon eclipsed by another society created the follow-

<sup>13</sup> Bousquet, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>14</sup> Furnivall, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

ing year on the broader foundation of Indonesian nationalism. This Indonesian study club aimed to awaken social consciousness among native intellectuals, and similar clubs were soon formed in all large cities in Java.<sup>15</sup> By 1926 these clubs had joined together in a federation, avowedly to bring unity out of their varying nationalist policies, but they were not able to sink their differences on such fundamental issues as co-operation with the government, Javanese versus Indonesian nationalism, and religious questions. They have, however, done much to improve social and economic conditions among Indonesians, on the principle that true nationalism can never flourish until the living standards of the masses have been raised and a middle class formed. The most active of these clubs, the Soerabaya branch under Soetomo, led the way in campaigning against usury, in founding schools, co-operative societies, credit banks, orphanages and boys' clubs, and in encouraging labor union activities.

Another somewhat analogous trend in the nationalist movement was the organization by young intellectuals of the *Taman Siswa* system<sup>16</sup> of over 200 schools, in which R. M. Soewardi Suryaningrat is the leader. This group is trying to create a national Indonesian culture, but one which varies according to the particular locality in which the school is founded. This effort is a protest against the European type of instruction proffered in government schools and, as such, is regarded with suspicion by the administration. Vocational training is stressed and the whole system bears the mark of Tagore and Montessori influences.

By 1927, however, the groups working under Soekarno, having found the useful economic and educational work they were doing less exciting than their former political activities, founded the National Indonesian Party at Bandoeng. This group continued to maintain close relations with the student organization at The Hague, and by 1929 its membership had grown to 10,000. Its extremist activities, especially those leading to disorders in the villages in December 1929, resulted in the arrest of its leaders, and with the subsequent breaking away of the religious elements from the secular nationalists this party withdrew from political action. The secular nationalists immediately

<sup>15</sup> Vandenbosch, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

<sup>16</sup> Bousquet, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

formed themselves into three groups,<sup>17</sup> differing as to method but not objective, and competing for the leadership of the whole nationalist cause. Of these new groups, the Indonesian Party (*Persatoean Sarikat Islam Indonesia*) regards itself as successor to the National Indonesian Party, and is strictly non-co-operative; the Parindra, formed in 1936 without much popular support by the remnants of the *Boedi Oelomo* and other groups, wants a free Indonesia ultimately but will co-operate with the government in the meantime; and finally there is the student federation *Perhimpoeaan Indonesia* which is non-co-operative except in local government and is religiously neutral. The religious element in *Sarikat Islam* sharply resented the secular nationalists' attack on polygamy and the pilgrimage to Mecca, and also their criticism of its alleged spendthrift activities. All of these party subdivisions, reunions and reincarnations not only confuse the issue of the common nationalist desideratum, a free Indonesia, but they are grist to the mill of those who assert that Indonesians are too mutually jealous and disunited in language, race and religion ever to constitute a cohesive entity. On the other hand, the main elements of disunity—divergence as to religion, the racial basis and co-operation with the government—are tending to be resolved in favor of non-co-operation, the elimination of the religious by the secular element and an all-Indonesian versus a Javanese-dominated nationalism. The driving force toward this greater unity is furnished by widely diversified nationalist elements in the labor unions, in the women's and youth movements, and even among Protestant and Catholic Indonesians.

Despite the growth of a more purely Indonesian nationalism, at the expense of communist and international influences, the Indies still feel repercussions from other world movements. Probably the most positive of these is Pan-Islam. Indonesians comprise about half of the pilgrims going to Mecca, where there is a permanent Indonesian colony of approximately 10,000 who represent a great drain on the native economy. In its early days *Sarikat Islam* sought inspiration from Turkey, Egypt and Arabia, later even to the point of sending a message of homage to Kemal Pasha. But with its growing absorption in local politics and its decreasing membership, *Sarikat Islam* as an essentially international religious movement lost force. Its decline

<sup>17</sup> Furnivall, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

coincided with the rise of *Mohammedijah*, the most important of the Indonesian reformist associations, whose growth symbolized Muslim resurgence reacting to Christian missionary activity although it adopted missionary methods and welfare programs. While as an organization it does not meddle in politics, individual members undoubtedly do. The Young Muslim Alliance, founded in 1926, is a mildly nationalist group, but like the *Mohammedijah* it is organized on a religious basis. The Dutch apparently have been successful, because they have been so circumspect, in their relations with Islam. Yet certain observers<sup>18</sup> feel that the Dutch, while exaggerating the force of secular nationalism and tolerating—even encouraging—the religious reform movement as a less dangerous outlet, are ignoring the anti-Dutch character of Muslim activities in the Indies. In general, however, the loss of a political epicenter for Pan-Islam in postwar Turkey strengthened the established trend for all native movements in the Indies to develop along racial rather than purely religious lines.

From the Congress movement in India, Indonesian nationalists have borrowed their policy of non-co-operation, the congress organization, and a limited program of *Swadeshi* (boycott of Dutch goods).<sup>19</sup> The last mentioned has been an indication of their growing interest in economic development as a prerequisite to the greater political strength of the masses. There is also among Indonesian partisans of co-operation the Indian-inspired ideal of dominion status for the Indies within the Dutch empire.

Chinese influence on Indonesian nationalism has been conditioned by the antagonism inspired in the natives by the 1,250,000 resident Chinese who form about two per cent of the total population.<sup>20</sup> The Dutch Government early developed a definitely anti-Chinese bias, and *Sarikat Islam* was born out of resentment of Chinese exploitation of local industry. Adverse native reaction has naturally not declined with the improved economic and legal position—not to mention the heightened nationalism—of the local Chinese, and only for a time during the communist period did the parallel developments of local Chinese and Indonesian nationalism converge. With the suppression of communism, however, the fundamental differences

<sup>18</sup> Bousquet, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-17; Vandenbosch, *op. cit.*, p. 373.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 332.

<sup>20</sup> Furnivall, *op. cit.*, p. 239, *et seq.*; Vandenbosch, *op. cit.*, pp. 353-70.

between their aims became apparent. Chinese interests in Netherlands India, like those of the Europeans, are essentially capitalistic; moreover, the numerical disadvantage of both groups in relation to the natives throws them more together, notably since the institution of representative government. Yet the Chinese wish to remain a group apart, and when in 1930 the government announced its intention of assimilating Chinese legally to Europeans, the former expressed their preference for an improved status as foreigners. On the other hand, there has been a simultaneous tendency for the Paranakans (Indonesian-Chinese) to move closer to the Indonesian nationalists. The Dutch have been keeping a watchful eye on the active Kuo-mintang movement among the local Chinese, outlawing manifestations offensive to Japan—notably the intermittent Chinese boycotts which have been occasionally enforced by terrorist methods. Indonesian nationalists, for their part, were deterred from appreciably raising the immigration fee against the Chinese by fears of a retaliatory boycott on Javanese sugar in China. But the whole problem has never become really acute, as the Chinese in the Indies do not constitute an economic or political problem comparable to that in countries to the north.

The amorphous character of Indonesian nationalism and its habit of absorbing all other economic cultural indigenous growths are attributable not only to the psychology of native leaders but to that of the Dutch as well. Here, as in other neighboring dependencies, there is a definite split between the more pro-native, albeit vacillating, attitude of the government and that of the resident Dutch population. The administration did not become definitely reactionary until after the communist and labor disorders, and then only on the score that the colony must be snatched from the toils of Moscow. The "ethical" policy, which flourished on decentralization theories at the turn of the century, welcomed greater native participation in the government, and instituted a program of mass welfare. But the violent turn which nationalism took disillusioned some of its early supporters, like Governor Fock, who became leaders of the repression. Even the more sympathetic and liberal policy of Fock's successor, de Graeff, in 1926 was no more successful in stemming current violence, and partially as a result of the offensive and alarmed tone of the Dutch press in the Indies he, too, was forced to become an instrument of repression.

Advocates of a strong government claim that severe measures have rid the colony of communism, but possibly the Russian relinquishment of the goal of world revolution in favor of state socialism may have been a contributing factor. The administration has attacked the manifestations rather than the causes of discontent. Its one constructive move has been to encourage the Muslim reformist groups in the hope that native energies will thus be directed into more peaceable channels. Certainly the Dutch Government cannot intern all its opponents. As a small power of eight million people governing a distant population of 60 millions, Holland knows that it keeps its empire upon the sufferance of others, and that it cannot afford to alienate world opinion and possibly attract international intervention by over-stern measures. Nor on moral grounds can the Dutch now suppress the long-delayed and still niggardly dispensation of education to natives, which has become both a unifying element and a driving force in local nationalism. Many administrative reforms have been effected in the past half-century, but native dissatisfaction shows that they have not kept pace with the pent-up force of aggrieved demands. The *Volksraad* is a compromise, but one that does not satisfy native opinion and consolidates its opposition, giving the nationalists a chance to criticize the administration without the risk of ever having to assume its responsibilities.

The Dutch have failed, like their neighboring imperialists, to prevent the birth and growth of native nationalism even among the docile Javanese. Moreover, they have not the moral advantage of having from the beginning countenanced the movement on a supervisory basis, as has the United States in the Philippines, nor of sharing their culture with the native élite, as have the French in Indo-China. Yet in criticizing Dutch policy one must remember that Holland's resources are not those of a great power, and that it is correspondingly more dependent on the Indies, where its investments<sup>21</sup> total at least seven times those of the United States in the Philippines. It is in the realm of material accomplishment that the force of Holland's prudent and conscientious colonial policy lies—in public works, scientific agriculture, public health measures, the development of natural resources, and the fostering of a favorable commercial balance. And in this program the natives have

<sup>21</sup> Vandenbosch, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

played more or less the role assigned to them by a policy of enlightened self-interest. The government's very real efforts to improve the natives' physical well-being have been largely offset by the great growth in the population. In the realm of imponderables, it might be surmised that the course of native nationalism in the Indies might earlier have taken a far more violent and possibly religious course if it had not been for the cushion supplied by the presence of an aggressive Chinese middle class, unsympathetic to native nationalism, and of a large Eurasian element which until very recent times has solidly identified its cause with the Dutch, and finally if the Dutch had had to deal principally with a fanatical people like the Achinese.

The government's repressive measures have been based on the ounce of prevention theory, and in this the Dutch have been aided by the character of Indonesian leaders who have shown no propensity to sow the seeds of nationalism in martyrs' blood. The press is severely censored, and since 1935 the government has had the power to examine private mail. Strikes are now virtually impossible, as is freedom of assembly; the government rests uneasily on the services of police informers, and the Governor General can at will intern or deport undesirable aliens.

Such a policy, however, is not reactionary enough for the nonofficial European residents, who were especially vocal about the mildness of the de Graeff regime and have displayed irritable nervousness about even such trivial matters as Indonesian insistence on speaking Malay in the *Volksraad*. In 1929 there was established the *Vaderlandsche Club*, to which thousands of reactionary Dutch belong. They see communism's ugly head in every nationalist organization and a betrayal of Dutch interests in every administrative reform. A small fascist group, stimulated by the visit of the Netherlands Nazi leader, Mussert, in 1935, found the *Vaderlandsche Club* not reactionary enough, and established a local national socialist club, which, however, lapsed after two years' unhealthy existence. A national socialist party, however, known as the N.S.B., survived until May 1940.

Among native conservatives, Dutch reactionaries have found allies against Indonesian nationalism. Inhabitants of the Outer Islands, while admiring Javanese culture, fear Java's dominant

political and economic position and profess contempt for its centuries-old submission to European conquerors. A contributing factor is the religious issue: the majority of the non-Muslims of the Indies live in the Outer Islands. In 1929 a group of Christian Amboynese in Batavia organized a society seeking autonomy for the Moluccas in a federated union of the rest of the Indies under the Dutch aegis. A year later a conservative bloc was organized in the *Volksraad*, and at Djokjakarta a society was founded primarily to strengthen the local sultanate's position, albeit on a democratic self-governing basis. In 1932 at Batavia a Greater-Netherlands study group was formed of both Europeans and Indonesians, advocating dominion status for the Indies.

Liberal Dutch opinion is not confined to Holland. Probably as a result of the reactionary trend noted above, a Society for the Promotion of Social and Political Welfare of the Netherlands Indies was founded, favoring an autonomous, democratic Indies within an imperial framework. The leading spirits in this movement were European members of the Batavia Law Faculty. But they and their journal, *De Stuw*, disappeared in the ensuing conservative *putsch* and the subsequent accentuation of the trend among both natives and Dutch toward antipodal extremism, fostered, as in the rest of southeast Asia, by the partitioning of economic and political power along racial lines.

While the subdivisions which characterized the movement during the depression years hampered the steady growth of Indonesian nationalism, the outbreak of the present European war gave it new impetus. The already extraordinary powers of the Governor General were increased by his virtual autonomy *vis-à-vis* the home government. The new burdens placed on the native population in the interests of the Islands' defense have given nationalists a bargaining point for wresting new political concessions. Moreover, they are not the only group in the Indies desirous of fundamental administrative reform. Observers generally feel that native loyalty would be assured by endowing the *Volksraad* with parliamentary powers and a really representative composition, by using the term Indonesia in official documents, and by creating an Indies citizenship. The governor was able to shelve such resolutions, at least temporarily, by an ap-



peal for maintenance of the *status quo* during the emergency. Whether this can long hold dynamic forces in check depends somewhat on the stand taken by the Indo-Europeans.

The Dutch East India Company, like the Portuguese, encouraged miscegenation to offset the numerical weakness of Europeans in relation to the native masses. Freedom from race prejudice permitted the assimilation of the resultant large body of Eurasians,<sup>22</sup> who along with the permanent Dutch residents born in the Indies form about 80 per cent of the European population. These Eurasians comprise neither a social nor an economic entity, and like the Chinese they have enjoyed disproportionately influential representation in elective bodies. But their legal assimilation to the Europeans has made them unable to acquire real property, except under the most restricted conditions, since Europeans are not permitted to own rural land. Through their Indo-European Union organized in 1919, the Eurasians expressed their fear of being submerged by the rising tide of Indonesian nationalism, and they were inclined to soft-pedal their grievances and to support Dutch rule. Indeed these grievances are less acute than in other colonies because of the greater degree of social acceptance by the Dutch of mixed elements and of those natives who are married to Europeans.

When depression economies accelerated the government's policy of employing lower-salaried Indonesians in clerical positions, at the expense of the Eurasians, the latter began to press for the salary rises necessary to procure for them such educational facilities as were required for social assimilation to the Dutch. At the same time they wanted a cheaper and more direct method of acquiring land. Since the Eurasians' demands were contested by Indonesian nationalists, who have been loth, as has the administration, to see the traditional Dutch safeguards against native land alienation abrogated, the government has been in a delicate position inasmuch as Eurasian support is a vital prop of Dutch rule. An important shift in Eurasian policy, analogous to that of the Paranakan and Arab minorities, now points to an alignment with the Indonesian nationalists in both local and central political bodies. It has often been said that defection by the Eurasians would precipitate the collapse of

<sup>22</sup> Vandenbosch, Amry, "The People Speak in the Dutch East Indies," *Asia*, March 1941

Dutch rule, particularly at a time when outside forces are exploiting every internal weakness.

In the event of a showdown with Japan, it is hard to foresee the nationalists' role. Certainly as anti-imperialists they would be pleased to see the triumph of an Asiatic over a European power, but not at the expense of their own liberty. A Japanese victory would also please the anti-Chinese element, which is anxious for the development of a strong native economy. In contrast to the ubiquitous Chinese, there are only a few thousand Japanese residents in the Indies, and their slight economic activity is largely noncompetitive. Yet Japan's efforts to woo Indonesian opinion, and above all the Muslim elements, have met with only mediocre success. In general, the Muslims feel that they have nothing to gain from Japan and are now in a pampered position in relation to the Dutch government. Native communists, suppressed in the Indies but represented in Holland until its invasion, have declared that the revolutionary group is prepared to defend the Indies against Japan, and upon the announcement of Japan's alignment with the Axis there were reports of anti-Japanese demonstrations throughout the Islands. On the whole, the nationalists' attitude seems to have reproduced pre-1940 Dutch policy—the desire for a stalemate in Asia. In the meantime the situation provides excellent political opportunities for fishing in troubled waters.

## VI. FRENCH INDO-CHINA

The ancient empire of Annam comprised the seaboard countries of modern French Indo-China. It was characterized (1) by a confusion of political, legislative and religious powers; (2) by the principle of collective responsibility, arbitrary authority within the family, the semi-autonomous commune and the state; (3) by the deification of agriculture; and (4) by an inequality before the law that was translated into the most rigid hierarchy binding the individual to his predestined place spiritually in the ancestral cult and physically in his family and commune—all to the end that heaven-mandated despotism might ensure social harmony. Immutability, isolation and the lack of a vital national culture were the price paid for China's millennial domination, and to this day the Annamites bear the indelible imprint of her civilization.<sup>1</sup>

While Annamite nationalism may trace its roots to the Chinese-dominated past, even after independence was achieved in 931 A.D. family and communal loyalties atrophied its development.<sup>2</sup> Prolonged contact with the nationalistic West, furnished by the French conquest (1859-84), was needed to quicken it into life. Though France naturally never wanted an indigenous nationalist movement to destroy her sovereignty, French institutions were so impregnated with the liberal ideas of 1789 that they unconsciously fostered patriotism and a love of political liberty in subject peoples.

The conquest was not achieved without protracted struggle.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately for the reputation of Annam nationalism, its pure heroism was mixed from the start with the dross of piracy and brigandage. In the conquest of Tonkin notably the issue became hopelessly confused. The French confounded patriot with pirate; mandarins identified all native Christians with French partisans; Chinese soldiers sent by their government to Tonkin turned private bandits once they arrived in the country. As the French conquered province after province, the Anna-

<sup>1</sup> Thompson, V., *French Indo-China* (New York, 1937), pp. 1-42.

<sup>2</sup> Briffaut, C., *La Cité Annamite* (Paris, 1908-12).

<sup>3</sup> Garros, C., *Forceries Humaines* (Paris, 1926), p. 83.

mites took refuge more and more in passive isolation, burning incense before the ancestral altar and trusting in the spirits for deliverance.

At the turn of the century the financial burdens increased under Governor Doumer's regime, awakening the native masses to a consciousness of their collective misery. They were ripe for the growing wave of unrest that flooded over Asia as a result of Japan's victory over Russia in 1905. The next year brought the first evidence of its effect on Annam in the form of the Gilbert Chieu conspiracy. This movement was essentially Chinese in its anti-foreign motivation, and eminently Annamite in that it was embroiled from the outset in discreditable financial difficulties. A list of grievances compiled by the Young Annamites at about the same time was more constructive in its aim.<sup>4</sup> They protested principally against the Franco-Russian Alliance and the arbitrary arrest of innocent Annamites later exiled to Poulo Condore penitentiary. This protest was only temporarily effective, for the pre-World War period, known locally as the Era of Plots, saw the severe repression of all outbreaks. A new conspiracy was announced daily. French colonials, in a panic, demanded protection and denounced the liberal policies of the pro-native Governors Beau, Klobukowsky and Sarraut as responsible.

It was China, Annam's perennial teacher, who gave the Annamites confidence in the West for the first time. Though Japan had been victorious and had become champion of the yellow races, the reforms instituted by China in 1900 influenced the Annamite intelligentsia far more. The writings of the Chinese reformers, Kang and Liang, stirred the Indo-Chinese to read European books, chiefly the 18th-century French philosophers. These men even took Chinese names: Rousseau became Lu, and Montesquieu, Manh. Revolutionary ideas buzzed in many an Annamite head.<sup>5</sup> France was reproached with having denied her heritage by keeping her protégés in ignorance. This was the first admission by the Annamite intellectuals that the West had any grounds for superiority. They flocked in large numbers to the newly-founded Hanoi University and, when

<sup>4</sup> Tran Ba Loe, *Excursions et Reconnaissances* (Saigon, 1880), vol. 2, p. 148.

<sup>5</sup> Pham Guynh, *L'Evolution Intellectuelle et Morale des Annamites* (Paris, 1922).

this was closed as part of the reaction to the 1908 uprisings, the native élite were disappointed and disillusioned.

This change in attitude was reflected in the resolutions formulated by the Permanent Annamite Mission at Paris in 1908 in which more and better education was requested even before improvements in the colony's economy. It was unfortunate that at the very time the Annamites were becoming eager to learn of the West, France was beginning to retract and regret the generosity of the earlier period. The Annamites were still preoccupied with the *malaise* which contact with the West had inspired in them. They contented themselves with citing abuses for the French to reform, but did not as yet think of taking matters into their own hands by demanding political rights.<sup>6</sup> Learning, not revolution, was the byword of the great majority in the period before the First World War.

The fact that Sarraut's liberal native policy antedated the War was an important factor in keeping the colony peaceful.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, since Annamite tradition holds that success is the mark of heavenly approval, ultimate victory strengthened French prestige by religious sanction. Japan's entry into the War on the Allied side removed any hope of enlisting Japanese support of an Annamite uprising. More immediately important was the stimulus given by the War to the colony's economy. The piastre rose steadily and with it the standard of living. Ties with France were being loosened physically and psychologically; Indo-China began to acquire a place of her own in the Far East. Not that the country was wholly quiet during the War, but such incidents as occurred—even the boy-emperor Duy Than's tragicomic attempt to escape—were of a local rather than a general character.

In 1915 the French War Department made its first experiment of importing trained Annamite workers to France. It was so successful that by 1918 there were 100,000 Annamites in France, half of whom were workers. If those Annamites used as soldiers had been volunteers in reality as well as in name, their sacrifice would have been less tragic, but colonial recruiters had used reprehensible methods. Lamentable scenes occurred in the villages and stations where these miserable recruits were herded

<sup>6</sup> Hoang-Cao-Khai, *Revue Indochinoise*, February 1910; Doan Vinh Thuan, *La France d'Asie et son avenir* (Paris, 1909).

<sup>7</sup> Duong Van Gao, *L'Indochine pendant la Guerre 1914-1918* (Paris, 1925).

together and put under military guard. Some even jumped overboard from the transport ships in a pathetic effort to escape back home. Money contributions suffered from the same abuse, but in that case the damage was not so vital. The sacrifice demanded was far beyond the colony's strength. Indo-China's participation in the War was none other than forced labor; France had promised to protect Indo-China, but this pledge was unilateral. Nor were the liberal promises which France had made to the colonies in her hour of need fulfilled. The native discontent that piled up in the postwar period was only a fitting retribution. Native ambitions were aroused, new ideas were brought back by the Annamites from France and, in general, the tempo of the colony's development was so accelerated that new problems which sprung up overnight demanded immediate solution.

In 1919 a fishwives' street brawl developed into an Annamite boycott of the Chinese. Its causes as well as its ineffectuality were due to the Chinese control of the economic situation. As in the rest of southeast Asia, Chinese penetration antedated European.<sup>8</sup> In Annam the Chinese were in control of the country's foreign commerce, and they had been used by the Annamite emperors to colonize the Mekong delta. France continued to encourage Chinese immigration because the Chinese proved to be capable provisioners of the army of occupation and an indispensable link between the ruling power and native subjects. After a time, however, the power of the Chinese as collectors of indirect taxes became so great that steps were taken to control their immigration and subsequently their movements within the country. Today the Chinese in Indo-China number some 400,000 as against 43,000 European residents, and 85 per cent of them are concentrated in the two southern territories of Cambodia and Cochin China, where there is less competition from the Annamites than in the densely populated northern regions of Tonkin and Annam proper. The carefully supervised system of Chinese immigration has produced a curiously unchanging pattern. Chinese groups within the colony are continually supplemented from identical groups abroad, and the

<sup>8</sup> Dubreuil, R., *De la condition des chinois et de leur rôle économique en Indochine* (Bar-sur-Seine, 1910); Thompson, V., "The Struggle for Indo-China," *Amerasia*, October 1940.

resultant homogeneity increases all the dangers associated with a state-within-a-state.

Strict French control over the Chinese shows an awareness of this threat. The system of organization by groups according to province and dialect was used until 1935. Heads of these groups were selected by the government from a list of candidates chosen by Chinese electors with certain residence and tax-paying qualifications. The heads were responsible to the government for taxes and the maintenance of order among their constituents. After the Nanking Agreement in 1935, the Chinese in Indo-China became "foreigners enjoying a privileged status" and dependent upon their own consuls, but in reality their position is virtually unchanged.

The Chinese in Indo-China appear to have taken a less active part in politics than elsewhere in southeast Asia. The rich are too concerned with retaining and multiplying their possessions, and the coolies too absorbed in their present misery to indulge in political activity. French tariff policy made Saigon unique among the cities of the region by the conspicuous absence therefrom of Japanese goods. Moreover, the Chinese have not taken root in Indo-China as they have in British Malaya for they have never been allowed to acquire real property. The French have always been concerned about Chinese allegiance to the homeland, but have contented themselves with watchful supervision. Though the Sino-Japanese War has greatly increased the immigration of wealthy Chinese, it has also made Chinese communities more amenable to the exactions of a government which could at least ensure law and order.

The attitude of the Annamites toward the Chinese is still one of admiration, but not of affection, for they increasingly resent Chinese exploitation of their weaknesses and their country's wealth. The Chinese control native products like rice and fish, and keep a usurious hold over the natives as a result of the latter's chronic lack of capital and foresight. The French control the mining and rubber industry and the Annamites have gradually replaced Chinese laborers on the plantations and in the mines, but the Chinese dominate the rest of the economic structure by their versatility in contacting producers and exporters, and by their close organization and family ties. The Chinese have lost their political control over the Annamites, but they have retained their cultural hold and have even

strengthened their economic grip. The relationship between the two groups is aptly illustrated by the respectful Annamite salutation of the Chinese as "my uncle," whereas the Chinese still refers to the Annamite as the "tail of a rat." Mutual antagonism between the two has been intensified by the French policy of divide and rule. Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Chinese contributions to the mother country have shown a sustained patriotism, but it should be remembered that the radicalism of Annamite nationalists seems to many of the wealthy Chinese a greater menace than even that of the Japanese.

Events of the past decade have, on their side, intensified Annamite resentment of the Chinese. When the depression forced large-scale Chinese repatriation, the Annamites attempted to take advantage of this long-desired opportunity to replace them as merchants and middlemen, but when the Chinese returned to the colonies along with prosperity, they had no difficulty in re-establishing their economic position. Only recently the arrival of many wealthy Chinese in Tonkin so increased the cost of living in Hanoi and Haiphong that the government was forced to relieve the distress of the poorest classes, and to assuage the resentment of the Annamites generally by fixing prices and rents. Thus nationalist sentiment has been stimulated by antagonism toward the Chinese, and almost the only evidence of the survival of Chinese political leadership has been the relationship still maintained between Annamite nationalists and the Communist Party in Canton.

Communism in its pure form has little appeal for a people so deeply attached to their soil and native villages as the Annamites, but communism in the embrace of postwar nationalism took root in Indo-China with amazing rapidity. Tonkin and north Annam, because of their economic setting and impregnation with Chinese culture, have been the regions where nationalism has flourished most. The existing differences in outlook between the three Annam countries—Tonkin, Annam and Cochin China—have been aggravated by the varied administrative policies applied to them by the French, so that in each nationalism has taken a different form. In Cochin China it has become an electoral struggle, in Annam it is dynastic, and in Tonkin, primarily economic and cultural. Unlike Japan's mikado, the Occidentalized emperor Bao Dai is not the focus



of the nationalist movement; he is regarded as useless and expensive by most Annamite nationalists. The age-old, piecemeal patriotism of the masses still stops at the portals of their commune. A truly national patriotism has yet to arise from the ashes of communal society and communal gods.

The Scholar Party of old irreconcilables continues to exist, but not to flourish. The nationalists are the young men whose political adherence is Western in concept, ranging all the way from constitutional monarchy to complete autonomy. But they are all working on the foundation of the old secret societies which existed even under the ancient Chinese, and Annamite emperors have been from time immemorial the mechanism by which all Annamite social and political movements have become effective.<sup>9</sup> The Annamites are the cultural offspring of China in their contempt for foreigners. Comprising 15 million out of the colony's 23 millions, they lump in an aggressive disdain cultured Khmers, amiable Laotians, and primitive tribes, among whom their attitude is just beginning to awaken a national consciousness. Toward the Indians who form a small mercantile and banking community the Annamites feel arrogance and resentment. The Annamite masses are, of course, not affected by ideological considerations, but the hardness of their lives makes them susceptible to any propaganda leading toward a change in which they would have nothing to lose and everything to gain. The contrast of their lives with those of Europeans in the colony, the labor problems arising from large-scale economic development and the resultant racial-class consciousness, add to the ferment of discontent. Vinh, the greatest famine province, has ever been the first to revolt. The old enemies—flood, famine and the extortions of officials and usurers—have enlarged the vicious circle by a higher cost of living that has nullified the economic advantages brought by the French regime.

The native intelligentsia have additional grievances in the form of thwarted ambitions. Obstacles have been placed in the way of their acquiring that higher education which they now deem essential to assure their professional advancement and eventually to oust the Western barbarians. They complain also of inequality before the law, of compulsory military service, of unfulfilled promises of political liberties beyond the limited

<sup>9</sup> Coulet, G., *Les sociétés secrètes en terre d'Annam* (Saigon, 1926).

advisory councils set up in each colony, and of being unfairly discriminated against socially and professionally.<sup>10</sup> They criticize the administration for extravagant and useless expenditures, but more especially for denying the principle fundamental in the protectorate form of government—that of training natives for progressive participation in their country's administration. The French, on their side, state that the Annamites have not the requisite qualifications of experience, training, or professional integrity to justify entrusting them with responsible self-government. Out of the haze of thwarted ambitions and puerile violence that characterizes the expression of their grievances, one fact is outstanding: the Annamites have definitely turned their backs on Chinese culture in favor of Western science and theories of government.

Distinctly destructive forces are jeopardizing Indo-China's new nationalism. To begin with, it is confined to the Annamites, who would frankly treat the Khmers and Laotians as subject peoples. Secondly, Annamite leaders cannot agree among themselves. They unite in disliking French rule, but cannot formulate a constructive program or even agree to follow any one of their mutually jealous leaders. The younger generation of nationalists, for example, dislike and are cordially disliked by the older nationalists who feel that they have paid for privileges which the younger men are enjoying without effort and without gratitude. Fundamentally there is a lack of public spirit in Annam, reasonable enough on historical grounds, but one which has crippled the whole movement. Mismanagement of funds has characterized all groups of nationalists. The small Annam bourgeoisie which is rich and selfish feels its interests are identified with French control, and so does not contribute voluntarily to the nationalist movement. Often it is wounded pride that makes individual Annamites join one of the nationalist parties, and no great movement can be built up on such an unstable, emotional basis. Violence and dishonesty have gone far toward alienating liberal sympathizers among the French, both in Indo-China and in France.

Not all the nationalist parties are revolutionary. The Tonkinese Party of Pham Quynh, and the Constitutionalist Party of Bui Quang Chieu want reform along democratic lines without

<sup>10</sup> *Cahier des vœux annamites* (Saigon, 1925).

any violent breaking away from France.<sup>11</sup> In 1925 the Revolutionary Party of Young Annam (*Tan-Viet-Cach-Manh-Bang*) was founded in north Annam among the petit bourgeoisie. The roots of this party are to be found among the political prisoners interned at Poulo Condore after the 1908 outbreaks, and it was revived during the post-War period through contacts with Siamese and Chinese revolutionaries. It contained two increasingly divergent trends of opinion—nationalist and communist. Pham Quynh's failure in the late 1920's to win governmental support for his mild reform program sent many neutral members into the revolutionary camp and made Cantonese influence predominate. The period that followed was one of preparation: it was the era of strikes and manifestations, notably among student bodies. The leaders' mutual jealousy prevented their fusing the two opposing camps, and when trouble broke out in China the Annamites lost faith in communism of the Cantonese brand. The Revolutionary Party, from then on, rapidly lost strength and finally died when the communists broke away at the end of 1929. The moderates in the party hesitated to denounce their communist ex-colleagues lest they themselves become involved, but their erstwhile comrades did not hesitate to inform on them to the police, and with their arrest in 1930 this party officially came to an end.

The Nationalist Annamite Party (*Vietnam-Quoc-Dan-Dong*) is Tonkinese, and strong regional feeling prevented its union with the party in Annam. The more realistic temperament of the Tonkinese made their action more formidable though it was never a large group numerically, having only 1,500 members out of a population of eight millions. This party is a replica of the Canton Kuomintang, and was founded by two brothers who set up a publishing house in Hanoi with the double aim of making money and spreading revolutionary ideas. Youth, especially disgruntled students, characterized this party: not one of its members was over 30 years old. From the outset it was a terrorist group and its propaganda was addressed primarily to the army. Women were affiliated and thus given one of their first opportunities in Indo-China for political self-expression. Foreign aid was solicited in Siam and particularly in Yunnan.

In January 1929 this party made a first, unsuccessful attempt

<sup>11</sup> See the series of manuscript pamphlets in the Agence Economique de l'Indochine in Paris.

to murder Governor Pasquier, and a month later succeeded in killing Bazin, head of the Labor Bureau. A note pinned to Bazin's body greatly aided the police, who for the first time got a real clue to the party's existence and to the astonishing fact that 50 per cent of its members were in government service. Following these revelations the party at once reorganized itself, but the spasmodic terrorism which it practiced to fill its depleted treasury put the police so hot on its trail that the leaders decided prematurely to launch their program from the preparatory stage to that of action. Their efforts centered on the troops garrisoned at Yenbay, because this post controlled the Red River Valley, and action there could easily be concerted with that of the Yunnanese Party. The mutiny at Yenbay in February 1930 was followed by violent outbreaks all over the colony. Assassinations and unarmed manifestations were punished with equal severity. Some of the party leaders were caught at this time, but more wholesale arrests followed a second attempt to murder Governor Pasquier and the more general use of blackmail to obtain party funds. Thus deprived of its leaders, the party died as an organized group in 1933. It had shown itself capable of isolated acts of terrorism and manifestations, but had proved weak in organization and in finding a program that would arouse the masses. The pacific mass demonstrations it organized were the only form of its activities that Moscow condoned, for they capitalized the forces of Oriental inertia and proved to European imperialists their dependence on native labor.

In 1931, six years after its birth, the Indo-China Communist Party was at its height and had a membership of 1,500 in addition to 100,000 affiliated peasants. Nguyen-Ai-Quoc was its founder, mentor and savior. Recognizing the Annamites' love of property and their patriarchal family system as well as the numerical and intellectual weakness of the proletariat, he planned first to assure Annam's independence through a democratic bourgeois regime and then to integrate it with the Soviet Union.<sup>12</sup> Nguyen-Ai-Quoc had studied in Paris where he had affiliated himself with the French communists, and from there he had gone to Moscow and later to Canton, where he had founded the Association of Revolutionary Annamite Youth, the first communist cell for Annamites in China. Canton had long

<sup>12</sup> Nguyen-Ai-Quoc, *Le procès de la colonisation française* (Paris, 1926).

been the Mecca of Indo-China's communists. There every year homage was rendered at the tomb of the Tonkinese student who in 1924 threw a bomb at Merlin, then Governor of Indo-China, while the latter was supposedly enjoying that city's hospitality. Instruction was offered there to young Annamite revolutionists at Wampoa Academy. The orientation which Nguyen-Ai-Quoc gave to Annamite nationalism while at Canton was nationalistic rather than communistic: his program included a reduction of the fiscal burden, notably in years of bad harvest, suppression of extra-legal jurisdiction, division of the alluvial lands and abandoned rice-fields among the neighboring peasants, and finally no conscription of coolies or native soldiers for service outside Indo-China. Nguyen-Ai-Quoc's was the first program to appeal simultaneously to Annamite intellectuals in the north and to Annamite peasants everywhere. Further, he was able to heal the breach created between the nationalist and communist delegates from Indo-China to the Hongkong Congress in 1929 and to keep the key to Moscow's support in his own hands. The price paid for this type of leadership was the financial and moral isolation of his party following Nguyen-Ai-Quoc's arrest by the English police at Hongkong in June 1931. But his policy of anonymity of leadership and strict discipline have been maintained.

The brutality of the French suppression of Indo-Chinese communism following the 1930 outbreak was severely criticized both in the colony and in France.<sup>18</sup> Justification in the eyes of its defenders lies in the success with which the small police force in Indo-China has apparently extirpated communist organizations. In any case the movement has been forced underground, though arrests made over the past few years suggest that cells are reforming in the northern frontier zone. Probably the present weakened state of French authority and the Japanese penetration of Tonkin have stimulated this activity which has undoubtedly been solidified by years of persecution and by the maintenance of contacts with analogous groups in China. But this movement is small and its effectiveness would depend largely upon whether the Annamites as a whole would respond to a nationalist appeal directed simultaneously against both France and Japan.

<sup>18</sup> Roubaud, L., *Vietnam* (Paris, 1931); Viollis, Andrée, *Indochine S.O.S.* (Paris, 1935).

On the whole, it may be said that the French have been remarkably successful in impregnating native intellectuals with French culture, but by inadequately embodying French concepts in the form of liberal native political institutions they have failed to ensure native loyalty in the colony's hour of need. The contradictions inherent in the French public's attitude toward colonization are largely responsible for this failure, as there have always been significant divergences—ranging from the general attitude that all colonies are a liability to the view that all natives are potential Frenchmen in varying degrees of evolution.<sup>14</sup> The French economic policy is the only one that has remained consistently imperialistic. This policy views Indo-China in terms of its usefulness to the mother country rather than as a nation entitled to expansion in its own right. Despite sporadic applications of liberal and even socialistic theories to Indo-China, the general administrative trend has been toward a divide-and-rule policy as the best means of hampering the growth of Annamite nationalism. Chronic fear lest arms placed in the hands of trained natives would be used against French rule delayed all projects designed to create a truly national Annamite army. Eleventh-hour gestures of liberalism inspired by the fear of a European war—such as the creation of an Annamite army by Colonial Minister Mandel in 1938;<sup>15</sup> an all-elective membership in the Grand Conseil Economique; the widening of native participation through powers in the local state councils; the fixing of prices for essential commodities and rents; the release of almost all political prisoners; and finally increased facilities for technical and vocational training—were all too tardy and too inadequate to counteract the results of a half-century of cultivation of disunity and distrust among the native intellectuals and the failure to give the masses any real cause to rise to the defense of a government that had never awakened their loyalty by extensively improving their standards of living.

The Annamite attitude toward Japan is hard to gauge. A pro-Japanese group has existed in the colony ever since 1906, but a far larger proportion of the population is anti-Chinese. In any case relatively few Annamites take any interest in international

<sup>14</sup> Leclerc, A., *De la démoralisation des conquis par les conquérants et des conquérants par les conquis* (Paris, 1902).

<sup>15</sup> See daily reports from Indo-China in *Bulletin Quotidien* issued by the Ministère des Colonies, 1938 to date.

affairs. Native journalists—and one should not forget that censorship in Indo-China is real—have frequently warned their compatriots to put no faith in Japan's promises of race brotherhood; Annamite radical-nationalists have naturally not been sympathetic to Japan's fascist proclivities. The apathy which the Annamite public showed in regard to the Japanese occupation of Hainan and the bombings of the Yunnan railroad, and the greater, or rather less languid, interest in the European than in the Sino-Japanese war, may by now have been dispelled by Japanese action in the colony. The prosperous state of Indo-China's economy during the first months of the European war, and later the heavy purchases of her major exports (rice, rubber, and minerals) by Japan when the formerly all-important French market was cut off, have contributed much to the current quiescence. Mystery surrounds the internal situation in Indo-China. It is quite possible that the Japanese penetration of Indo-China, synchronizing with a relaxation of French control, will provide the stimulus necessary for developing national unity among hitherto antagonistic regional groups and may supply them with the missing contact with the inarticulate masses.

## VII. THAILAND

For the past century Siam, which became Thailand in 1939, has offered the unique example of a small Asiatic country maintaining her sovereign status while her neighbors have fallen under foreign rule. Her survival has been due less to the innately superior qualities of her people than to the strategy of her leaders, who have played off against each other two powerful and mutually jealous European rivals. By decorous and diplomatic statesmanship Thailand progressively cast off the shackles of a semi-colonial status and transformed an Asiatic feudality into a modern, and in many ways model, state—with official friendship for all and little malice toward any but the Chinese within her frontiers. Only with the revolution of 1932 has there appeared a more aggressive, supernationalist policy.

The constitutional regime retained most of the policies and a few of the personnel of the absolute monarchy which it had violently displaced. The original manifesto promising the maintenance of independence and the improvement of social and economic conditions, as well as the temporary constitution of June 1932, were far more radical documents than the permanent constitution which was promulgated six months later.<sup>1</sup> True, the king's powers had been reduced to those of a constitutional monarch, but he was no longer merely the figurehead originally envisaged. The intervening period had been marked by an increase in his personal influence, the definite curtailment of a communist impulse, the voluntary eclipse of the radical leader, Luang Pradit, by the first premier, Phya Mano, an official of the old regime, and the definite withdrawal from the political scene of the People's Party, in whose name the *coup d'état* had been engineered originally.<sup>2</sup> Excepting for a few of the more liberal princes, the Thai royal family, under whose aegis Thailand had been transformed into a modern state, was prohibited from further participation in the government. Aside from a few strikes and many petitions, Thai public opinion

<sup>1</sup> Aksorlukana, L. P., *La constitution siamoise de 1932* (Paris, 1933).

<sup>2</sup> Lingat, R., "Installation du régime constitutionnel," *Chronique du Siam*, 1932.



during this period remained, as it always had been, inarticulate and passive.

Shortly after the constitution was promulgated in December 1932 the cleavage between the conservative group led by Phya Mano and the revolutionary elements under Luang Pradit began to be apparent.<sup>3</sup> The reactionary trend of the Mano administration was felt in a series of measures curtailing freedom of the press, the refusal of permission to form an opposition party in the semi-appointive, unicameral Assembly, and above all in Phya Mano's reaction to the radical economic program sponsored by Luang Pradit. On April 1, 1933, the climax came with the dissolution of the Assembly, followed by the passage of a law making communism a crime, and the exile of Luang Pradit. Elimination of the liberal element and the breakdown of the constitutional machinery narrowed the struggle to one between the military group led by Phya Bahol, one of the original revolutionaries, and Phya Mano's forces. Anticipating a similar move by Phya Mano, Phya Bahol engineered a *coup d'état* on the first anniversary of the revolution, thus eliminating the Mano regime. Despite a nominal reversion to a constitutional administration, Phya Bahol retained many of Phya Mano's measures, notably those ensuring financial stability, increased appropriations for defense, censorship of the press, and new electoral machinery. But when he finally determined to recall Luang Pradit, the forces of conservatism rallied for their final stand which culminated in a rebellion led by Prince Bovaradej in October 1933 in which the King and many members of the royal family were implicated.

The suppression of this revolt ended the menace of counter-revolution: it forced the King into a position that led to his abdication two years later; it restored a somewhat chastened Luang Pradit to the State Council; and it saw the emergence of a new leader of the military party, Luang Bipul, the present premier. Henceforth the struggle for power was between the military clique, headed by Luang Bipul, and the civil group of Luang Pradit, under the benevolent and unifying aegis of Phya Bahol.

The ensuing period was marked by increasingly arbitrary government control, sporadic violence and public uneasiness. In September 1934 the government was forced to resign by a

<sup>3</sup> Sivaram, M., *The New Siam in the Making* (Bangkok, 1936).

surprising vote of no-confidence over a rubber restriction agreement, but it was re-formed with an almost identical personnel. The importance of the incident lay in its being the first political change effected by constitutional rather than violent means. King Prajadhipok's abdication in June 1935 ended the influence of the remarkable Chakkri dynasty on Thai affairs, and it opened a period characterized by the absence of a strong monarch and the initiation of a sharply nationalistic domestic and foreign policy. The increasingly marked divergency in viewpoint between the two major groups in the administration for the first time permitted the Assembly an opportunity to become—albeit temporarily—an important political factor. Opposition from the elected members showed itself over the increasing number of appointments of military men to civil posts, the growing defense budget, and the general suppression of democratic procedure. This National Assembly, still half nominated, once prorogued, suffering from public indifference at the polls, and from a persistent refusal to permit party organization among its members, was also handicapped by its unrepresentative character and by a proneness to nepotism and subservience which further retarded its evolution. Despite occasionally violent criticism, the generally friendly tone of Thailand's Assembly, even during discussion of the opium and crown lands scandals, contrasted with the acrimonious debates in the Burmese and Indies legislatures. In the State Council both contending elements were composed of men almost as politically inexperienced as the Assembly delegates, and, as under the old regime, initiative remained purely personal, and the administration tended to degenerate into a struggle between personalities. The uncertainty regarding Thailand's ultimate political form, as shown in the divergent views held by the State Councilors, came unfortunately at a time when Asia and Europe were growing increasingly troubled, so that the foreign policy advocated by each side reflected current democratic or fascist convictions.

When Premier Phya Bahol was finally replaced by Luang Bipul in December 1938, the military element was in the ascendant through its increasingly nationalistic economic measures, through the suppression of opposition emanating from the Assembly and its civil colleagues, through postponement of the advent of a totally elective Assembly for another decade,

and finally by the sensationally severe repression of a conspiracy organized by the remnants of dissension, chiefly outside the government.<sup>4</sup> The military clique consolidated its position in the late summer of 1940 by pressing irredentist claims on its neighbor Indo-China.<sup>5</sup>

When the new rulers of Thailand took over power in 1932, they found 95 per cent of the country's business in foreign hands.<sup>6</sup> The public debt, though small and harmless, was held in Great Britain; the administration was riddled with expensive foreign advisers; rice, the country's mainstay both gastronomically and financially, was handled by the Chinese, who had an even firmer grip on the fishing industry. Control of teak and rubber, the other major exports, was shared between Europeans and Chinese, on the general basis of the former supplying the capital and technical direction, while the latter furnished the labor and controlled the retail market. Any radical alteration of this situation involved the delicately adjusted relationships with France and England and, to a far lesser degree until recently, with China. It also met with two internal difficulties arising from the country's poverty and the apathy with which the Thai people regarded any but administrative employment. Further, the revolution in Thailand synchronized with the world economic depression.

On the home front, self-sufficiency became the official goal. Thailand was, and still is, largely a producer of raw materials and an importer of manufactured goods. The agricultural angle of the problem was the easiest and consequently the first springboard for the attack. In introducing new crops by scientific methods the government hoped to reduce the dangers of rice monoculture. To eliminate the export of currency and dependence on the import of foreign textiles, the government has made several semi-successful attempts to develop a cotton and silk industry. This policy has involved the replacement of foreign by native capital and labor—largely nonexistent—in the development of the country's resources. Over 88 per cent of the Thai people are engaged in agriculture and fishing, while only 5.2 per cent have commercial occupations.<sup>7</sup> The government's

<sup>4</sup> Thompson, V., *Thailand, the New Siam*, pp. 100-101.

<sup>5</sup> *Far Eastern Survey*, October 23, 1940.

<sup>6</sup> Zimmerman, Carle, *Siam: Rural Economic Survey 1930-31* (Bangkok, 1931).

<sup>7</sup> Census of 1937.

attempts to redress this balance were aided by the closing of world markets, the intensified competition of Thailand's two great rice-exporting neighbors, and more recent transportation difficulties. All have contributed to diminishing the hold which rice has always had in Thai economy. Government policy has taken the form of finding new markets for Thai rice to only a minor extent. It has concentrated on relief for the debt-ridden peasantry and the replacement of Chinese middlemen and exporters by state agencies.

The Thai farmer has become heavily indebted mainly through lack of capital for his recurring agricultural, social and fiscal needs, and partly through long-standing habit and inertia—all of which factors have been ably exploited by the Chinese. The co-operative movement which started languidly under the absolute monarchy has in the last few years been increasingly encouraged by the administration. In addition to its major aim of building up national capital, this movement has the psychological advantage of encouraging thrift and group action among a people renowned for uneconomic thriftlessness and individualism. Though the aggregate results are small, such capital as has been invested in the slow-growing government savings banks has almost doubled in the past three years. The very recent rise in note circulation is evidence of the undoubtedly increasing wealth of Thailand.<sup>8</sup>

The long-awaited Revenue Code sponsored by Luang Pradit (who became Minister of Finance in December 1938) has revolutionized the taxation system and has transferred the burden from the peasant to the commercial class. The administration anticipates a 40 per cent rise in revenues from this radical change, in which many of the direct imposts have been either abolished or appreciably reduced and are to be replaced by indirect taxation which falls almost wholly on the foreign community.

Government encouragement of agricultural self-sufficiency has involved the displacement of foreigners to a far slighter degree than has the country's industrial and commercial policy. Despite the contention of an American expert,<sup>9</sup> that the nefarious role of Chinese middlemen and moneylenders has been

<sup>8</sup> See Report of the Financial Adviser, July 1940.

<sup>9</sup> Andrews, James, *Siam: Second Rural Economic Survey 1934-35* (Bangkok, 1935), p. 311.

greatly exaggerated, there is a deep-rooted conviction on the part of all Thais that the Chinese are responsible for the peasants' indebtedness, the poor representation which Thai rice has acquired abroad, and the general lack of indigenous commercial talent. For years under the old regime, the Thais were delighted to welcome annually thousands of Chinese immigrants who supplied the country's labor needs and then rose to important mercantile positions through the display of those abilities conspicuously absent in the Thai people.<sup>10</sup> The advent of Chinese women immigrants, beginning in the World War period, aggravated the problem of assimilating the Chinese into the Thai body politic, and in the past 15 years conditions in China have increased both the number of Chinese immigrants and their political activities. Finally, the growth of Thai nationalism has increasingly featured the economic hold of the Chinese as a parasitic drain on the resources of the country and as a political danger to the present regime.<sup>11</sup> The result has been a series of increasingly stringent anti-Chinese measures designed to check immigration and to reserve to Thai nationals certain economic fields which the Chinese had heretofore either monopolized or controlled. These measures, notably those of April 1939 which were passed by a large majority of the Assembly, often in secret session, were soothingly announced as directed against no single national group but aimed only to develop Thai abilities. Actually, however, they have resulted in leaving thousands of Chinese without the means of livelihood almost overnight, and the opportunities thereby created have not by any means been seized upon by the Thais with either efficiency or avidity.

These regulations were shortly followed by an open anti-Chinese drive in which hundreds of Chinese schools were closed, all but one of Bangkok's eleven Chinese newspapers suppressed, thousands of opium addicts deported, and a number of leaders of the Chinese community arrested. In the absence of Chinese consular representation in Thailand, Chungking's protests resulted in Bangkok's justification of this policy on the grounds that the terrorist activities of the secret societies, which have flourished anew under the guise of patriotic efforts in connection with the Sino-Japanese War, were a menace to public

<sup>10</sup> MacNair, H. F., *The Chinese Abroad* (Shanghai, 1926), p. 47.

<sup>11</sup> Landon, K. P., *The Chinese in Thailand* (Shanghai, 1941), pp. 156-180.

order. Certainly the possible consequences and effectiveness of Chinese hostility in the future are factors which the Thai Government is weighing in formulating its cautious policy toward the Sino-Japanese War and toward the Chinese resident in the country.

Though the Chinese form the bulk of the mine laborers, a portion of the teak foresters, and a majority of the rubber planters, the government's policy to replace foreign by native industry affects Europeans probably more than it does the Chinese. However, only about a thousand of the Occidentals resident in Thailand are engaged in business; the remainder are either missionaries or government employees. Leases for the teak industry, which is financed and managed principally by the British, have been renewed but on distinctly less favorable terms; a far larger percentage of the forests have been reserved for Thai nationals, and the government's recent acquisition of a few sawmills forecasts its restricting this industry. Tin mining has been less invaded by government control, not from lack of will to do so, but because the Chinese are the only skilled laborers available, foreign capital is firmly entrenched, and Thai capital other than governmental is as yet uninterested. In time, however, the government will control this industry and this will mean an end both to the British monopoly of smelting Thai tin in Malaya, and to the Chinese middlemen who now handle it. Though the government recently announced its intention of opening a rubber factory, this industry which is principally in Chinese hands is the least touched of all the major economic fields.

The handwriting on the wall has for years been sufficiently plain to discourage foreign business interests, for they have had to contend simultaneously with the depression, Japanese competition, and ever-increasing governmental control. The orgy of anti-foreign legislation in the spring of 1939 came to a climax with the withdrawal of the two foreign oil companies from the country, and their replacement by the unprepared and inexperienced Oil Fuel Department of the Ministry of Finance. This would have been hard enough to accomplish under normal circumstances, but war has augmented the difficulties. The problem has been only superficially solved by the government's attempt to take over local shipping, directly through the purchase of ships to be run by a state company, and indirectly

through legislation forcing out foreign firms by requiring their capital henceforth to be at least 70 per cent Thai, their crews 75 per cent Thai, and all vessels registered as Thai.

For many years government policy has been to regulate business with regard to its profits and its labor policies, but only within the past two years has it entered the competitive field. The trend toward new government industries and the grant of state subsidies to private Thai firms were the outstanding developments of 1939.<sup>12</sup> Most of these new companies have been launched under the aegis of the Ministry of Defense in order to make more palatable the large appropriations which the Assembly has periodically shown itself reluctant to grant. In order to have men qualified eventually to take over the management of all the country's business, the government is not only sending promising students abroad for technical training but is establishing numerous technical, commercial, and agricultural schools in Thailand.

While Thailand's internal irredentism dates principally from the advent of the constitutional regime, its external irredentism is of more recent vintage. Not that Thailand did not resent the losses it suffered at the hands of Western imperialism in the late 19th century, but with the Franco-British guarantee of the neutrality of the Menam basin (1896), the burying of rival claims by the members of the Entente Cordiale, and the signing of the Siamese-French treaty of 1907 and the Siamese-British treaty of 1909, Thailand's two powerful neighbors seemed to have satisfied their territorial ambitions.<sup>13</sup> And Thailand itself was apparently content to set what remained of its house in order and to concentrate on obtaining international recognition of its full fiscal and sovereign rights. This was accomplished progressively in a series of treaties in the postwar period, and consummated in the 14 agreements signed by Thailand with foreign powers in 1937.

At first glance it may seem strange that Thai irredentism has been directed more against Indo-China than toward the richer peninsular provinces which Britain lopped off in 1909.<sup>14</sup> Thailand's claim to sovereignty over Cambodia and Laos have al-

<sup>12</sup> *Quarterly Trade Reports: Southeastern Asia* (Singapore, 1940).

<sup>13</sup> Lafuze, G., *Great Britain, France and the Siamese Question* (Urbana, 1935); Thornely, P. W., *History of a Transition* (Bangkok, 1923).

<sup>14</sup> Mills, L. A., "Anglo-Siamese Relations 1867-1924," *Royal Asiatic Society Journal*, Straits Branch, 1925; also his *British Malaya* (Singapore, 1925).

ways been vague, except to Thai nationalists; they were disputed by Annam, prior to the latter's conquest by France,<sup>16</sup> and to a lesser extent by pre-British Burma. Moreover the territory involved, while more than twice as vast, is nothing like so densely populated or rich in resources as is the British-held area. The difference in Thai attitude may be explained by the facts that Great Britain had acquired Thai territory without wounding Thai pride, as the French had done in the 17th and again in the 19th century,<sup>10</sup> that British territory is inhabited very largely by Malays whereas French land acquisitions are peopled by races vaguely related to the Thais, and that it is easier to press claims against a freshly defeated power. Also there are several economic factors which furnish clues to the situation. First of all, Great Britain is Thailand's neighbor on two frontiers and still possesses the most formidable stronghold in south-east Asia. Secondly, Thailand's public debt is secured in London. Thirdly, until the outbreak of war in Europe, British shipping came second in the list of tonnage cleared in Bangkok's port. And lastly, in 1939 the British Empire accounted for nearly 41 per cent of Thailand's foreign trade.

French interests in Thailand, unlike those of Great Britain, have remained almost wholly political, although until the recent "war" she retained important missionary, banking and mining investments. Trade exchanges between Thailand and Indo-China have been negligible, as have been those between Burma and Thailand, because all of these neighbors produce almost identical exports. The era of good feeling or "passive juxtaposition" began to show signs of breakdown in 1937. Soothing official communiqués did little to calm the fear felt on both sides of the Mekong,<sup>17</sup> where it was heightened by alarmist articles, notably from Saigon, about Thailand's growing friendship with Japan, the increase in Thai armaments, and the maps printed in Thai schoolbooks showing the Annamite Range as the country's natural frontier. The change in Siam's name to Thailand in June 1939 confirmed suspicions that that country wanted to

<sup>16</sup> Berjoan, A., *Le Siam et les accords franco-siamois* (Paris, 1927); de Caix, Robert, articles in *L'Asie Française*, 1904, and in *Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales*, 1902, 1907; Pavie, A., *Mission Pavie: géographie et voyages*, Vol. III (Paris, 1879-95), and *Etudes diverses*, Vols. I-III (Paris, 1898-1904).

<sup>18</sup> Maurel, G., *Histoire des relations de la France et du Siam* (Paris, 1906).

<sup>17</sup> Chandet, H., articles on Siam in *L'Echo de Paris*, January 1937; Bernard, Col. F., "The Security of Indo-China," *The Asiatic Review*, April 1938.



extend her sway over all Thai peoples, including the Laos in Indo-China, the Shans of Burma, and now the non-Thai Cambodians. A year later three pacts were negotiated between Thailand on the one side, and France, Great Britain and Japan.

Thailand's relations with Japan have given France and Great Britain concern twice during the present century—in the years following Japan's victory over Russia, and again after Thailand was the only country abstaining from censuring Japan in the League of Nations vote on the Manchurian question in 1933. This, in turn, gave rise to renewed suspicions of Japan's interest in the Kra Canal.<sup>18</sup> Despite frequent protestations of friendship, the exchange of Buddhist and other goodwill missions, and increased facilities for travel and education, Thai-Japanese relations showed marked growth only in the economic field. As a result of the depression and the depreciated yen, Japanese goods began to flood the Thai market, as they were doing all over East Asia. Thailand could point with justice to its frequent rejections of Japanese offers of capital and requests for concessions, but when Thai claims on Indo-China synchronized with the Japanese penetration of that colony, open alarm was voiced lest the Thai-Japanese pact, ratified in December 1940, contained secret clauses jeopardizing not only French but British colonies nearby. As usual, Thailand reiterated her policy of impartial friendliness to all,<sup>19</sup> and Luang Bipul denied that his country's demands for "what was rightfully hers" were associated with Axis policy.<sup>20</sup>

The long-threatened, full-dress war along the Mekong never occurred.<sup>21</sup> There was considerable bombing and exchange of gunfire, each government accusing the other of border violations and maltreatment of the other's nationals in the classic manner, but both sides showed genuine reluctance to come to grips. Evidences of an intensification of nationalist sentiment among the population of Bangkok have not been wanting, but it seems to have been inspired to a large degree by the military clique who have been using the campaign against Indo-China to increase their domination over the civil elements in the government.

<sup>18</sup> Christian, John, "The Kra Canal Fable," *Amerasia*, February 1938.

<sup>19</sup> Luang Pradit, *Le Siam pacifiste et la politique étrangère du gouvernement siamois* (Bangkok, 1937).

<sup>20</sup> *Straits Times*, October 14, 1940.

<sup>21</sup> See *PM*, New York, March 9, 1941.

As a result of Japan's so-called mediation Thailand obtained about a third of her demands;<sup>22</sup> France lost far more in prestige than in territory; while Japan herself emerged strengthened in her position of arbiter in southeast Asia and possibly with undefined advantages not revealed in the printed treaty terms. Thailand's present position is very precarious, and it is unlikely that she can maintain her century-old policy of avoiding foreign entanglements. The government has now to hold in check aggressive nationalist elements which it has itself unleashed for home consumption, and which have stimulated and been stimulated by a violent and irresponsible press campaign. Though the government officially refuses to believe that Thailand will be affected by Japan's moves in Indo-China, its attitude may change if the Japanese penetrate into Cambodia, Cochin China, and even farther west, for Thailand offers Japan a better base for attacking Malaya. That Thailand is primarily interested in her own internal evolution, there is little doubt. She has extracted all she can from Indo-China without becoming involved in a first-class conflict, but she is unwilling to antagonize Great Britain. In brief, Thailand is aware that Japan's action in southeast Asia depends largely upon Britain's fate, and that her policy and ultimately even her destiny will be, as they have been in the past, decided in Europe.

Nationalism, which is the most striking development of recent years, has its roots in the traditional Thai love of independence; it has grown through struggles with European powers abroad and through Chinese and European competition within the country. It was consciously fostered by King Rama VI,<sup>23</sup> whose policy was taken over by the constitutional regime on a larger scale. Such opposition to current government policies as exists has been handicapped in its expression by the country's incomplete democracy, by its tradition of paternalism and initiative solely from above, and by the scarcity of trained administrators. For the time being it is eclipsed by the military clique which is more firmly than ever in the saddle, and which along with the international situation has halted the Assembly's attempt to evolve a real parliamentary system. Thailand is still groping for a political formula, but her present policy seems to be shaping up very much like that of the Philippines. Thai policy

<sup>22</sup> *How Thailand Lost Her Territories to France* (Bangkok, 1940).

<sup>23</sup> *Asavabahu, Clogs on Our Wheels* (Bangkok, B. E. 2458).

has changed less during the past 50 years than has the personnel that directs it. Foreign business is withdrawing from the country and is being replaced by state enterprise. The ignorant and easily swayed agricultural class, forming the bulk of the population, have political influence in inverse ratio to their numbers, so that political exploitation of this element is the great imponderable of the future. In spite of deliberate efforts by the government to transfer their loyalty from the king to the constitution, many of the Thai people, especially in the northeast, are not even aware that a revolution has taken place. The indifference of the people to public life, as shown at the polls, has made it far harder to effect changes than the revolutionaries ever imagined. Certainly the days of absolutism have gone, and there is no element in the country that seriously wants them back. The main question that remains is which faction among the revolutionaries will contrive to seize permanent power, and present odds are on the army. Whether this jockeying for internal control will have the inadvertent effect of drawing in an outside force that will resolve the issue in its own favor is a question of the future whose paramount importance local disputants are now beginning to appreciate.

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## THE I.P.R. INQUIRY SERIES

At the invitation of the Institute of Pacific Relations, scholars in many countries have been engaged since early in 1938 in the preparation of studies forming part of an Inquiry into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East. The purpose of this Inquiry is to provide an impartial and constructive analysis of the major issues which may have to be considered in any future adjustment of international relations in that area.

The studies include an account of the economic and political conditions which led to the outbreak of fighting in July 1937, with respect to China, to Japan and to the other foreign Powers concerned; an evaluation of developments during the war period which affect the policies of all the Powers in relation to the Far Eastern situation; and, finally, an estimate of the principal political, economic and social conditions which may be expected in a post-war period, the possible forms of adjustment which might be applied under these conditions, and the effects of such adjustments upon the countries concerned.

The Inquiry does not propose to "document" a specific plan for dealing with the Far Eastern situation. Its aim is to present information in forms which will be useful to those who lack the time or expert knowledge to study the vast amount of material now appearing in a number of languages. A list of Inquiry studies already completed appears on the following pages.

